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ABSTRACT
Within the field of psycholinguistics there are those who argue for a close relationship between
working memory capacity (WMC) and syntactic processing (Just and Carpenter, 1992) and those
who argue that there is no such relationship (Waters and Caplan, 1996b; 2004). Despite years of
research, empirical data has yet to settle this disagreement, perhaps because a number of
methodological differences between studies from each side make direct comparisons of data
nearly impossible. The current study was designed to partially replicate three previous studies
using their own experimental sentence types in a self-paced word-by-word reading paradigm in
order to examine the effects of several methodological factors, including judgment type and
object-relative clause construction, on performance in the syntactic processing task. In
Experiment 1 we used Just and Carpenter’s (1992) true/false judgment and found data
theoretically consistent with their main results which supported a relationship between WMC
and syntactic processing, but only for sentence sets constructed in the manner of Waters and
Caplan (1996b; 2004). In Experiment 2 we used Waters and Caplan’s (1996b; 2004)
acceptability judgment with the same stimulus sets and found no support for a WMC-syntactic
processing relationship. Finally, in Experiment 3 we used a grammaticality judgment with the
same stimulus sets and once again found no support for a WMC-syntactic processing
relationship. Together, the results of all three experiments suggest that a number of
methodological factors that have been previously considered irrelevant in the syntactic
processing task in fact produce significant changes in the results that in turn alter the conclusions
drawn. In particular, we found evidence that judgment type can alter overall reading times,
suggesting that task demands may cause participants to alter their processing strategies in the
task. Our results also illustrate that the pattern of results can depend largely upon the method of
object-relative clause construction used for the task.
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE SYNTACTIC PROCESSING CONTROVERSY
1.1 Syntactic Processing
Human language is an incredibly rich and complex code used for the storage,
organization, and communication of ideas. Successful production and comprehension of human
language requires the capacity to process and integrate a number of interconnected types of
information (e.g., phonology, semantics, syntax, pragmatics, etc.) within a short period of time.
The question that has long plagued language researchers is: To what extent is the capacity to
process and integrate linguistic information domain-specific? In other words, is it the case that
special cognitive mechanisms and neural substrates are devoted exclusively to the processing and
integration of linguistic information, or is it the case that domain-general mechanisms and
resources perform these functions for linguistic information just as they do for other types of
information?
The proposed answers to this major theoretical question are closely linked with theories
of language acquisition, which are of necessity also concerned with issues of domain-specific
and domain-general skills and knowledge, as well as external influences (e.g., linguistic input)
and natural laws that govern things such as anatomy and stimulus properties (Berwick, Pietroski,
Yankama, & Chomsky, 2011). Disagreements amongst various acquisition theories typically boil
down to the extent to which each of these factors is believed to be responsible for both
commonalities and differences in language acquisition. In other words, while it is the case that
all typically developing individuals who are not artificially deprived of linguistic input will
acquire a language, they do not all acquire the same language, and thus any comprehensive
theory of acquisition must explain how this is so.
One theory of language acquisition, popular with linguists, is the nativist or generativist
perspective. According to generativists, the basis of language proficiency is the possession of a
grammar (i.e., a set of rules that determines what is considered to be a well-formed sentence and
what is considered ill-formed). Moreover, generativists argue that possession of a grammar is
necessarily innate because linguistic input is too impoverished to provide sufficient opportunity
to learn what must be learned in order to produce an infinite variety of utterances from the finite
pool of components (Chomsky, 1965, 1986). To put it another way, generativists argue that
generalization from directly experienced linguistic exemplars is insufficient to account for the
development of the full expressive potential of a language. This “poverty of the stimulus” (POS)
argument leads to the logical conclusion that innate factors must weigh more heavily in the
acquisition of a language than do external factors. In particular, generativists argue for an inborn
set of potential parameters for language, known as Universal Grammar, and a domain-specific
mechanism by which any given individual is guided to appropriate parameter settings by their
linguistic experience, known as the Language Acquisition Device (Chomsky, 1965). That is,
Universal Grammar is argued to contain a finite set of potential grammatical rules for human
languages, and by means of exposure to a language in childhood, an individual’s Language
Acquisition Device becomes set on the particular rules appropriate for that language.
The generativist view is thus a theory that relies heavily upon innate domain-specific
skills and knowledge to explain how an individual comes to acquire a language, and this has
important implications for the generativist view of language processing in adults. In particular,
the generativist view assumes a fairly invariant level of linguistic competence in native speakers
of a particular language and discounts factors that might lead to individual differences in
language use, such as memory constraints (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999).
1

Support for the generativist view typically comes from linguistic arguments explaining
transformed grammatical structures such as Chomsky’s (1968) “polar interrogatives.” To
illustrate this sort of argument, Berwick et al. (2011) use the example of how native English
speakers invariably know that the answer to 5a below is 5b rather than 5c, even though
technically the auxiliary verb can could be modifying either fly or eat because both 5b and 5c are
grammatical utterances.
(5a) Can eagles that fly eat?
(5b) Eagles that fly can eat.
(5c) Eagles that can fly eat.
According to Berwick et al. (2011) and other generativists, the fact that English speakers
do not select 5c as the answer to 5a is due to rules in the grammar about the location in which
words of certain grammatical classes can be generated and how those words can be deleted or
moved within the general grammatical framework (these rules are referred to as the deep
structure of a sentence). Generativists thus argue that the reason that 5b is the unambiguous
answer to 5a is that the auxiliary verb can is generated under ‘S’ rather than in the verb phrase of
5b, and because of this it can be moved in order to form the question 5a, while in 5c can is
generated within a complementizer phrase modifying the main subject, eagles, a location from
which it cannot be moved to create question 5a. The Figure 1.1.1 below demonstrates this
difference in the generation position of can.

Figure 1.1.1. The (simplified) deep structures of question 5a (left) and sentences 5b (middle) and
5c (right).
The generativist argument is that movement rules such as those demonstrated above are
part of the innate, abstract grammar and cannot possibly be learned from the imperfect and
incomplete input that human children are exposed to while acquiring their native languages.
Furthermore, such rules are similar across a variety of languages, suggesting some common core
of an abstracted form of language that persists across wide variation in personal experiences with
specific languages.
In contrast to the generativist view is the probabilistic constraints framework which sees
the task of language acquisition as a matter of learning to use a language rather than a matter of
grammatical parameter setting (Seidenberg, 1997). According to this framework, language is
governed by probabilistic constraints at all levels of representation and these constraints are
learnable through the engagement of domain-general statistical learning mechanisms that are
active when an individual is attempting to comprehend and produce language (Seidenberg &
MacDonald, 1999). In this functionalist approach, language acquisition begins with the encoding
of the basic form-meaning associations required for producing and comprehending utterances
2

into neural networks. As these neural networks are used and elaborated, other properties such as
morphology and syntax emerge (e.g., Allen & Seidenberg, 1999). The probabilistic constraints
framework thus explains the ability to make judgments about the grammaticality of a sentence as
the result of differing outputs of the neural network rather than as dependent upon abstract,
innate knowledge of a grammar (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999).
According to Seidenberg and MacDonald (1999), the appeal of the probabilistic view is
that it incorporates domain-general factors, such as memory limitations, that have demonstrable
impacts on language performance, in contrast to the generativist view’s focus on the idealized
speaker that abstracts away from language in use to language in theory. By focusing on the
competence model of an idealized speaker, the generativist view separates the causes of errors in
production and comprehension from domain-specific linguistic processes. Thus in the
generativist view, errors are caused by factors extrinsic to the grammar. The probabilistic
constraints view, on the other hand, incorporates the causes of errors into the process of
producing and comprehending language, and thus embeds domain-specific skills and knowledge
within the domain-general influences that are present in the real-world linguistic context.
Because of this, the probabilistic constraints view limits itself to providing an explanation of
utterances that people can and do produce, rather than the unusual and complicated constructions
that are theoretically possible within a grammar, but that are rarely actually produced outside of
the context of linguistic studies (e.g., The cat that the dog that the girl who Willard loves bought
chased is now sitting on the windowsill.; Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999).
While the support for the generativist view comes from looking at how native speakers of
a language judge grammaticality and extrapolates backwards from this data to propose the POS
argument, support for the probabilistic constraints view moves in the opposite direction by
looking at how properties of linguistic stimuli can support the acquisition of complex and
abstract linguistic knowledge. Specifically, linguistic stimuli contain statistical information such
as transitional probabilities that have been shown to be useful in segmenting words from
continuous speech streams in both infants (Saffran, Newport, &Aslin, 1996) and adults (Mirman,
Magnuson, Graf Estes, & Dixon, 2008; Thiessen, 2010). Statistical information in language input
has also been demonstrated to support the acquisition of syntax (i.e., the rules for arranged words
and phrases into well-formed sentences) in children (Kidd, 2012) because it provides access to
distributional cues in the language (Thiessen & Erickson, 2013) that results in the same ability to
judge the grammaticality of sentences that generativists attribute to the abstract grammar
(Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999). Furthermore, statistical learning is not specific to language,
but rather is a domain-general learning strategy (Yang, 2004) subject to domain-general
constraints (Thiessen, 2011).
Returning to the example of polar interrogatives above, probabilistic constraints theorists
would argue that it is not the case that generation and movement rules in an abstract grammar
account for the finding that sentence 5b is unambiguously the answer to question 5a (i.e., the
generativist argument), but rather that such decisions are based upon differential outputs of
neural networks trained on statistical and distributional regularities in the linguistic input
(Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999). That is, when asked the question 5a, the neural network will
produce an output consistent with 5b and not consistent with 5c based solely off the combined
calculations of distributional properties at multiple level of representation.
Sensitive to the criticism that their theory does not do enough to account for individual
differences in language production and comprehension, linguists from the generativist
perspective have proposed separations amongst linguistic information that allow the different
3

types (e.g., morphology, syntax, pragmatics) to be processed in different ways. These exact
divisions vary somewhat depending upon the researcher presenting the argument, but there
seems to be a certain amount of consensus for the position that the processing of syntactic
information operates independently of the processing of things like semantics and pragmatics
(Fodor, 1988). These linguistic arguments have in turn been incorporated into psycholinguistic
theories of sentence processing and comprehension that make predictions about the relationship
between the domain-specific processing of syntax and domain-general skills such as Working
Memory Capacity (WMC). Specifically, Just and Carpenter (1992) have argued that syntactic
processing requires recruitment of a general verbal working memory resource that is used for all
types of linguistic information because it involves not only short term maintenance of
information, but also manipulation of that information and storage of intermediate processing
outputs. On the other hand, there are psycholinguists who maintain that syntactic processing,
guided by innate grammar, is both automatic and obligatory (Waters & Caplan, 1996a) and thus
occurs without recruiting the same resource that is used to process other types of linguistic
information (Caplan, Waters, & Dede, 2007).
These two psycholinguistic theories make very different predictions about the outcome of
a number of experimental manipulations that will be explained further below. Furthermore, the
predictions of both sides have been tested a number of times over the years. Yet somehow it
remains unclear which theory more accurately describes human syntactic processing and its
relationship to domain-general skills. In the current work we propose that this lack of clarity is
largely an effect of simple, yet profoundly important methodological choices that have
delineated studies from the two perspectives. Furthermore, by closely examining and testing
these methodological differences, the current work is able to demonstrate that the answer you get
when asking which resources are involved in syntactic processing depends largely upon how you
choose to manipulate and measure processing and how you choose to look at the data produced.
1.2 Measurement of Syntactic Processing
In order to fully describe the two competing psycholinguistic theories of syntactic
processing, it is necessary to describe the predictions they make about performance on syntactic
processing tasks. While the particular methodologies used to create and present these tasks vary,
as will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2, a brief introduction to the general syntactic
processing task will be of use during the discussion of the theories.
In a syntactic processing task, participants are asked to read or listen to a variety of
sentences and then make judgments about each (variations in judgment type will be discussed
further in Chapter 2). Depending upon how the task is set up, there are three dependent variables
that may be of interest: reading/listening time, judgment reaction time, and judgment accuracy.
The set of sentences presented to participants is manipulated so that some sentences are simple
and some are complex, and differences in the three dependent measures are expected as
complexity increases.
There are a number of ways to manipulate sentence complexity. Main clause sentences
such as “The woman went out last night.” are the simplest type of sentence, involving as they do
a straight-forward word order. One method of increasing the complexity level of a sentence
involves embedded clauses of various types into such sentences. For example, a subject-relative
clause is one that is inserted into a main clause sentence to modify the main subject of the
sentence (e.g., “The woman that called a friend went out last night,” where “that called a friend”
is modifying “the woman”). A second type, more complex type of clause is known as an objectrelative clause. Object-relative clauses modify the subject of the sentence by making it the object
4

of a subordinate clause. An example of an object-relative clause would be something like “The
woman that I phoned went out last night.” In this sentence, “the woman” is simultaneously the
subject of the main verb, “went out,” and the object of the clause “that I phoned.” Using one
element to fulfill two roles in a sentence increases the complexity of a subordinate clause,
making object-relative clauses more complex than subject-relatives (which in turn are more
complex than main clauses). King and Just (1991) argued that object-relatives are also more
complex than subject-relatives because they interrupt the main clause, requiring that the
individual temporarily stop processing the main clause in order to process the relative clause,
thus necessitating temporary storage of main clause information while the relative clause is
processed, whereas subject-relative clauses do not require such a pause due to the head noun’s
role as the subject of both clauses.
In addition to embedding clauses of varying types, sentence complexity can also be
increased by introducing syntactic ambiguity. One common way to accomplish this is by
reducing embedded clauses. Reduction of a clause simply means removing any pronouns or
complementizers (that, which, whom, etc.) that typically introduce the clause (e.g., The woman I
phoned went out last night.). How ambiguous a reduced clause is depends upon its structure. The
previous example might still be easily understood after being reduced, but something like “The
horse raced past the barn fell,” is typically far more difficult to parse. This difficulty arises
because the verb within the relative clause, “raced”, could be the main verb of the sentence (e.g.,
The horse raced.) or it could be a past participle used in the relative clause to modify the subject
of the main clause (i.e., the horse that did race). In fact, this second interpretation is the accurate
one, but a reader does not know this until encountering the final word of the sentence (which also
happens to be the main verb), “fell.”
A simple main effect of increasing complexity on the three dependent measures of the
syntactic processing task (reading/listening time, judgment reaction time, and judgment
accuracy) is not in dispute. It is generally accepted that more complex sentences take longer to
read/listen to, longer to react to, and result in lower accuracy than simple sentences, whatever the
theoretical background of the researcher. Essentially, it is not a matter of debate that complex
sentences are harder than simple ones. What is in dispute is whether complex sentences are
disproportionately harder for some people than for others, and if they are, why this should be so.
This issue will be explained in more depth below.
1.3 Single Resource Theory
The first psycholinguistic model of syntactic processing is the capacity theory proposed
by Just and Carpenter (1992) (to be referred to here as “single resource theory”). In this model, it
is assumed that each element (i.e., stored words or phrases, syntactic structures, computations,
etc.) of a sentence requires a certain level of activation to be processed successfully. Some
elements require more activation and others require less, but all contribute to the overall demand
of the sentence. Because sentences vary in the number of elements they contain and the
activation required by each element, they also vary in the amount of overall activation required
to successfully process them. Thus, sentences with more complex syntactic structures or with a
greater number of words will have higher activation demands than syntactically simple, short
sentences.
In addition to variability in the activation demands imposed by sentences, there is natural
variability amongst individuals in the maximum amount of activation they have available to meet
these demands, according to single resource theory. Furthermore, the theory holds that this
individual variability should interact with sentence demands. When the activation demands of
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sentential elements are low, even individuals with lower levels of maximum available activation
should have enough of it on hand to enable fast, parallel processing of the sentence as a whole,
resulting in high levels of judgment accuracy as well as relatively fast reading/listening and
reaction times. However, as sentential demands increase and begin to tax available activation,
trade-offs between storage and processing elements are required to avoid exceeding the
maximum. One trade-off that may occur is that between speed and accuracy. This means that
processing of all sentential elements may be slowed down significantly so that all elements still
consume a share of the available activation, but complete processing of each element requires
longer than it would if there were more activation available. The results of this trade-off would
be slowed reading/listening and reaction times accompanied by high comprehension accuracy.
A second trade-off that could occur when overall demands are high could result in highdemand elements (e.g., pragmatic cues, complex syntactic structures, etc.) being dropped from
the processing queue entirely in favor of processing less demanding elements. This type of tradeoff would not necessarily affect reading/listening and reaction times on a task, but would
certainly result in decreases in comprehension accuracy. This pattern of results, according to Just
and Carpenter (1992) could create the appearance of modular syntactic processing. In other
words, if a sentence’s activation demands are high enough relative to the individual’s available
activation to cause a trade-off where elements such as pragmatic cues are dropped entirely, then
comprehension data for that sentence would appear to support claims that pragmatic cues and
syntactic structures cannot be processed in parallel (i.e., because they were not being processed
in parallel in that particular sentence). Just and Carpenter (1992) would argue, however, that this
support would be faulty in that it is not the case that pragmatic cues can never be processed in
parallel with syntactic structure, only that the individual must have enough available activation to
do so.
The important theoretical takeaway from this model of demands and trade-offs in
syntactic processing is that all of the elements of a sentence (e.g., syntax, semantics, pragmatics,
etc.) are thought to be handled by the same resource, which we will refer to as general verbal
working memory (gvWM). In their original paper, Just and Carpenter (1992) theorized that this
resource was located specifically in the domain-general central executive component of
Baddeley’s (1986) model of working memory. While it is beyond the scope of the current work
to delve deeply into the various models of working memory, and even more so to determine
which model is more accurate, the most relevant aspect of Just and Carpenter’s (1992) proposed
location of the gvWM resource is that it is domain-general. Because of this feature of the
resource, the single resource model can make a number of testable predictions about the
relationship between performance on syntactic processing measures and measures of domaingeneral working memory capacity (WMC) such as the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Readingspan task.
The most obvious prediction is that, if syntactic processing and WMC tasks both rely on
the same resource, then scores on the tasks that measure them should be strongly positively
correlated. Just and Carpenter (1992) report that some studies have found correlations of .5 to .6
between sentence comprehension tasks and the Reading-span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980;
Masson & Miller, 1983). A second prediction is that when the activation demands of a sentence
are high in relation to the activation available to the individual, performance on sentence
comprehension tasks will be lower in terms of accuracy and slower in terms of reading/listening
and reaction times. This means that performance should decline when complexity is increased
for everyone, but also that one should find that individuals with less available activation (i.e.,
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lower working memory capacity) should differ in terms of judgment accuracy as well as
reading/listening and reaction times from those with more activation available (i.e., higher
working memory capacity) when asked to process sentences with high activation demands (i.e.,
grammatically complex or long sentences). Several studies have found just such effects when
participants were divided into span groups based on reading span scores and their performance
on sentence comprehension tasks was compared (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992; King & Just,
1991; MacDonald et al., 1992). Furthermore, taxing the activation available to high capacity
individuals by imposing extra load during sentence processing (e.g., by requiring concurrent
maintenance of extra information) should decrease accuracy and cause increases to reaction and
reading times. This too has been observed experimentally (e.g., King & Just, 1991; MacDonald
et al., 1992).
Although there is empirical support for the single resource view, not all theorists agree
that this support is particularly convincing. Waters and Caplan (1996a) in particular take issue
with the interpretation of these data for several reasons, among them a seemingly consistent
failure to find three-way interactions between sentence structure, phrase, and working memory
capacity in the data that would support the prediction that increasing complexity differentially
impairs the performance of low-span individuals where processing load is highest. For this and
other reasons, Waters and Caplan (1996a) proposed their own model of syntactic processing,
here to be referred to as the “dual resource theory”.
1.4 Dual Resource Theory
In contrast to single resource theory, Waters and Caplan’s (1996a; see also Caplan et al.,
2007) dual resource theory holds that verbally mediated tasks such as sentence comprehension
and the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Reading-span task require the recruitment of two
separate cognitive resources, one to handle interpretive processes and one for post-interpretive
processes. Interpretive processes are defined by Waters and Caplan (1996a) as any processes
involved in the initial assignment of word meaning and syntactic structure during sentence
processing, while post-interpretive processes are those that involve verbal retrieval and explicit
reasoning. The authors argue that interpretive processes occur automatically and obligatorily in a
domain-specific resource referred to as syntactic verbal working memory (svWM) and that postinterpretive processes require the recruitment of a consciously controlled domain-general
resource referred to as general verbal working memory (gvWM).
Two important conclusions arise from the nature of these proposed resources. The first
conclusion is that there must be a strict separation between svWM and gvWM, rooted in their
automatic versus controlled natures and coupled with a strict non-separation between gvWM and
resources used for information in other domains. If dual resource theory is accurate, then
interpretive processes never recruit gvWM because the automatic nature of svWM means it is
always sufficient to handle them (and only them; svWM never handles post-interpretive
processing), but gvWM resources can be depleted by demands from other domains (e.g., visual
information). The second, related conclusion is that svWM capacity does not vary significantly
between individuals (an idea that harkens back to the competence assumption of the generativists
discussed earlier) because of its automatic nature, but gvWM does because of its effortful nature.
The distinction between automatic (svWM) and controlled (gvWM) processing has
important methodological implications in that it stands to reason that one must measure the two
processes differently. Almost by definition, interpretive processes must be measured online to
capture their automatic nature, while post-interpretive processes are necessarily reflected in
offline measures due to their controlled nature. Waters and Caplan (1996a) thus argue that
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comprehension questions such as those used in single resource studies (King & Just, 1991;
MacDonald et al., 1992; Just & Carpenter, 1992), which require further processing of the
question and reasoning to complete, are not in fact measuring the svWM resource as those
researchers would claim, but rather the gvWM resource. This overlap, they argue, is the reason
single resource researchers found any relationship between sentence comprehension tasks and
the Reading-span task. While this argument is quite valid in terms of questioning what
comprehension questions are actually measuring, it assumes that the single resource studies used
only comprehension accuracy as the critical measure of syntactic processing. This is not the case.
Just and Carpenter (1992), MacDonald et al. (1992), and King and Just (1991) also used firstpass or per-word reading times to support their hypotheses. It seems difficult to argue that
reading time, an online measure, is actually capturing the gvWM resource rather than the svWM
resource. Regardless of the appropriateness of this criticism of single resource studies, it is the
basis of Waters and Caplan’s (1996b) decision to use a different type of judgment,
acceptability/plausibility, in their measure of syntactic processing. This judgment, though still
offline because it comes at the end of each sentence, is thought to require less processing than
comprehension judgments and thus is considered more likely to be a measure of svWM. For
online measurement, these studies have relied either on mean per word reading times (calculated
by dividing total reading and reaction time by the number of words in the sentence),
reading/listening times for phrases, and judgment reaction times. The implications of these
modifications to both offline and online measures in the core syntactic processing task will be
discussed further in Chapter 2.
Given the theoretical disparities between the two models, it logically follows that dual
resource theory makes predictions that directly oppose those of the single resource theory.
Specifically, dual resource theory would predict that there should be no significant correlation
between sentence comprehension tasks and WMC tasks, provided that the sentence
comprehension tasks appropriately exclude offline measures that allow for the use of postinterpretive processing. Indeed, Waters and Caplan (1996b), Waters, Caplan, and Yampolsky
(2003), and Waters and Caplan (2004) all failed to find significant correlations between the
tasks. In terms of complexity, the dual resource theory does predict that complex sentences will
be associated with lower accuracy and longer reading times generally, but does not predict
performance differences between those who score low and high on measures of verbal working
memory capacity that would demonstrate a disproportionate decline in performance for low
scoring individuals wherever processing demands are highest (i.e., a three-way interaction
between capacity group, sentence type, and critical phrases). Waters and Caplan (1996b), Waters
et al. (2003), and Waters and Caplan (2004) all found that complex sentences result in lower
accuracy and longer reading times generally, and that low-span individuals are less accurate and
slower than high-span individuals overall, but they all failed to find the three-way interaction
(structure x phrase x span) predicted by single resource theory. Finally, dual resource theory
would predict no effect of cognitive load (i.e., storage of words or digits) on accuracy, reading
times, or reaction times during sentence comprehension tasks because cognitive load should tax
gvWM but not svWM. Waters et al. (2003) did not find an effect of digit load on syntactic
processing in their acceptability/plausibility task.
In summary, the single and dual resource perspectives make incompatible claims about
the recruitment of resource(s) during syntactic processing that should be easily distinguishable
with the use of syntactic processing and WMC tasks, yet use of these tasks has generated
contradictory empirical evidence. This is quite clearly problematic for both theories.
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One explanation for the contradictory empirical results may be that the cumulative effects
of a number of methodological differences have rendered them incapable of being directly
compared with each other. For example, single resource studies typically utilize a comprehension
judgment (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992), but dual resource studies typically use an
acceptability/plausibility judgment (e.g., Waters and Caplan, 1996b). While Waters and Caplan
(1996b) justify their judgment type by arguing it is more online than comprehension, no study
has yet directly compared the two judgment types to test this argument, nor is it clear what
effects this difference may have on the very nature of the syntactic processing task.
In addition to judgment types, single and dual resource studies vary in the types of
sentences included in the syntactic processing task and in how those sentences are presented. In
dual resource theory (and its studies), all complex structures are considered roughly equivalent in
how much harder they are than simple structures, so it should not matter precisely how one
constructs an object-relative sentence. In single resource theory, however, there is reason to
believe that things like word order, subject animacy, and verb bias affect the processing load of
the sentence, and so it stands to reason that such factors must be taken into account when
constructing object-relatives sentences for any syntactic processing task designed to fairly
distinguish between the two theories. Furthermore, careful consideration needs to be given to
how this fair syntactic processing task should be presented. As will be discussed in more depth
below, single and dual resource studies have varied in how precisely (if at all) they have
measured online processing both in terms of the tools used (e.g., eye-tracker vs. a computer
recording reaction times) and in terms of how they have broken up sentences for presentation
(e.g., whole sentences, phrases, word-by-word). It stands to reason that this variability is an
impediment to any definitive comparisons, most especially when one is trying to compare firstpass reading times directly measured (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992) with per-word reading
times estimated from judgment reaction times (e.g., Waters and Caplan, 1996b).
A second issue to consider is that of how the data from syntactic processing tasks is
examined. For one thing, it is typically the case that reading times are only examined for
correctly judged items. Because low-spans have much lower accuracy than high-spans, this
means more of their data gets dropped. This could be one reason for the dearth of significant
three-way interactions cited by Waters and Caplan (1996a) as a criticism of single resource
theory (inaccurately so in the case of MacDonald et al., 1992). Indeed King and Just’s (1991)
finding that 11 of 22 low-spans were ‘non-comprehenders’ of complex sentences suggests
exactly the disproportionate effect of syntactic complexity on low-span individuals that the threeway interaction is designed to test for. Another problem is that studies vary in exactly what
measures they use (accuracy, proportion, A', etc.), an issue to be revisited below.
Collectively, these concerns regarding methodological and data examination choices
suggest that it is premature to conclude that the empirical evidence for each theory is equally
strong. Rather, it seems to be the case that the jury must remain out on the question of what
resource(s) are required for syntactic processing until such time as empirical evidence is
provided that speaks to the effects, both individual and cumulative, of these issues. Thus, the
current work serves two purposes. The first purpose is to explain and critically examine the
methodological differences between core studies from the single and dual resource perspectives.
The second purpose is to use this examination to partially replicate key findings of previous
studies from both perspectives, thus allowing for direct comparisons of the resulting data. While
these comparisons do not definitively settle the core theoretical question at hand, they are at the
very least a solid first step in doing so.
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE LITERATURE
2.1 Single Resource Studies
The single resource theory was proposed based upon the results of three core studies:
King and Just (1991), MacDonald et al. (1992), and Just and Carpenter (1992). All three studies
used a syntactic processing measure with a comprehension judgment as well as the original
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span task, and found that those low and high in verbal
working memory capacity differed in their accuracy and reading times on the syntactic
processing task. In this section we will review the methodologies of these studies in some depth
in order to later highlight the many ways in which single resource studies differ from dual
resource studies.
In their first experiment, King and Just (1991) manipulated syntactic complexity by
creating target sentences with either a subject-relative clause (e.g., “The reporter that attacked the
senator admitted the error publicly after the hearing.”), or an object-relative clause (e.g., “The
reporter that the senator attacked admitted the error publicly after the hearing.”). Storage load
was also manipulated, by having participants read sets of one, two, or three sentences in which
the target sentence was always the final sentence of the set (i.e., storage load of 0, 1, or 2 words).
After each target sentence, participants answered a true/false comprehension question about it
and then reported all sentence-final words for the set. All sentences were presented visually, one
word at a time. Participants clicked a handheld switch in order to advance to the next word,
giving a measure of per-word reading time.
In addition to the sentence comprehension task, participants completed the Daneman and
Carpenter (1992) reading span task and were classified into span groups (low and high) based
upon their scores. As mentioned previously, in this task participants read sets of two to six
sentences before attempting to recall all sentence-final words at the end of the set. Span scores
are the highest set size for which participants can correctly recall all words for three of five sets.
In line with single resource theory, the researchers hypothesized that when the storage
and processing demands of sentences were too high for an individual’s capacity, performance
would suffer. In other words, they expected that low-span participants would have lower
comprehension accuracy on complex object-relative sentences as well as longer reading times in
critical areas where syntactic processing demands are highest (i.e., at the relative clause ending
and at the main verb). Additionally, they expected to find that extra storage load would impair
the performance of high-span individuals such that their accuracy and reading times would look
like low-span participants not under load. Load was also expected to impact low-span
participants, spurring even greater declines in performance up to the point of complete failure to
process.
Results showed that low-span participants were significantly lower in comprehension
accuracy than high-spans for both sentence types, but especially so for the complex objectrelative sentences. In fact, low-span participants’ comprehension was so low for object-relative
sentences that the researchers divided participants into two groups: comprehenders and noncomprehenders. Non-comprehenders were defined as those participants who scored within a 95%
confidence interval of chance performance. Eleven of the 22 low-span participants were
classified as non-comprehenders according to this cut-off, whereas only two of the 24 high-span
participants were. Load also affected comprehension performance, with accuracy decreasing as
load increased for all participants in complex object-relative sentences, and for low-span
participants even in simple subject-relatives.
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Per-word reading times in target sentences where a correct comprehension judgment was
made were analyzed at four points (the beginning of the relative clause, the end of the relative
clause, the main verb, and the final words of the sentence) in order to examine potential
differences between span groups in critical areas. Critical areas are those points at which greater
load is placed on processing resources by the demands of the syntactic structure. The relative
clause-ending area is critical in both subject- and object-relative sentences because it is the point
of clause resolution. Additionally, the main verb is a critical area for object- but not subjectrelative sentences because extra processing must occur in order to correctly assign the verb to its
subject. Overall, low-span comprehenders had longer reading times at all points of the target
sentences, but these differences were especially large (and statistically significant) in the critical
areas, with low-span comprehenders taking 60-ms longer at the critical area of subject-relative
sentences and 100-ms longer at each of the two critical areas in object-relative sentences. Lowspan non-comprehenders did not show these differences in the critical areas, suggesting they did
not spend the time required to process these demanding sentences, resulting in chance
comprehension performance.
Taken together, the results of the first experiment support the single resource theory of
syntactic processing by showing accuracy declines and reading times increase as the processing
and storage demands of sentences are increased by syntactic complexity and storage load, and
this is especially so for participants who are already low in available resources (i.e., low-span).
In their second experiment, King and Just (1991) were interested in determining whether
or not low-span individuals could take advantage of an additional cue within sentences to
compensate for their limited resources and thereby improve comprehension performance for
complex sentences. Object-relative sentences were created in which either both verbs (e.g., “The
robber that the fireman rescued stole the jewelry.”), the main verb only (e.g., “The robber that
the fireman detested stole the jewelry.”), the relative verb only (e.g., “The robber that the fireman
rescued watched the program.”), or neither verb (e.g., “The robber that the fireman detested
watched the program.”) were pragmatically biased by their likelihood of being associated with
their subjects (i.e., “rescue” is more likely to be associated with “fireman”, while “stole” is more
likely to be associated with “robber”).
Each sentence was presented in the same self-paced word-by-word manner as in the first
experiment, but this time target sentences were always presented individually, eliminating the
extra storage load factor. Participants once again answered true/false comprehension questions
following each sentence. For half the sentences, the true/false question tested comprehension of
the relative clause while for the other half, the main clause was tested. Participants also
completed the reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and were classified into low- and
high-span groups based upon their scores.
The researchers reasoned that low-span participants ought to be able to use pragmatically
biased verbs in place of complex syntactic computations to improve their comprehension
accuracy because simple retrieval of pragmatic associations between nouns and verbs should be
less resource demanding, especially when the cue was provided at exactly that point in the
sentence where it would be most useful, eliminating any extra storage demands. Accordingly, it
was expected that low-span participants’ comprehension accuracy would be equivalent to that of
high-spans when both verbs were biased, but lower when neither verb was biased. In sentences
where only one verb was biased, it was predicted that only the relative verb would improve
performance because it, unlike the main verb, occurred at exactly the point it where its pragmatic
association could be most useful (i.e., the end of the relative clause). This pattern of results
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would contradict the dual resource theory, because this theory would predict that even complex
syntactic processing should be automatic and obligatory, and therefore it should not be the case
that low-span individuals can forgo it and use pragmatic cues instead. In terms of reading time, it
was not necessarily expected that the pragmatic cue would have much impact in terms of
speeding processing in the critical areas because it might not be incorporated rapidly enough to
show online effects. A lack of such an online effect may be seen as compatible with the dual
resource theory in that it could be argued that any comprehension increases are due to offline
post-interpretive processes rather than a trade-off between syntactic and pragmatic processing
online. Finally, no effect of the pragmatic cue was expected in the high-span group because these
participants should not need to use it, as they have sufficient capacity to handle the syntactic
computations of the complex sentences.
The comprehension accuracy results showed that overall, low-span participants
performed worse than high-span participants, though all participants showed high
comprehension accuracy when the true/false question was testing comprehension of the main
clause. This high accuracy was somewhat lessened when neither verb was pragmatically biased
(around 80%). When the relative clause was tested, the accuracy of high-span participants
remained high in all verb biasing conditions, but low-span participants’ accuracy was high only
when the relative verb or both verbs were pragmatically biased. In fact, when pragmatic bias was
either absent or placed on the main verb, low-span individuals’ accuracy dropped significantly
(by 10 to 15 percent).
Per-word reading times were examined for the same four sentence areas as in the
previous experiment and reported collapsed across verb biasing conditions. The only significant
difference between span groups occurred at the second critical area (i.e., the main verb) where
low-span participants took 116-ms longer than high-span participants. There was no longer a
significant difference at the clause-ending area. Recall from the first experiment that the clauseending area was considered to be critical in both subject- and object-relative sentences, whereas
the main verb area is only critical in the object-relative sentences. This suggests that low-span
participants were able to utilize the pragmatic cue to reduce the load associated with the relative
clause, without affecting the load associated with processing at the main verb. This finding
contradicts the dual resource theory, which would explain the increased comprehension
performance as a result of pragmatic cues being used in post-interpretive processing rather than
online. Thus, both the comprehension and reading time results support the single resource theory.
Taken together, the results of both experiments show that low-span individuals are
reliably slower than high-spans at processing sentence areas with high syntactic demands as well
as less accurate in comprehension performance, especially when the relative clauses is being
tested and there are no readily available pragmatic cues to assist in interpretation. These results
are consistent with the single resource theory of syntactic processing. However, because there
was no three-way interaction between complexity, phrase, and span group, Waters and Caplan
(1996a) argue that these results are actually compatible with the dual resource view.
In a second study testing the single resource model, MacDonald et al. (1992) manipulated
syntactic complexity in the sentence comprehension task by crossing two factors: clause
resolution and ambiguity. Clause resolution refers to the fact that for half the sentences, the first
verb was part of the main clause while for the other half, the first verb was part of the relative
clause. Of these two resolution types, main clause resolution is the more frequently used and is
thus the interpretation that is more likely to be initially activated when processing a sentence.
The second factor, ambiguity, refers to whether or not the first verb was amenable to both a main
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clause and a relative clause resolution. In unambiguous sentences, the first verb was either
clearly part of the main clause (e.g., “The experienced soldiers spoke about the dangers before
the midnight raid.”) or clearly part of the relative clause (e.g., “The experienced soldiers who
were told about the dangers conducted the midnight raid.”). In ambiguous sentences, however,
the first verb could be interpreted as either a past tense main clause verb (e.g., “The experienced
soldiers warned about the dangers before the midnight raid.”) or a past participle introducing a
reduced relative clause (e.g., “The experienced soldiers warned about the dangers conducted the
midnight raid.”). Which interpretation is correct is unclear until one encounters either the
prepositional phrase “before the midnight raid” or the second, unambiguous verb “conducted.”
Because they allow for two interpretations, ambiguous sentences should be generally more
difficult to process than unambiguous sentences.
All four sentence types (unambiguous main clause, unambiguous relative clause,
ambiguous main clause, and ambiguous relative clause) were presented in a self-paced, word-byword manner and participants answered a yes/no comprehension question at the end of each. In
addition to the sentence comprehension task, working memory capacity was measured using the
reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).
The researchers were most interested in performance differences between low- and highspan participants on ambiguous, main clause resolved sentences. Because main clause resolution
is the preferred initial interpretation of a sentence, it should be the case that unambiguous
versions of these sentences are processed quickly and with high accuracy. However, the
researchers hypothesized that when main clause resolution sentences contained ambiguous first
verbs, individuals with sufficient capacity (i.e., high-span) would also activate and maintain the
less preferred, relative clause interpretation until disambiguating information was provided,
whereas those without sufficient capacity (i.e., low-span) would not. This activation of
alternative interpretations in high-span participants was expected to be associated with a cost in
terms of longer reading times for the disambiguating region of these sentences, but both span
groups were expected to be highly accurate in terms of comprehension judgments because of the
main clause resolution.
High-span participants were also expected to have longer reading times for ambiguous,
relative clause resolved sentences; however, because the less preferred resolution turns out to be
the correct one in these sentences and low-span individuals do not have this interpretation at the
ready, the increased reading times were expected to be accompanied by significantly higher
accuracy rates in the high-span group. No span group differences were predicted for
unambiguous versions of relative clause resolved sentences.
The comprehension accuracy results showed that all participants had higher error rates on
ambiguous than on unambiguous sentences, as expected. In main verb resolved sentences,
accuracy did not differ between span groups on either unambiguous or ambiguous sentences.
There was also no effect of span for unambiguous sentences with relative clause resolution. For
ambiguous relative clause resolved sentences, however, there was a significant difference
between low- and high-spans, with the latter showing significantly lower error rates.
Per-word reading times were examined for three sentence areas: the first verb, the
disambiguating region, and the last word of the sentence. The critical region was defined as the
region where the disambiguating information was provided, as this area should trigger the
processing required to choose an interpretation for the sentence. High-span reading times were
approximately 160-ms longer than low-span times for ambiguous sentences with main clause
resolution and approximately 130-ms longer for ambiguous relative clause resolved sentences.
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However, these increased reading times were found at the last word of the sentence rather than at
the area defined as critical by the researchers. Despite their location, it is important to note that
these reading times did show the critical three-way interaction (complexity x phrase x span
group) that supports the single rather than dual resource theory.
The accuracy rates clearly support the single resource theory by showing lower
performance on complex structures (i.e., ambiguous and relative clause resolved sentences) for
those low in capacity. Additionally, although reading times did not increase exactly where
expected, these results do support the single resource model by supporting the contention that
those with the capacity to do so (i.e., high-span participants) activate multiple syntactic
interpretations in order to correctly process ambiguous sentences, whereas those without such
capacity (i.e., low-span) do not, and by exhibiting the critical three-way interaction.
A second experiment was conducted to rule out the possibility that the high-span
performance was due to either a task-specific strategy activated by the knowledge that at least
some sentences in the task did have a relative clause resolution or to linguistic characteristics of
the verbs, such as permitted argument structures (i.e., the number of elements that may be
involved in the action of the verb; MacDonald, et al., 1992). Strategy use was controlled by
presenting high-span participants with only main clause resolution sentences. Verb
characteristics were controlled by constraining argument structures with the inclusion of proper
nouns in half the sentences, thereby ruling out relative clause interpretations (e.g., “Colonel
Wilson spoke/warned about the dangers before the midnight raid.”). High-span participants still
spent more time reading at the end of ambiguous sentences than at the end of unambiguous
sentences, though this effect was attenuated in sentences with proper nouns. The authors
interpret these results as ruling out a strategy development explanation as well as indicating that
it is the possibility of a relative clause interpretation (provided by the common noun) that
explains performance changes for high-span participants, rather than specific properties of the
ambiguous verbs used in the first experiment.
Finally, MacDonald et al. (1992) conducted a third experiment to determine whether or
not participants would activate and maintain dual interpretations for ambiguous sentences when
overall storage load between the verb and disambiguating information was increased by
increasing sentence length. Stimulus sentences from the first experiment were modified to create
long versions by adding three words to each (e.g., Short version: “The experienced soldiers
warned about the attacks conducted the midnight raid.”; Long version: “The experienced soldiers
warned about the surprise enemy guerilla attacks conducted the midnight raid.”). The sentence
comprehension task was otherwise identical to that in the first experiment. As before,
participants were divided into span groups based upon their scores on the reading span task
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).
The results of the first two experiments were replicated for the short version sentences.
That is, high-span participants had longer reading times for both main and relative clause
resolved ambiguous sentences, as well as higher comprehension accuracy for relative clause
resolved ambiguous sentences. The effect of ambiguity on reading times for ambiguous
sentences virtually disappeared in the long version sentences, such that high-span participants no
longer reliably differed from low-span participants, suggesting that high-spans were no longer
maintaining the alternative interpretation that had previously slowed processing of these
sentences. As expected, accuracy for long main clause sentences was equivalent across groups,
yet it was still the case that high-spans showed higher comprehension accuracy for ambiguous
relative clause sentences. This finding is difficult to reconcile, if the assumption is that
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participants are only more accurate on relative clause sentences if they can maintain both
interpretations, yet the main clause reading time results suggest that high-span individuals were
no longer doing so. One possible explanation for this may be that high-span participants could
more quickly re-activate the relative clause interpretation because it had previously been
activated before being abandoned, and that this was what allowed accuracy to remain high.
Despite this potential anomaly in the results, the researchers concluded on the basis of the overall
reading time data that this experiment provided evidence that that high-span individuals do
abandon the alternative interpretation when their capacity is further taxed by the storage
demands of the sentence, a conclusion in line with predictions of the single resource model.
Taken together, the results of the three experiments of MacDonald et al. (1992) support
the single resource view of syntactic processing by suggesting that high-span participants engage
in more demanding syntactic processing (i.e., activating dual representations) in order to achieve
higher comprehension accuracy than low-span individuals.
The studies by King and Just (1991) and MacDonald et al. (1992) both support the single
resource theory by demonstrating that span groups formed using scores on the standard reading
span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) differ in their performance on comprehension tasks that
manipulate the activation demands during sentence processing through syntactic complexity and
storage load, in terms of both accuracy and reading times. This relationship between the two
tasks contradicts the idea that syntactic processing is performed by an isolated resource (svWM)
(Caplan et al., 2007). To further demonstrate this point, Just and Carpenter (1992) conducted an
experiment to replicate a prior study by Ferreira and Clifton (1986) on the use of pragmatic cues
during garden path sentence processing. In the original study, participants read garden path
sentences (i.e., sentences with reduced relative clauses and ambiguous first verbs, similar to
those found in MacDonald et al., 1992) containing head nouns that were either animate or
inanimate (e.g., “The defendant/evidence examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.”). Animacy
is a pragmatic cue (i.e., a non-syntactic cue) that constrains the potential interpretations of
syntactically ambiguous sentences, and thus should enable participants to avoid being led down
the garden path (i.e., to an incorrect interpretation of the sentence) during the comprehension
task if they are able to use it during online processing. Specifically, inanimate head nouns, in
combination with the verbs used in the task sentences, should trigger the object-relative clause
interpretation from the start of the sentence, resulting in faster and more accurate processing.
Ferreira and Clifton (1980) were surprised to discover that their participants did not make use of
the animacy cue to disambiguate sentences, instead showing evidence of following the garden
path in the form of longer first-pass reading times for later portions of sentences where
disambiguating syntactic information was provided. This result supports the core idea of the dual
resource theory that syntactic processing is modular with respect to other types of linguistic
information. At issue, however, is the fact that Ferreira and Clifton (1980) did not measure
working memory capacity and thus had no way of determining if individual differences in
capacity affected performance. In their replication, Just and Carpenter (1992) addressed this
issue by having participants complete the standard reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter,
1980) and dividing participants into low- and high-span groups based upon their scores. Just and
Carpenter (1992) also made slight alterations to sentence comprehension task, by adding
sentences with unreduced relative clauses as a simpler, control structure, and by excluding any
sentences from the original task where the grammatical subject of the sentence could also be
interpreted as an instrument (i.e., sentences where the subject could be the one doing the action
or the means by which the action is accomplished). All of the sentences were presented all at
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once on a computer screen, with an eye-tracker recording fixations during reading. For each
sentence, participants answered a true/false comprehension question.
The primary variable of interest in this study was first-pass reading times. Overall, it was
expected that reading times would be longer for syntactically more complex garden path
sentences than for non-garden path sentences for both span groups. It was also expected that
high- but not low-span individuals would be able to take advantage of the animacy cue in garden
path sentences and thus show faster initial reading times on the disambiguating portion of these
sentences (i.e., the high span individuals would have used the inanimacy of the first noun to
correctly parse the sentence as a reduced relative on the first pass).
Fixation durations were examined for three sentence areas: the by phrase (e.g., “by the
lawyer”, the initial verb (e.g., “examined”), and the main verb (e.g., “shocked”). The by phrase
was considered the most critical area, as this is where disambiguating information is provided
and thus where processing demands should be highest for those who are unable to use the
animacy of the head noun to initially construct a correct interpretation for the sentence. Overall,
non-garden path sentence reading times were faster than those for garden path sentences. Firstpass reading times were also faster for sentences containing an inanimate head noun than for
those with animate head nouns, but only for high-span participants; low-span participants did not
show an effect of animacy. In subsequent reading times, this interaction of span and animacy at
the by phrase was no longer present.
These results support the single resource theory by demonstrating that high-span
participants can use non-syntactic pragmatic cues to correctly select a complex relative clause
interpretation during first-pass reading, whereas low-span individuals cannot use these cues until
later in processing. In other words, syntactic information and pragmatic information may only
appear modular when one does not have the capacity required to process both in parallel. This
conclusion is also supported by the second experiment of MacDonald et al. (1992), where proper
nouns were shown to also speed the processing of syntactically ambiguous sentences for highspan participants. However, there is an apparent contradiction when one compares the King and
Just (1991) experiment to the Just and Carpenter (1992) experiment, as pointed out by Waters &
Caplan (1996a), that must be discussed further. In King and Just (1991), low- but not high-span
participants used the pragmatic cue online, whereas in Just and Carpenter (1992) the high- but
not low-span participants did so. One explanation may be that high-span participants did actually
use the pragmatic cue in King and Just (1991), but their performance was already so high (above
80% regardless of the phrase being tested or the presence of pragmatic cues) that its use was not
reflected in their accuracy rates. Another explanation might be that the two types of pragmatic
cues are not directly comparable due to differences in the demands of the sentences containing
them. Both studies used object-relative sentences, which are more complex than subjectrelatives, but while Just and Carpenter (1992) further increased complexity by reducing the
relative clauses, King and Just (1991) decreased complexity by using unreduced clauses. Thus, it
could be the case that the combined results of these studies simply show that low-span
participants can use pragmatic cues in moderately complex (i.e., unreduced object-relative) but
not very complex (i.e., reduced object-relative) sentences because of the increased demands. A
second stimulus factor to consider is the placement of the pragmatic cues. King and Just (1991)
used pragmatically biased verbs placed near the ends of their sentences deliberately so that they
might contribute to processing exactly when needed, while Just and Carpenter (1992)
manipulated animacy of head nouns that were found at the very beginning of sentences,
necessitating maintenance of the animacy cue for the full duration of the sentence. This
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difference in storage load may have made the verb bias cue less demanding to use than the
animacy cue, and thus explain why low-spans could use one but not the other.
2.2 Dual Resource Studies
The evidence reviewed so far has supported Just and Carpenter’s (1992) single resource
theory by demonstrating that when activation demands during syntactic processing strain or
exceed the individual’s available capacity, comprehension accuracy declines while reading and
reaction times slow (although in some cases slowing can be associated with higher
comprehension, e.g., MacDonald et al., 1992). Still, not everyone agrees with the single resource
explanation for these results. One problem raised by Waters and Caplan (1996a) is that these
studies have failed to find statistically significant three-way interactions that would show a
disproportionate effect of syntactic complexity on low-span participants’ reading times in critical
sentence areas. This argument is technically accurate in regards to King and Just (1991) and Just
and Carpenter (1992),though it could be argued that the finding in King and Just (1991) that half
the low-span participants were so-called “non-comprehenders”, while only two in the high-span
group were, could be classified as a disproportionate effect despite the fact that reading times for
correctly comprehended sentences only did not show a significant three-way interaction, and
MacDonald et al. (1992) did find a significant three-way interaction of ambiguity, phrase, and
WMC.
Aside from statistical concerns about the single resource data, Waters and Caplan (1996a)
have also argued on theoretical grounds that any relationship found between sentence
comprehension tasks and the original reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) do not
necessarily reflect a shared resource for interpretive processing (svWM), but rather could be
attributed to recruitment of a more general resource used for post-interpretive processing
(gvWM) because of the nature of the offline comprehension questions, which presumably
require further processing to complete. While this argument merits further exploration, in that it
does seem likely that the demands of syntactic processing task judgments could affect results, it
should be noted that it does not account for the fact that online measurement of per-word/first
pass reading times in the Just and Carpenter (1992) showed an effect of working memory
capacity, as measured by the reading span task.
In support of these criticisms of single resource theory, dual resource theorists have
conducted their own studies to test the relationship between measures of syntactic processing and
measures of WMC by modifying both types of tasks in several potentially important ways. As
with the single resource studies, we will review three core dual resource studies in some depth in
order to highlight the methodological contrasts between studies from the two perspectives.
Waters and Caplan (1996b), Waters, Caplan, Alpert, and Stanczak (2003), and Waters and
Caplan (2004) all used modified versions of the sentence comprehension and reading span tasks
to examine syntactic processing resource(s). Although these studies all found main effects of
both syntactic complexity and working memory span, none demonstrated the vital three-way
interaction that would support the single resource prediction of a disproportionate effect of
complexity in low-span groups, nor did they find that additional storage load harmed syntactic
processing, as one would expect under single resource theory.
In the first of the core dual resource studies, Waters and Caplan (1996b) were interested
in replicating the results of MacDonald et al. (1992), but with certain changes in methodology.
Recall that in MacDonald et al. (1992) high-span participants had longer reading times, but also
higher comprehension rates than low-span participants when sentences were temporarily
syntactically ambiguous because they contained first verbs that could be interpreted either as a
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past tense main verb or as a past participle introducing a reduced relative clause. Waters and
Caplan (1996b) also included reduced relative clause sentences (e.g., “The horse raced past the
barn fell.”) in their syntactic processing measure, as well as two additional types of syntactically
ambiguous sentences, reduced sentential complements (e.g., “The defendant confided to the
lawyer he admired the judge was his brother.”) and reduced embedded clauses (e.g., “The picture
books were lying beside was a landscape.”). Non-garden path sentences were created for these
same clause types by including either unreducing clauses (referred to as “Non-garden path A”;
e.g., “The farmer who was leased a tractor ploughed.”) or non-ambiguous first verbs (referred to
as “Non-garden path B”; e.g., “The boy given a cookie was hungry.”).
In addition to these changes to syntactic structure, Waters and Caplan (1996b) modified
the syntactic processing measure by having participants complete acceptability judgments (i.e.,
responding “yes” when sentences made sense and “no” when they did not) for each sentence
rather than answer a comprehension question. Unacceptable sentences were created for each of
the clause types described above by inserting semantically incongruent words into garden path
(e.g., “The cookie fried the oven ate.”) and non-garden path A (e.g., “The waiter who was tipped
a wig quit.”) sentences.
Finally, Waters and Caplan (1996b) also modified the method of presentation for the
syntactic processing task. In their first experiment, participants between 50 and 80 years of age
were presented with the sentence comprehension task in one of two ways: whole sentence or
RSVP (rapid serial visual presentation). In the whole sentence condition, each sentence remained
displayed on the computer screen in full until participants made their acceptability judgments. In
the RSVP condition, each successive word appeared for 250-ms and participants made their
judgments after the last word of each sentence had disappeared.
Participants also completed a modified version of the reading span task consisting of
semantically acceptable (e.g., “It was the man that clenched the pillow.”) and unacceptable (e.g.,
“It was the toy that clenched the man.”) cleft subject sentences divided into sets from two to six.
Each set size was presented five times. For each sentence in a set, participants made an
acceptability judgment. After the last sentence of each set, participants were prompted to recall
the last word of each sentence in the set. Participants were then divided into low-, medium-, and
high-span groups based upon their scores on the modified reading span task.
In the whole sentence condition, the researchers expected that acceptability judgment
accuracy would be lower for garden path than for non-garden path sentences, and that high-span
participants would have higher accuracy than low-span participants on garden path sentences.
These predictions are compatible with both the single and dual resource theories. Predictions for
the RSVP condition are generally the same, that garden path performance should be less accurate
than non-garden path and that low-spans should be less accurate than high, but if single resource
theory is accurate, then it should be the case that the effect of working memory span is much
larger in the RSVP condition than in the whole sentence condition. This is because it has been
argued that the speed of the RSVP condition decreases processing resources (Miyake, Carpenter,
& Just, 1994) while also increasing storage load by disallowing reviewing of stimuli after the
first pass (Waters & Caplan, 1996b).
For acceptability judgments, A' scores were calculated. A' is a nonparametric sensitivity
index calculated by estimating the area under the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
An A' value of .5 would indicate chance performance, while a value of 1 would indicate perfect
discrimination on a forced-choice test (Pollack & Norman, 1964). A' values were analyzed with
a 3 (span) x 2 (presentation condition) x 3 (clause structure) x 3 (garden path status) ANOVA.
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There were main effects for each factor: low-span participants were less sensitive than mediumor high-spans, sensitivity was lower in the RSVP than in the whole sentence condition,
sensitivity was also lower for garden path than for non-garden path sentences, and sensitivity
was lower for the complement clause structure than for the embedded and reduced relative
structures. These main effects were qualified by significant two-way interactions. The structure
by span interaction showed that only low-span participants were less sensitive on complement
clause structures, whereas medium- and high-span participants were equally sensitive on all
structures. The structure by garden path status interaction showed that sensitivity on non-garden
path A and non-garden path B sentences did not differ in sentences with complement or
embedded clause structures, but that in sentences with reduced relative structures, sensitivity was
higher for non-garden path A. All other interactions were non-significant.
In addition to analyses of acceptability sensitivity, reaction times for sentences correctly
judged as acceptable were examined within presentation conditions. In the whole sentence
condition reaction times, which included the reading time for the entire sentence, were divided
by the number of words in each sentence to calculate a mean per-word reading time. Overall,
mean reading times were longer for garden path sentences than for both types of non-garden path
sentences in this condition. For embedded clause structure sentences, there was also a difference
between non-garden path sentence types such that mean reading times were longer for nongarden path A sentences. In the RSVP condition, reaction times to the final word of each
sentence, which included the reading time for that word, were examined. Reaction times for
garden path sentences were longer than for non-garden path sentences for all clause types. For
reduced relative clause sentences only, reaction times for non-garden path A sentences were
longer than those for non-garden path B sentences. There were no effects of working memory
span group for either condition.
Together, the accuracy and reaction time results confirmed that garden path sentences are
more difficult to process than non-garden path, that the RSVP condition was more difficult than
the whole sentence condition, and that low-span participants perform lower overall than
medium- and high-span participants. However, because the low-span participants were not
differentially impaired in the RSVP condition, the authors conclude that their lower performance
could not be attributed to differences in syntactic processing and thus the results are consistent
with the dual rather than single resource view.
Anticipating one potential criticism of the first experiment, that it was conducted with
older adults, Waters and Caplan (1996b) conducted two further studies with college-aged adults.
In these experiments, participants completed the same sentence comprehension task described
above, but only under RSVP presentation conditions. In one of these experiments, RSVP
presentation rate was set to 250-ms per word for one condition and to 170-ms per-word for
another. In the next experiment, RSVP presentation rate was set to 120-ms per word. These
speeded up rates were used in order to rule out the possibility that the RSVP condition was not
fast enough in the first experiment to produce the interaction predicted by the single resource
theory. In both follow-up experiments, participants were divided into high- and low-span groups
based upon scores of the standard reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) rather than
the modified version from the first experiment.
Acceptability results were similar to those in the first experiment. Low-span participants’
sensitivity scores were lower than those of high-span participants, meaning they had a more
difficult time discriminating acceptable from unacceptable sentences. In terms of structure,
performance was lower for garden path than for non-garden path sentences, and for complement
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clause sentences than for the other two types of clauses. Interestingly, performance on garden
path sentences was lower for the 250-ms than for the 170-ms RSVP condition.
Reaction times were also analyzed. At slower presentation rates (250-ms and 170-ms),
reaction times were longer for garden path sentences than for non-garden path sentences with all
clause structure types, and high-span participants had longer reaction times to garden path
sentences than did low-spans. In the 250-ms condition only, reaction times to complement
structures were longer than those to embedded and reduced relative clauses. In the fastest
presentation rate (120-ms) condition, garden path sentence reaction times were longer than nongarden path reaction times for both reduced relative and embedded clause structures, but not
complements. Also in this condition (120-ms), high-span participants showed longer reaction
times to garden path sentences than to both types of non-garden path sentences, but low-span
participants showed longer reaction times to garden path sentences only in comparison to nongarden path B sentences.
The fact that high-spans took longer, but were more accurate on garden path sentences
than low-spans is consistent with MacDonald et al.’s (1992) finding that high-span participants
maintain dual representations when possible in order to correctly parse ambiguous sentences.
However, because low-span participants in this study were not disproportionately impaired by
the faster RSVP rates, the author argue that the results are in fact consistent with the dual rather
than single resource view.
One potential problem in comparing Waters and Caplan (1996b) to the single resource
studies discussed above is that their measure of per-word reading time in the whole sentence
condition was actually a mean created by dividing reaction times by the number of words in a
sentence. Likewise in the RSVP condition, times were in fact reaction times recorded after
presentation of the last word of each sentence. These methods are problematic for direct
comparison in that they do not allow the measurement of individual differences in reading times
at specific points within sentences and because there is a well-known wrap-up effect that is
independent of syntactic complexity, whereby processing times at the ends of sentences are
longer (Balogh, Zurif, Prather, Swinney, & Finkel, 1998). In a later study, Waters and Caplan
(2004) did allow participants to control the rate at which stimuli the syntactic processing task
were presented, though sentences were in phrases rather than word-by-word.
In the first experiment of Waters and Caplan (2004), the syntactic processing task
contained items with four types of unreduced subordinate clauses: cleft-subject (e.g., “It was the
food that nourished the child.”), cleft-object (e.g., “It was the woman that the toy amazed.”),
subject-relative (e.g., “The father read the book that terrified the child.”, and object-relative (e.g.,
“The man that the fire injured called the doctor.”). Half the sentences were semantically
plausible and the other half were not (e.g., “It was the car that drove the woman.”). Sentences
were presented auditorily, spliced into phrases. Participants had to push a button to hear
successive phrases until the complete sentence was heard, at which time they made a plausibility
judgment (plausible? yes/no). Participants also completed a modified reading span task, a subset
of the task from Waters and Caplan (1996c). In this version of the reading span task, all
sentences contained cleft-subject clauses and semantic plausibility was varied. Sentences were
arranged in sets from two to six sentences long. Participants made plausibility judgments about
each sentence and recalled sentence-final words after the last sentence in each set. In the task
instructions, speed and accuracy on the plausibility judgment were stressed over storage of
sentence-final words. Participants were divided into low-, medium-, and high-span groups based
upon their scores on the reading span task.
20

According to Waters and Caplan (2004), single resource theory would predict a threeway interaction in this task, such that low-span participants should show longer listening times
for computationally demanding portions of complex sentences than high-spans (i.e., a
complexity x phrase x span group interaction). Dual resource theory would predict no such
interaction.
Listening times for trials where correct plausibility judgments were made were analyzed
for two syntactic complexity comparisons: cleft-subject vs. cleft-object and subject-relative vs.
object-relative (i.e., simple vs. complex comparisons). For both comparisons, listening times
were longer for the complex structure (i.e., cleft-object and object-relative) than for the simple
structure (i.e., cleft-subject and subject-relative) at the most capacity-demanding portion of the
sentences (i.e., the verb). There was also evidence of the wrap-up effect, where listening times
were longer for phrases at the end of sentences. In terms of group differences, low-span
individuals had longer listening times for the complex cleft-object sentences than either mediumor high-span participants, but no such difference existed for the complex object-relative
sentences. Low-span participants also showed longer listening times for the third noun phrase of
simple cleft-subject sentences.
Accuracy rates on the plausibility judgments were also examined. These results showed
that low-span participants were significantly less accurate than medium- and high-span
individuals for both of the complex structures (cleft-object and object-relative) but not for the
simple structures (cleft-subject and subject-relative).
Although this experiment did find differences on the syntactic processing task that were
related to working memory span group, they argue that these differences do not support single
resource theory for several reasons. The first reason is a criticism Waters and Caplan (1996a)
have applied to Just and Carpenter (1992) data: that there was not a significant three-way
interaction (Group x Sentence Type x Phrase). In other words, Waters and Caplan (2004)
maintain that if the data were to support single resource theory, there should be evidence that
syntactic complexity affects low-span individuals disproportionately more than it does mediumor high-span individuals. Another reason these data are interpreted as supporting dual rather than
single resource theory is that the low-span participants showed longer reading times for
sentences with both complex (cleft-object) and simple (cleft-subject) structures, albeit in
different regions. It is argued that this result indicates low-span individuals found the task harder,
but not syntactically harder. (This point is a confusing one to parse out, considering that the task
was to process syntax. If processing the syntax was not the difficult portion, then one wonders
what was difficult about the task, but this argument is not explained further.) Waters and Caplan
(2004) also considered the possibility that better measures of working memory capacity might be
required to find the relationship predicted by single resource theory. A second experiment was
conducted to address this issue.
In the second experiment of Waters and Caplan (2004), participants completed the same
syntactic processing task as in the first, with the exception that another simple structure was
added: subject-subject (e.g., “The law that favored the millionaire frustrated the workers.”).
These types of sentences were used by others (e.g., King & Just, 1991) and are considered a
better comparison structure for object-relative sentences (e.g., “The law that the millionaire
favored frustrated the workers.”) than the subject-relative structure from the first experiment
(e.g., “The millionaire favored the law that frustrated the workers.”) sentences because both
require the verb to be associated with the head noun across an intervening relative clause.
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In addition to the modified reading span task from the first experiment, three more
working memory measures were administered. A second reading span task was added that
differed from the first only in that it contained all complex rather than all simple sentences. The
third working memory task was an alphabet span task (Craik, 1986) in which participants hear
lists of words and are required to recall them in alphabetical order. The final working memory
task was a subtract 2 span task (Salthouse, 1988) in which participants are required to repeat
random sequences of digits after subtracting two from each. Participants were not separated into
span groups in this experiment, instead scores on the individual tasks and a composite of the
tasks were used to calculate correlations with performance on the syntactic processing task.
The predictions for this experiment were the same as the first. That is, if single resource
theory is accurate, there was expected to be a three-way interaction. A lack of such an interaction
would support the dual resource theory.
Listening times were examined only for those trials in which participants made correct
plausibility judgments. Once again, listening time results confirmed that participants listened
longer to complex than simple sentences (cleft-object longer than cleft-subject and subject-object
longer than both object-subject and subject-subject). As participants were not divided into span
groups, there were no data reported on specific listening times within groups. Instead,
correlational analyses are reported. Scores on all four working memory measures as well as a
composite score combining the four were analyzed for correlations with difference scores that
were obtained by subtracting listening times at specific regions (i.e., verbs or noun phrases) in
simple sentences from listening times in the same regions of complex sentences. None of these
correlations were significant, ranging from .008 to .16 in magnitude.
Taken together, Waters and Caplan (2004) argue that these two experiments support a
dual rather than single resource view. Again, the main reason for this is a lack of a three-way
interaction (span group x sentence type x phrase) showing disproportionate declines in
performance on complex sentences for low-span individuals in Experiment 1, but the conclusion
is also drawn from the lack of significant correlations in Experiment 2.
Recall that comparing performance on simple and complex sentences is but one test of
single resource theory. Just and Carpenter’s (1992) theory also predicts that increasing storage
load should affect performance during syntax processing. MacDonald et al. (1992) found that
increasing the number of words in sentences caused high-span participants to abandon their
strategy of holding alternate interpretations of ambiguous sentences in mind and King and Just
(1991) found that performance on the comprehension task declined as the number of sentencefinal words to be recalled increased. Waters, Caplan, and Yampolsky (2003) also decided to test
this prediction of single resource theory, using digit load. In this experiment, participants
completed the same syntactic processing task as that in Waters and Caplan (2004), presented in
the same auditory moving window paradigm (i.e., self-paced by phrases). All participants
completed the task under all three load conditions (no load, three digit load, and five digit load)
in three counterbalanced sessions. Working memory capacity was not measured, so participants
could not be divided into span groups. However, all participants have verbal working memory
capacity, measured or not, and presenting each participant with each level of load should still
provide a way to capture any potential effects of varying storage load on syntactic processing.
On the other hand, some effects may be hidden by the lack of measurement, because low-span
and high-span individuals might perform differently under each level of load.
The first analysis was on listening times for sentences that were correctly judged as
plausible. For all load conditions, there was a main effect of complexity such that listening times
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were longer at the verb area of complex (i.e., cleft-object and object-relative) sentences than in
simple (i.e., cleft-subject, subject-relative, and subject-subject) sentences. There was also a main
effect of load for all sentences, such that listening times were longer under five digit load than
under three digit load and longer in both load conditions than in the no-load condition. The threeway interaction of sentence type, phrase, and load condition was only significant when
comparing object-relative to subject-relative sentences by subjects, but not by items. In terms of
plausibility judgment accuracy, the only significant result was that accuracy was higher for the
simple cleft-subject sentences than for the complex cleft-object sentences. There was no effect of
load on plausibility judgments.
In light of the lack of evidence of a disproportionate effect of load on critical phrases
(i.e., the verb area), Waters et al. (2003) argue that these results are consistent with a dual rather
than single resource theory. One problem with this conclusion is that working memory capacity
was not measured. Individuals vary in the capacity they have available. Someone with a lower
capacity should show greater effects of three digit load than someone with a higher capacity
according to single resource theory, but we have no way to tell if this occurred in the Waters et
al. (2003) data. Furthermore, given that all sentences were unreduced, it could be the case that
sentences were not sufficiently complex to produce three-way interactions in critical areas, even
under load.
2.3 Neurological Evidence
The fact that all of the evidence reviewed to this point has been purely behavioral in
nature, regardless of whether it has been produced by single or dual resource theorists, should
not be taken as an indication that neurological predictions have not been made and tested by each
theory. Indeed, studies of brain function should be at least as useful in distinguishing between the
two theories as behavioral studies are because it should be possible to determine which brain
area(s) are involved in syntactic processing. However, as with behavioral studies, the
neurological evidence produced so far is somewhat mixed.
Functional dissociations exposed by brain disorders or trauma are one source of
information about brain areas involved in a variety of tasks. Several studies from the dual
resource perspective have suggested that patients with disorders which significantly impair
domain general resources such as WMC (e.g., aphasia, Alzheimer’s, etc.) retain their ability to
process complex syntactic structures, suggesting that there is indeed a dissociation between
domain-general resources (gvWM) and syntactic resources (svWM) (e.g., Rochon, Waters, &
Caplan, 1994; see Waters and Caplan, 1996a for a review). However, other researchers have
found that such patients do show deficits in syntactic processing if the items they are asked to
process are of sufficient complexity (Almor, Kempler, MacDonald, Anderson, & Tyler, 1999),
suggesting that the methodological issues here highlighted may have been at play in these
investigations as well.
Aside from patient data, brain activation during syntactic processing can also be assessed
with a variety of neuroscience techniques. For example, Martín-Loeches, Muñoz, Casado,
Melcón, and Fernández-Frías (2005) looked at ERP waveforms in response to grammatical
violations and complex grammatical structures presumed to tax WMC. Both manipulations
elicited identifiable negativities in the waveform, and these negativities differed qualitatively
from each other. However, the negativity associated with grammatical violations disappeared
when complexity was highest, suggesting that processing of violations and structure are
separable when demands are low but can interfere with each other when demands are high. This
conclusion is supportive of the single resource theory, but is not particularly convincing on its
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own, as it does not take into account individual differences in either syntactic processing or
WMC.
King and Kutas (1995) did assess individual differences by classifying participants as
‘poor’ or ‘good’ comprehenders on the basis of true/false comprehension item accuracy before
looking at ERP waveforms in response to simple and complex sentences. The authors found a
prolonged left anterior negativity (LAN) localized on the verbs of complex sentences (i.e., where
processing load should be highest) that was exaggerated in ‘poor comprehenders’ compared to
‘good comprehenders.’ Multi-word analysis of three sentence regions ruled out the possibility
that the LAN was related to lexical factors and instead supported the notion that complex
grammatical structures load on WMC. Although this study did not assess working memory
directly, the observed LAN was similar to that attributed to the effects of load on WMC in
previous studies (e.g., Kluender & Kutas, 1993). Furthermore, we know that low-span
individuals tend to show lower accuracy than high-spans overall (e.g., King & Just, 1991), which
at least suggests that the ‘poor comprehenders’ were likely to also be low-spans.
Another ERP study by Vos, Gunter, Schriefers, and Friederici (2001) looked the
relationship between WMC (measured by a reading span task) and the processing of complex
grammar under concurrent load (monitoring for specific words) in native German speakers. The
behavioral results showed that low-spans and high-span individuals under concurrent load
slowed down and were less accurate on complex sentences. The ERP waveforms also
differentiated between span groups in the windows from 200- to350-ms and 500- to 800-ms after
the presentation of disambiguating information. In the earlier window, high-spans showed a
posterior positivity while processing object-relative sentences that has previously been argued to
reflect the recognition of a garden path sentence (Friederici, 1997), while in the later window
there was a frontal positivity while processing object-relative sentences that has been argued to
reflect the assignment of correct syntactic structure (Friederici, 1997). This frontal positivity was
smaller for high- than for low-spans, suggesting that the high-spans were more efficient at using
disambiguating information to assign the correct syntactic structure.
In the final ERP study to be discussed here, Vos, Gunter, Kolk, and Mulder (2001)
measured WMC with an auditory version of a reading span task and manipulated syntactic
complexity, grammaticality, and working memory load during a sentence comprehension task.
Their behavioral results were in line with dual resource theory in that they found main effects of
grammaticality and working memory load, but no significant interactions that would indicate
span differences on syntactically complex sentences. ERP waveforms, on the other hand,
presented a different picture. High-span participants showed an anterior negativity in the 250- to
450-ms window after the presentation of a critical verb that was not present in low-span
waveforms. Furthermore, this negativity disappeared when high-spans processed the complex
sentences under working memory load. A bit later, in the 500- to 800-ms window, a
centroparietal positivity appeared in both low- and high-span waveforms; however, this
positivity came later for both low-spans and for high-spans under high load. These results
support the single resource theory first by showing that span groups differed and second by
showing that working memory load caused high-spans to look like low-spans. Even more
interestingly, the fact that span effects were seen in the ERP waveforms but not the behavioral
data suggests that behavioral data are less sensitive to the theoretical relationship in question,
suggesting one explanation for conflicts between single and dual resource studies that only
utilize behavioral measures.
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Other researchers have used other imaging techniques to examine brain activation during
syntactic processing. For example, Makuuchi, Bahlmann, Anwander, and Friederici (2009) had
participants read main clause and subject-relative sentences that varied in length (to manipulate
storage load) in an fMRI study. They found two distinct areas of activation in the left inferior
frontal gyrus, one associated with syntactic structure and the other associated with length, which
seems to support the dual resource theory. However, the authors also found evidence of
extensive connectivity between the ‘distinct’ areas, especially when processing the more
complex sentences, suggesting the two interact when the task demands it. This connectivity, in
combination with the fact that their ‘complex’ subject-relative sentences are actually commonly
used as simple sentences in other studies (e.g., Just and Carpenter, 1992) and the fact that they
did not actually assess individual differences in WMC, suggests that caution should be exercised
when attempting to claim these results as support for the dual resource theory.
Finally, PET imaging was used by Waters, Caplan, Alpert, and Stanczak (2003) to
examine changes in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during processing of simple and
complex sentences. Participants were classified into span groups on the basis of scores on four
WMC measures and into ‘speed of processing’ groups based upon plausibility judgment
response times during a syntactic processing task separate from the one in which complexity was
manipulated. None of the behavioral results showed an effect of span group, nor were there any
significant differences in rCBF between span groups, though low-spans did show a significant
correlation between their reaction times and their rCBF in both the inferior frontal lobe and the
right cingulate that was not seen in high-spans. Examined in terms of speed of processing, rCBF
data showed that fast processors exhibited bilateral activation in the inferior frontal lobe while
slow processors showed activation in the left superior temporal lobe and structures in the right
hippocampus. Waters et al. (2003) argue that these results support the dual resource theory by
demonstrating that performance on the syntactic processing task is related to speed of processing
in general, but not to WMC. However, it should be noted that the syntactic processing stimuli
used in this study are the same as those used in Waters and Caplan (2004). These sentences are
less complex than those that were used to elicit span group differences in Just and Carpenter
(1992) at least by virtue of being unreduced, and perhaps by virtue of being constructed in an
entirely different manner (an issue to be explored in the experiments reported in Chapters 3, 4,
and 5).
While this brief review of the neurological evidence is certainly not comprehensive, it
should be sufficient to illustrate that the imaging literature is almost as contradictory on the issue
of the resource(s) involved in syntactic processing as the behavioral literature reviewed before it.
One could argue that this is perhaps due to the fact that imaging results are only as sound as the
design of the behavioral task they are measuring brain activation for, and thus the same issues
raised in relation to those tasks are thus a factor in the imaging studies as well.
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
In principle, providing empirical evidence that clearly distinguishes between single and
dual resource theories of syntactic processing is a fairly straightforward task, considering the
opposing predictions of the two models. All of the studies discussed thus far have set out to do
just this, yet there remains disagreement about which theory more accurately describes the
resources(s) required for the processing of syntax, with some studies supporting the single
resource view (MacDonald et al., 1992; King & Just, 1991; Just & Carpenter, 1992) and others
supporting the dual resources view (Waters & Caplan, 1996b; Waters & Caplan, 2004; Waters et
al., 2003). Determining which set of studies provides stronger evidence for which theory is
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difficult, as there are many methodological differences that make direct comparisons
questionable. These differences could be argued to individually affect results to varying degrees,
in addition to producing a cumulative effect. Before discussing how to resolve these conflicts,
methodological differences in both the syntactic processing and working memory tasks will be
reviewed and their potential effects discussed.
One of the first comparison issues in the syntactic processing task is the type of judgment
used. The single resource studies described above all use yes/no or true/false comprehension
questions, whereas the dual resource studies use acceptability/plausibility judgments. The
purpose of modifying the sentence comprehension task with acceptability judgments was to
ensure that the task did not allow for the use of post-interpretive processes, as when
comprehension questions are completed, in order to increase confidence that the task was
measuring svWM rather than gvWM. There is reason to think that acceptability judgments
should accomplish this goal because initial assignment of word meaning is assumed to be an
interpretive process, under control of svWM. However, it is also important to note that there is
psychophysiological evidence to suggest that semantic and syntactic incongruities are processed
differently by the brain (e.g., Kolk, Chwilla, Van Herten, & Oor, 2003), suggesting that these
acceptability judgments may not ensure measurement of purely syntactic processing. Given that
the primary interest of these studies is to measure syntactic processing, it stands to reason that
the most desirable measure is one that taps syntactic rather than semantic violations. For this
reason, it seems plausible that an acceptable alternative to both comprehension and acceptability
judgments is the grammaticality judgment. In grammaticality judgment, participants simply
indicate whether or not a given sentence is grammatically correct. While such judgments are
somewhat similar to acceptability, in that agrammatical sentences may not appear to make sense,
they do not rely on sentences containing semantically implausible words. Rather, grammatical
violations often consist of subject-verb disagreements (e.g., “They goes to the store.”). Previous
studies have found that grammaticality judgments are related to performance on measures of
working memory capacity and that performance on them suffers under conditions of cognitive
load (McDonald, 2008a and 2008b).
A second methodological issue is the way in which syntactic processing items were
presented to participants. In the single resource studies sentences were presented either word-byword (King & Just, 1991; MacDonald et al, 1992) or all at once with an eye-tracker (Just and
Carpenter, 1992), both allowing for precise online measurement. In Waters and Caplan (1996b),
presentation was either controlled by the experimenter (RSVP conditions) or the participant
(whole sentence condition), but there was never an online measure of reading time. Per-word
times were estimated by dividing reading-plus-reaction times by the number of words in the
sentence, but this method assumes a priori that reading time is equal for all words in the sentence
and thus does not allow for analysis of any differences in critical areas. Waters and Caplan
(2004) and Waters et al. (2003) did allow participants to self-pace presentation of sentences,
however, sentences were presented auditorily rather than visually and in phrases rather than
word-by-word. Artificial chunking on its own may wipe out span group differences by changing
natural stimulus chunking strategies of low- and high-span individuals (e.g., Swets, Desmet,
Hambrick, & Ferreira, 2007), but these methods are also problematic in that they do not provide
the same level of precision in the measurement of per-word processing time as that found in Just
and Carpenter (1992). Waters and Caplan (1996a) themselves argue that online measurement is
vital to distinguishing between single and dual resource theories, so it stands to reason that this
type of measurement is the one that should be compared across single and dual resource studies,
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and yet we cannot do so with any confidence because of the widely varying methods that have
been used in the previous studies. Indeed, we have even seen evidence that offline behavioral
and online ERP data can directly contradict each other in terms of which theory they support
(e.g., Vos et al., 2002).
Another methodological issue with the syntactic processing tasks is that the items
presented in dual resource studies differ from single resource studies in how their complex
syntactic structures are formed. Complex object-relative sentences can be formed in several ways
that may differ in terms of the demands they impose. Table 2.4.1 provides examples of
comparable object-relative sentences from each of the six studies. The first thing to note about
the sentences in Table 1 is that reducing relative clauses makes them more difficult to process.
MacDonald et al. (1992), Just and Carpenter (1992) and Waters and Caplan (1996b) did reduce
object-relative clauses, but the other three studies (King & Just, 1991; Waters et al., 2003;
Waters and Caplan, 2004) did not. Also of note is the fact that the reduced relative clause
sentences in Waters and Caplan (1996b) are quite a bit shorter than those in MacDonald et al.
(1992), which would decrease storage load in these sentences.
Table 2.4.1. Comparable syntactic processing items by study.
Study
King & Just (1991)
MacDonald et al. (1992)
Unreduced Just & Carpenter (1992)
objectrelative
Waters & Caplan (1996b)
clauses

Reduced
objectrelative
clauses

Example Sentence
The reporter that the senator attacked admitted the error publicly.

Length
12-17

The experienced soldiers who were told about the dangers conducted the midnight raid.

11-13

The defendant/evidence that was examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.

9-11

The farmer who was leased the barn ploughed.
The ocean that the fish swam in was polluted.

7-8
8-9

Waters & Caplan (2004)/
Waters et al. (2003)

The law that the millionaire favored frustrated the workers.

MacDonald et al. (1992)

The experienced soldiers warned about the dangers conducted the midnight raid.

11-13

Just & Carpenter (1992)

The defendant/evidence examined by the lawyer shocked the jury.

9-11

The horse raced past the barn fell.
The picture books were lying beside was a landscape.

7-8
8-9

Waters & Caplan (1996b)

9 (mean)

Focusing on just the reduced clause sentences in Table 2.4.1, note that in both
MacDonald et al. (1992) and Just and Carpenter (1992) these clauses always begin with an
ambiguous verb. In the first example from Waters and Caplan (1996b), the clause also begins
with an ambiguous verb, but they differ in terms of where the disambiguating information is
presented. MacDonald et al. (1992) and Waters and Caplan (1996b) introduce disambiguating
information with second, non-ambiguous verbs that occur near or at the end of sentences,
whereas Just and Carpenter (1992) provided disambiguating information in the form of by
phrases that were then followed by further information. This location difference is important
because sentence wrap-up effects (Balogh et al., 1998) may obscure span group differences when
disambiguating information is sentence-final, unless perhaps the sentence also contains sufficient
load (i.e., more words) such as those of MacDonald et al. (1992). As for the second example
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sentence from Waters and Caplan (1996b), the reduced object-relative clause begins with a noun
rather than an ambiguous verb, a difference which could affect complexity and by affecting the
potential for ambiguity.
A final point about the examples found in Table 2.4.1 concerns the animacy of the head
noun in ambiguous sentences. Specifically, Just and Carpenter (1992) only found span group
differences in first-pass reading times when sentences had inanimate head nouns (i.e., only the
high-span participants could use this cue to speed processing in ambiguous sentences). The
Waters and Caplan (1996b) sentences that were formed in the same was as those of Just and
Carpenter (1992; i.e., ambiguous verb first) only contain animate nouns (as far as can be
determined from examples, full lists are not presented in the article nor is animacy discussed).
Thus, it may not be at all surprising that Waters and Caplan (1996b) did not find effects of span
group on these sentences.
All of these syntactic processing task stimuli differences may affect complexity in
various ways. Precise control over syntactic complexity is key to distinguishing between the
single and dual resource views because syntactic processing is such a well-practiced skill for all
typically developing individuals, and such well-practiced skills may become automatized over
time, requiring fewer resources to complete as expertise grows. Indeed, developmental evidence
does suggest that automatization occurs for frequently used syntactic structures. In childhood,
syntactic structures are generally acquired in order of increasing complexity. After years of
experience, adults far outperform children in grammaticality judgments for all structures, but
McDonald (2008b) showed that taxing the working memory capacities of adults with cognitive
load resulted in declines in performance on more complex, later acquired structures (e.g., past
tense and third-person plural) but not on simpler, earlier acquired structures (e.g., word order). In
other words, finding syntactic processing differences predicted by single resource theory in
adults requires the use of appropriately complex/rare structures because simpler/common
structures are so well practiced that they can be processed accurately even under resource
demanding circumstances.
Caplan, Waters, and Dede (2007) argue against the automatization of syntactic
processing argument because of previously mentioned data from their own studies showing that
even patients with disorders that significantly impair domain general resources (e.g., aphasia,
Alzheimer’s, etc.) can process complex syntactic structures (e.g., Caplan, et al., 1985; Rochon, et
al., 1994), which they say suggests that the syntax specific resource (svWM) must be fully
automatic and sufficient to process even the most complex sentences without recruitment of
domain general resources. But as previously mentioned, others have found that such patients do
show deficits in syntactic processing, if the items are of sufficient complexity (Almor, et al.,
1999).
Aside from differences in the syntactic processing task, the previous studies have also
showed significant variation in how they measure WMC. The single resource studies above all
used the standard reading span task of Daneman and Carpenter (1980) while most dual resource
experiments use a modified version. This modified version was developed by Waters and Caplan
(1996c), who report that the task has higher internal consistency (between .92 and .95) as well as
higher test-retest reliability (.65-.73) than the original task. However, they also report that the
modified task only moderately correlates (.52-.63) with the original task, which is problematic
when trying to compare across studies. In their second experiment Waters and Caplan (2004) did
use other measures (i.e., alphabet span and subtract 2 span) in addition to a more complex
version of their modified reading span task, and reported no significant correlations with their
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syntactic processing task. Using multiple working memory measures is a good idea both because
it helps to ensure a more accurate score for individuals and because if the syntactic processing
task really recruits a domain general resource, then it should be related to a variety of tasks
measuring that resource. It is important, though, to fully analyze performance on the syntactic
processing task in relation to working memory scores by using working memory measures to
categorize individuals into groups, which Waters and Caplan (2004) did not do.
Taking into account all of the methodological differences between single and dual
resource theory experiments, it seems clear that making any final conclusion about which side
presents a more compelling argument for the resource(s) involved in syntactic processing would
be premature. Before this important theoretical question can be answered, the effects of these
methodological differences need to be thoroughly evaluated. This is precisely the purpose of the
three current experiments.
In the following three experiments, we attempt to partially replicate the work of Just and
Carpenter (1992), Waters and Caplan (1996b), and Waters and Caplan (2004). One set of
stimulus sentences was created in the style of each of these three studies. Each set contained
sentences representing four levels of complexity: main clause, subject-relative clause, unreduced
object-relative clause, and reduced object-relative clause. We also manipulated animacy at each
level of complexity, such that half of each sentence type contained an inanimate subject and the
other half contained an animate one. Finally, we also manipulated the type of judgment made
about the sentences. In Experiment 1, participants answered true/false items after all sentences in
the manner of Just and Carpenter (1992). In Experiment 2, participants made acceptability
judgments about sentences, in the manner of Waters and Caplan (1996b) and Waters and Caplan
(2004). In Experiment 3, we test a judgment type not previously utilized by single or dual
resource researchers, the grammaticality task. For all experiments, sentences were presented in a
self-paced word-by-word paradigm, thus we have three types of dependent variable to look at:
reading times, judgment response times, and judgment accuracy.
In addition to measuring syntactic processing, we also administered measures of WMC.
First, we included the original Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Reading-span task because it has
been used in so many single resource studies. However, because Waters and Caplan (1996c)
report that this task is not strongly correlated with other measures they have administered, and
because the single resource theory predicts that the resource used for syntactic processing is
domain general, we also included three automated working memory span tasks to increase the
confidence in our measurement of WMC. The three tasks used, Operation-span (Unsworth,
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), Symmetry-span (Shah & Miyake, 1996), and Reading-span
(another modified version of Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), have been administered to over
6,000 participants over eight years and show high test-retest reliability and internal consistency,
as well as high convergent, divergent, and criterion-related validity(Redick, Broadway, Meier,
Kiriakose, Unsworth, Kane, & Engle, 2012).
By analyzed data from these two types of tasks in the convention of the original studies
(e.g., looking at critical areas, A' values, etc.), we are able to comment on the effects of the
various methodological manipulations on the dependent variables of interest, thus providing a
first step toward coming to some resolution within the literature.
2.5 Power Analysis
Before undertaking the following experiments, we attempted to determine the number of
participants needed to find the three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC (or of
complexity, phrase, and WMC with the Waters and Caplan, 2004 stimulus set) by conducting a
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power analysis. According to Bakeman (2005), generalized eta squared is the best effect size
measure for repeated measures ANOVAs. The formula given by Olejnik and Algina (2003) for
calculated generalized eta squared for mixed designs where the between-subjects factor is
manipulated requires the Sums of Squares for each of the factors individually as well as their
interaction (and is only illustrated for two factors total). Unfortunately this information is not
available in the three studies (Just and Carpenter, 1992; Waters and Caplan, 1996b, 2004) that
we are attempting to replicate, nor is it calculable from the data that is provided in them. Instead,
using the methods recommended by Tahlheimer and Cook (2002), we calculated Cohen’s d
using the data from MacDonald et al. (1992) and Just and Carpenter (1992). Only these two
studies were used because they were the only ones from Chapter 2 that had data for the kinds of
interaction that we would predict to find if single resource theory is accurate (i.e., the only
interactions that distinguish between the predictions of the single and dual resource theories).
In a 2 (ambiguity) x 3 (region) x 2 (WMC) ANOVA, MacDonald et al. (1992) found a
significant three-way interaction. Note that here ambiguity refers to whether or not the sentence
was reduced and region refers to the area of the sentence. Using their sample sizes, means
(estimated from their figures), and MSe, we calculated a Cohen’s d of 2.16 for this interaction,
which is a very large effect.
Just and Carpenter (1992) conducted a 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) ANOVA on unreduced
object-relative sentences and another on reduced object-relative sentences. In both analyses, the
interaction of animacy and WMC was significant. Using their sample sizes, means (estimated
from their figures), and MSe, we calculated a Cohen’s d between .56 and .60 for these
interactions, which is a medium effect size.
Note that neither of these interaction matches precisely with what we will be testing in
each of the current experiments. Our complexity manipulation in this case will be structure (main
clause, subject-relative clause, unreduced object-relative clause, and reduced object-relative
clause. We will also use the animacy manipulation of Just and Carpenter (1992) and we will
have two WMC groups. Because of this, our ANOVAs will be 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2
(WMC) mixed within-between analyses.
Based upon the above calculations and the fact that we are using extreme groups rather
than a median split, we chose to assume a medium effect size of .5 for our power analysis for a
repeated measures ANOVA with a within-between interaction, performed in G*Power 3.1.2. The
results of this analysis called for 16 participants per experiment, eight low-span and eight highspan. However, this number intuitively seems low. For this reason, we chose to double the
recommended N to 32 participants per experiment (16 low-span, 16 high-span), for a total of 96
participants across all three. Given our calculations from the available information, our use of
extreme groups, and the fact that previous experiments have used as few as 10 participants in one
span condition (MacDonald et al., 1992), we feel that this N is appropriate.
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1
3.1 Introduction
The primary purpose of Experiment 1 was to replicate the results of Just and Carpenter
(1992) using their stimuli and judgment in a self-paced word-by-word reading paradigm. The
secondary purpose was to examine the effects of this judgment type and presentation paradigm
on results obtained using the stimuli of Waters and Caplan (1996b) and Waters and Caplan
(2004). Experimental sentences in Just and Carpenter (1992) consisted of reduced and unreduced
object-relative sentences containing by phrases (e.g., The witness/evidence that was examined by
the lawyer shocked the jury.). The main subject of these sentences were either animate (e.g.,
witness) or inanimate (e.g., evidence). Waters and Caplan (1996b) also used object-relative
sentences that were either reduced or not, but instead of using a by phrase to resolve the
ambiguity, resolution was held off until the presentation of a second verb in these sentences (e.g.,
The horse raced past the barn fell.). The reduced versions of these sentences are referred to as
‘garden path sentences’ because they tend to lead the reader to an incorrect interpretation before
the ambiguity is resolved. Finally, Waters and Caplan (2004) used a third type of object-relative
sentence where the subject is followed directly by an object. In this study, all object-relative
sentences were presented in unreduced form (e.g., The law that the millionaire favored frustrated
the workers.). Note that neither of the Waters and Caplan studies manipulated animacy in their
experimental sentences. Using these details, three sets of experimental stimuli were created for
testing syntactic processing in the current experiment (see Appendices B, C, and D for full lists
of experimental sentences).
In the original Just and Carpenter (1992) experiment, sentences in the syntactic
processing task were shown all at once, below a neutral filler sentence and an eye-tracker was
used to measure first-pass reading times on each word. The primary dependent variable of
interest was first-pass reading time of the by phrase of correctly judged experimental sentences.
In the current experiment, sentences were presented in a self-paced word-by-word reading
paradigm, a methodology that has been argued to be equivalent to eye-tracking measures (Just,
Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). In addition to the sentence comprehension stimuli, measures of
WMC were administered and used to divide participants into low- and high-span groups for the
analyses reported below.
3.2 Methods
Participants
Participants were 32 (19 female) undergraduate psychology students at Louisiana State
University who received course credit for their participation. All participants reported normal or
corrected to normal vision and hearing, and no history of language or speech impairments. Mean
age was 19.28 (SD = 1.33). Sixteen participants were classified as low-span and 16 were
classified as high-span, as explained below (descriptives can be found in Table 3.2.1). An
additional 16 participants were run in Experiment 1, but dropped from analyses for the following
reasons: 11 participants were medium-span (see explanation of cut-off criterion below), two
participants made too many errors on at least one automated span task (see criterion below), one
participant was a non-native English speaker, and two participants were dropped for
experimenter errors (lost automated task data and repetition of counterbalanced set order).
Syntactic Processing Task
Three stimulus sets were created based upon example sentences found in Just and
Carpenter (1992), Waters and Caplan (1996b), and Waters and Caplan (2004). Each of the three
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stimulus sets consisted of 80 experimental sentences containing an object-relative clause and 80
filler sentences (40 main clause or MC and 40 subject-relative or SR sentences). Object-relative
clauses in Set 1 (the Just and Carpenter stimuli) contained a by phrase, while those in Set 2 were
constructed to be garden path sentences (like Waters and Caplan, 1996b), and those in Set 3 were
constructed with subject-object word order (like Waters and Caplan, 2004). Within each set, half
of the object-relative clause sentences were unreduced (OR-U) and the other half were reduced
(OR-R). Half of the sentences of all types had an animate subject and half had an inanimate one.
Note for Set 1 and Set 2 OR sentences, this means that the first noun of the sentence was either
animate or inanimate, but for Set 3 this manipulation was found on the second noun of the
sentence, due to the subject-object construction. Example sentences can be found in Table 3.2.1
below, and full lists of the experimental object-relative sentences can be found in Appendices B
(Set 1), C (Set 2), and D (Set 3).
Table 3.2.1. Example syntactic processing items by set.
Set

Structure
Main Clause (MC)

Example Sentence
The doctors airlifted the patient to the large hospital in the city.

All Sets
Subject-relative (SR)
Unreduced Object-relative (OR-U)

The door that locked automatically caused a lot of trouble.
The evidence that was examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.

Set 1
Reduced Object-relative (OR-R)
Unreduced Object-relative (OR-U)

The boy sniffed by the dog was sitting on the curb.
The suitcase that was searched for missing valuables vanished.

Set 2
Reduced Object-relative (OR-R)
Unreduced Object-relative (OR-U)

The baby grabbed with both hands squealed.
The tree that the ordinance protected sheltered the squirrel.

Set 3
Reduced Object-relative (OR-R)

The law the millionaire favored frustrated the workers.

Within each set, four lists were created by including one version of each of the base
experimental sentences found in the appendices. For example in Set 1: list 1 might include the
animate reduced version of a sentence, list 2 might then have the inanimate reduced version, list
3 the animate unreduced version, and list 4 the inanimate unreduced version. Filler sentences
were the same for all four lists within a set. Before beginning the syntactic processing tasks,
participants were assigned a list number (1, 2, 3, or 4) and a serial order for set presentation (123,
231, 132, 213, 132, or 321). Participants would then be presented with the same list number from
each of the three sets in the serial order assigned. This assignment ensured that four participants
from each span group saw each of the four lists for each set, and that each set was seen in each
serial position by between four and six participants (full counterbalancing of serial set orders
would require 24 participants per span group). Within each list for each set, items were arranged
into five blocks containing equal numbers of each type of experimental and filler sentences.
Presentation within these blocks was randomized by the stimulus software.
All sentences were presented in a self-paced word-by-word manner, using SuperLab
software on a Mac computer. At the beginning of each trial, the participant would see the first
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word of the sentence on the screen and dashed lines holding the places of the other words, as
follows:
The

workers .

The participant would then press the spacebar to move through the sentence, with each
button press causing each consecutive word to appear while the previous word would disappear.
Word presentation moved forward only, so it was not possible for participants to review any part
of the sentence after progressing past it. After the participant read the entire sentence, a response
screen would appear. The response screen consisted of a shorter statement referring back to the
sentence that had just been read, followed by the question “True?” Half of the shorter statements
were true of the previous sentence (e.g., The millionaire favored the law.), while the other half
were false (e.g., The law favored the millionaire.). Participants were asked to indicate whether
the statement was true or false by pressing labeled keys on the keyboard.
This methodology was chosen because it has been used previously by single resource
researchers (e.g., Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982; King and Just, 1991), but it should be noted
that this manner of presentation meant that the participant always knew the approximate length
of the sentence from the start of the trial and could also determine how close she was to the end
of it as she progressed through it. The relevance of this point will be discussed in the results
below.
Working Memory Capacity Measures
All participants completed four measures of working memory capacity: the automated
Reading-span, the automated Symmetry-span, the automated Operation-span (Unsworth, Heitz,
Schrock, & Engle, 2005), and the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Reading-span.
Automated Reading span (R-span).
In the R-span task, participants read sentences on the screen and make judgments about
whether or not the sentences make sense (nonsensical sentences contain words that are
semantically anomalous). After each judgment, participants see a letter on the screen. Judgmentletter pairs are presented in set sizes ranging in size from four to seven. When participants have
completed all judgment-letter pairs in a set, they are asked to recall the order of the letters in the
set. Three trials of each set size are presented in random order. Participants who do not perform
with at least 85% accuracy on the sentence judgments are excluded to ensure both tasks are being
equally attended to. Scores on the task are calculated by summing the total number of correct
letters in the correct order.
Automated Symmetry span (S-span).
In the S-span task, participants view pictures and make judgments about whether or not
the pictures are symmetrical about the vertical axis. After each judgment, participants view a red
square within a grid. Judgment-square pairs are presented in sets sizes ranging from three to
seven. When participants have completed all judgment-square pairs in a set, they are asked to
recall the locations of all red squares in the set. Three trials of each set size are presented in
random order. Participants who do not perform with at least 85% accuracy on the symmetry
judgments are excluded in order to ensure both tasks are being equally attended to. Scores on the
task are calculated by summing the total number of correct square locations in the correct order.
Automated Operation span (O-span).
In the O-span task, participants view one math problem and one word on the screen at a
time. Participants read the math problem and solve it aloud, then read the word on the screen.
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Problem-word pairs are presented in sets sizes ranging from two to five. When participants have
completed all problem-word pairs in a set, they are asked to recall all the words from the set in
order. Three trials of each set size are presented in random order. Participants who do not
perform with at least 85% accuracy on the math problems are excluded in order to ensure both
tasks are being equally attended to. Scores on the task are calculated by summing the total
number of correct words in the correct ordinal positions.
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Reading-span.
In the Reading-span task participants read sets of sentences while memorizing the last
word of each until asked to recall the words. Sets were presented using PowerPoint software on a
Mac computer, with the experimenter controlling the rate of presentation and hand scoring the
task. The number of sentences in a set varies from two to six, and each set size is presented five
times. The reading span score for each individual is commonly determined by the largest set size
for which three of five sets are accurately recalled. In the current experiments, an alternate
scoring method was also used, due to a lack of variability in our sample. This scoring method
will be described in more detail in the results section below.
Procedure
The three automated span tasks were always administered before the syntactic processing
tasks and the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) task was always administered after them, but for
some participants the automated tasks were presented in an entirely separate 1-hour session,
while for others they were presented at the beginning of one 2-hour long session. This difference
occurred because we attempted to use the automated span tasks as a screening tool to select
participants for all three experiments during the first semester of the project, but unfortunately
found that only a small number of those invited back (36 out of almost 200) actually returned to
participate. For this reason, in the second semester we ran the automated tasks immediately
before administering the syntactic processing tasks (in all three experiments) and then examined
results afterwards to determine whose data to keep.
Participants were included in the current study if they met two criteria. The first criterion
was scoring 85% or higher on the secondary task in all three automated measures, as described
above. The second criterion was that they fall in the low or high end of the distribution of scores.
For this criterion, cut-off values were selected by finding the upper and lower 50 composite zscores in a previous sample of 200 participants who had completed the same measures in another
lab. (Participants in this sample had given permission to be contacted about future studies, and so
were also invited to participate in the syntactic processing portion of the current experiment, but
fewer than five actually did so.) Using this method, the lower cut-off value was set at -.53 while
the upper value was set at .72 (centered on a mean of 0, with a standard deviation of 1).
3.3 Results
Both for the sake of thoroughness and for the sake of comparison with previous studies
and later experiments, results of three types of dependent measure are reported in Experiment 1:
true/false judgment accuracy, true/false judgment response time, and critical area reading times.
However, it should be born in mind that the critical comparison between Experiment 1 and the
study it is designed to replicate, Just and Carpenter (1992), involves the examination of the
critical area reading times only, as this is the online measure of processing that the authors used
to support their single resource theory. Figure 3.3.1 below shows the (recreated) critical area
first-pass reading time results from Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left panel. These results are
contrasted with the results that dual resource theory might predict for reading times in the same
area in the right panel. Note that Waters and Caplan (1996a) would not predict the two-way
34

interaction demonstrated in the left panel, but they would also argue that it is insufficient to
support single resource theory. Instead, Waters and Caplan (1996a) argue that only a three-way
interaction of WMC, complexity, and animacy that would demonstrate disproportionate
processing load in the low-span group would sufficiently support the theory. For the purposes of
clarity, we will hereafter refer to this theoretically required interaction by the abbreviation
‘WCAREQ’ (i.e., the WMC x complexity x animacy interaction).

Figure 3.3.1. Recreated results for critical area reading times on experimental sentences in Just
and Carpenter (1992) on the left compared with dual resource theory’s predictions on the right.
Working Memory Capacity Measures
As already mentioned, the automated span tasks were used for participant selection based
upon composite z-score cut-off values. For the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) task, we first
scored it in the traditional method, by finding the highest set level for which the participant
correctly recalled three of five sets. This scoring method for the task showed little variability in
our sample, with most participants scoring 2, some scoring 3, and very few scoring 4, resulting in
an imbalanced split between high- and low-span participants (11 to 21 in Experiment 1). Thus,
this task was re-scored such that each participant’s score was a proportion of words correctly
recalled out of the number possible to recall (determined by the number of sets read). Table 3.3.1
below shows the descriptive statistics for all of the WMC measures in the current experiment.
Table 3.3.1. Experiment 1 WMC measure descriptives.

R-span
Automated S-span
Tasks O-span
Composite
D&C
(1980)

Original
Recode

Low-span
Mean
SD
-1.01
0.76
-0.53
0.53
-1.55
0.90
-1.28
0.59

High-span
Mean
SD
0.92
0.27
0.77
0.62
1.01
0.28
1.12
0.31

2.13
0.70

2.69
0.79

0.34
0.10

0.70
0.07

Table 3.3.2 below shows the correlations amongst all WMC measures across all three
experiments. Note that the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) task and the composite WMC score
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show a modest (yet significant) correlation. This is in line with the findings of Waters and
Caplan (1996b) that the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) task is not highly correlated with other
measures of WMC. Also note that all analyses reported in all experiments were conducted first
using the composite z-score and then using the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) recoded scores
for the low/high split. Results did not differ by WMC task, so all results are reported using the
first analyses run with the composite z-score as the split variable.
Table 3.3.2. Correlations amongst WMC measures across experiments.
1
1 D&C original
2 D&C recode
.41**
3 Composite WMC .40**
4 R-span Z-score
.37**
5 O-span Z-score
.38**
6 S-span Z-score
.30**
** p < .01

2
.41**
.38**
.38**
.30**

3
.90**
.91**
.83**

4
.74**
.63**

5
.60**

6
-

Just and Carpenter (1992) Stimuli – Set 1 (Appendix B)
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on true/false judgment accuracy showed a main effect of complexity, F (3,
90) = 32.47, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .52, a main effect of answer, F (1, 30) = 6.49, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .18, and a
main effect of WMC, F (1, 30) = 4.67, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14. These main effects were qualified by
three significant two-way interactions. Complexity interacted with answer, F (3, 90) = 3.85, p =
.01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11 such that accuracy was higher on true unreduced object-relatives than on false
unreduced object-relatives, t (31) = 3.19, p < .01, but all other contrasts were nonsignificant.
There was also an interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 3.99, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12,
such that accuracy was higher for inanimate reduced object-relative clauses than for animate
reduced object-relative clauses, t (31) = -2.74, p = .01. Finally, there was also an interaction
between complexity and WMC, F (3, 90) = 3.71, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11, such that low-spans were
significantly less accurate on unreduced object-relatives than high-spans, t (30) = -2.91, p < .01.
Figure 3.3.2 below shows the mean accuracy scores (out of 10) collapsed across answer for each
sentence type (answer is collapsed because it is an indicator of bias to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but
is not part of the experimental manipulations of interest).
The finding that accuracy decreases with complexity (i.e., from left to right in Figure
3.3.2) is in line with the predictions of both single and dual resource theory. Both theories would
also predict a main effect of WMC, such that low-spans would be less accurate than high-spans,
but this was not the case, except for unreduced object-relative (OR-U) items. This finding
suggests that the items in the current set were not particularly difficult, a conclusion confirmed
by subjective reports of the participants that Set 1 was the easiest of the three in the experiment.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on true/false judgment response times showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) =
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21.30, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .42, a result of longer response times on more complex sentences (see
Figure 3.3.3 below). The main effects of animacy and WMC were not significant (p = .07 and
.31 respectively), but there was a significant interaction between complexity and animacy, F (3,
90) = 3.34, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10, such that response time was faster for inanimate items with
reduced and unreduced object-relative clauses, ts > 2.09, ps < .05 than for animate ones. Figure
3.3.3 below shows the judgment response times for each sentence type.

Figure 3.3.2. Experiment 1 Set 1 True/False judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.

Figure 3.3.3. Experiment 1 Set 1 True/False judgment response times, with standard error bars.
Waters and Caplan (1996a) argued that true/false comprehension items required postinterpretive processing to complete. In the current data, the main effect of complexity on
judgment response times seems to support this idea. Judgment response times include both the
time it takes participants to read the true/false item and the time it takes them to judge whether
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that statement is true or false. Given that true/false statements were of the same length for all
sentence types, it seems unlikely that the main effect of complexity was due to anything other
than an increase in the time it took to make a judgment about the veracity of the statement, a
post-interpretive process.
The significant interaction between complexity and animacy suggests a somewhat
different conclusion. At first glance, this interaction seems to be compatible with the dual
resource view in that it suggests that participants are using the pragmatic cue (animacy) postinterpretively in order to reason about the true/false comprehension items. Because it is generally
the case that inanimate nouns are less likely to be the subjects of a main verb, participants are
able to make judgments about those items more quickly than when the head noun is animate.
This explanation does not, however, account for why accuracy was generally higher for items
with an inanimate head noun because in the current set of stimuli, the inanimate noun in the
true/false comprehension item was equally likely to be the subject or the object. If participants
explicitly and rapidly decided that inanimate nouns were probably not the subjects of the main
verbs, then they would be wrong half of the time and thus their accuracy scores would be around
five instead of around eight or higher as they are in Figure 3.3.2. Furthermore, although it is not
the area of primary interest, we can examine reading times for the last portion of the sentence
(i.e., the area after the critical area but before the judgment item). A 2 (complexity) x 2
(animacy) ANOVA on just the experimental object-relative sentences showed that there was a
marginally significant main effect of animacy in this area, F (1, 31) = 4.11, p = .051, such that
reading times were faster for sentences with inanimate subjects than for those with animate ones.
This suggests that the animacy cue was already being incorporated into the participants’
interpretation of the sentences before the time of judgment, while the fact that judgment response
times were longer for animate items suggests that the animate head noun was indeed more
ambiguous during online processing and thus participants required extra time to determine if it
was indeed the subject of the main verb or not.
Finally, although there was no significant effect of WMC, nor an interaction, we can see
in Figure 3.3.3 that the effect of animacy appears roughly equal in magnitude for both WMC
groups in the unreduced object-relative items, but in reduced object-relative items it almost
disappears for low- but not high-spans, a trend that is consistent with the idea that low-spans lose
the ability to incorporate the animacy cue when the activation demands of a sentence increase as
they do when an object-relative clause is reduced. Together, this trend and the animacy effect in
the last portion of the sentence are supportive of the single resource theory in that they suggest
the animacy cue is being processed online, at least to a certain extent.
Critical Area Reading Time.
While the accuracy and judgment response time data are interesting, the main dependent
measure of interest to Just and Carpenter (1992) was the time it took to read the critical area,
defined in their stimulus set as the by phrase in object-relative sentences (both reduced and
unreduced). In a reduced object-relative sentence, this area should place the highest demand on
processing resources because it is where the ambiguity introduced by reducing the clause is
resolved. In an unreduced object-relative sentence, this area should not be as demanding because
the complementizer at the head of the clause has already signaled to the reader that a clause is
indeed present. Thus, any differences in reading times between reduced and unreduced sentences
in this area should be reflective of differential demands on processing resources.
Before any analyses were conducted, reading times were trimmed to reduce outliers.
Trimming was accomplished by using each participant’s own mean and standard deviation.
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Original reading time values that were greater than three standard deviations from the
participant’s mean were replaced with the value of the mean plus three standard deviations. The
same was done for values three standard deviations below the mean, with the exception that no
replacement value was allowed to be less than zero. The vast majority of replaced data points
were above rather than below the mean. For each of the three experiments, no more than 2% of
data points were replaced overall, nor was the replacement rate any higher than 2% for any
individual participant within each experiment.
After trimming was completed, reading times for the individual words in the by phrase
were averaged together to get one reading time for the entire area of the sentence. Finally, items
for which participants made a correct true/false judgment were extracted for analysis. We
included both items for which the correct answer was true and for which the correct answer was
false because participants did not know until they reached the comprehension statement if the
item would be true or false, therefore, the actual correct answer should not affect reading times
online. Note that this contrasts with Experiments 2 and 3, where only correctly judged acceptable
and grammatical items could be used due to the nature of the stimuli.
Critical area reading times were first tested in a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC)
mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA which revealed a main effect of complexity,
F (3, 90 ) = 21.94, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .42, and an interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90 ) =
2.72, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .08, reflected by the fact that critical area reading times were longer for
sentences with animate reduced object-relative clauses than for those with inanimate reduced
object-relative clauses, t (31) = 2.43, p = .02, but there were no other significant differences.
Figure 3.3.4 below shows mean by phrase reading times for the experimental sentences (OR-U
and OR-R) along with reading times in the analogous areas of filler sentences (MC and SR).

Figure 3.3.4. Experiment 1 Set 1 critical area (i.e., by phrase) reading times, with standard error
bars.
One oddity about the critical area reading times in Figure 3.3.4 is that they are so long for
main clause items regardless of animacy. An explanation for this may be that main clause
sentences and reduced object-relative sentences are completely indistinguishable from each other
for the first three words. That is, they both begin with a noun phrase and a verb in the past
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tense/participle form (e.g., The shelf contained). It is not until a by phrase appears that a
participant knows the sentence is indeed a reduced object-relative. Given that reduced objectrelative sentences were twice as frequent as main clause sentences in the set (40 vs. 20), it is
possible that participants spent longer reading the noun phrase following the first three words
(e.g., an entire encyclopedia) because they were surprised or confused at the lack of a by phrase.
While this oddity in the filler sentences is interesting, the more pressing contrast for the
purposes of replicating Just and Carpenter (1992) is found in the experimental object-relative
sentences only. The left panel of Figure 3.3.5 below shows the recreated critical area reading
times from Just and Carpenter (1992) while the right panel shows critical area reading times
from the current experiment for comparison. In the left panel, we can see that animacy did not
matter for Just and Carpenter’s (1992) low-span participants, but for their high-span participants
an inanimate head noun led to significantly faster reading times in the critical area than when the
head noun was animate. We see no such effects in the right panel (as expected, given the lack of
significant interactions above).

Figure 3.3.5. Recreated results of Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left panel, next to actual data
for Set 1 in Experiment 1 on the right.
Clearly critical area reading times in Figure 3.3.5 do not replicate the principle finding of
Just and Carpenter (1992). There were no differences associated with WMC, and certainly no
WCAREQ interaction called for by Waters and Caplan (1996a). One explanation for this might be
found in the debrief questionnaire. Participants were asked specifically about any button pressing
strategies they may have employed while reading sentences. The overwhelming majority of
participants, both low- and high-span (and in all judgment conditions, a point to be revisited
later), reported that as they became accustomed to the tasks, they began to realize it was easier to
press as fast as they could in order to get all of the words of the sentence in their minds so that
they could make the judgment, especially when the sentences were longer. As previously
mentioned, participants knew from the beginning of each trial the approximate length of the
sentence due to the fact that dashes held the places of the words that had not yet appeared.
Participants could also tell approximately how close to the end of a sentence they were for the
same reason. Sentences in Set 1 were longer than in the other two sets, and note that the reading
times in the right panel are at the same level as the fastest, facilitated reading times found in Just
and Carpenter (1992). Thus, although it has been argued that the self-paced word-by-word
presentation paradigm is equivalent to first-pass reading times collected with eye-trackers (Just,
Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982), this may not have been the case in the current study due to a
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strategy inadvertently introduced by the method of presentation (a method used, it should be
noted, by both Just et al., 1982 and King & Just, 1991).
In order to determine whether or not this ‘rushing strategy hypothesis’ holds any weight,
we attempted to separate participants by their overall reading speed. We first calculated mean
per-word reading times for each participant on each type of object-relative sentence and found
the median reading time for both types. We then classified participants as either ‘fast,’ ‘mixed,’
or ‘slow.’ Fast participants were below the median reading time on both true and false items,
while slow participants were above for both. Mixed participants were above the median on one
type and below it on the other. The majority of participants were classified as ‘fast’ (N = 20, 19,
18, and 14 respectively for each sentence type), while one quarter or less were ‘slow’ (N = 7, 8,
5, and 8 respectively). The remaining participants were classified as ‘mixed.’ While these
imbalanced sample sizes violate the assumptions of standard statistical tests, we can still look at
the trends in the data by plotting them for comparison with the data above. Figure 3.3.6 below
shows the critical area reading times for ‘fast’ participants in the left panel and those for ‘slow’
participants on the right (‘mixed’ participants are not shown, but their reading times were similar
to those of the ‘fast’ participants, just slightly slower overall when averaged together).

Figure 3.3.6. Fast vs. Slow participant critical area reading times, presented for comparison with
the Just and Carpenter (1992) data recreated above.
The first thing to note about Figure 3.3.6 is that critical area reading times of ‘fast’
participants are all below 350ms, whereas in Just and Carpenter (1992) the fastest critical area
reading time was 350ms, and this is true for both low- and high-span participants. Moving to the
right panel, we can see that ‘slow’ participants show critical area reading times within the range
of reading times observed by Just and Carpenter (1992) and that there is now some
differentiation between low- and high-span participants (i.e., the blue and red lines have drawn
apart from each other as they did not in the left panel). Though the reading times in the right
panel do not show a pattern identical to that of the Just and Carpenter (1992) data, this is perhaps
not overly troubling, given the extremely small sample sizes represented in this panel that also
preclude the use of traditional statistical tests for group differences. Rather, the important
takeaway from this qualitative examination is that participants who rushed through sentences all
look the same, while those who slowed down showed some evidence of differences related to
span group membership, suggesting that there is indeed something to our ‘rushing strategy
hypothesis’ that explains the lack of the WCAREQ interaction in the analyses reported above.
A second explanation for the lack of an effect of WMC may be related to the stimuli
themselves. Subjectively speaking, participants reported that the Set 1 sentences were the
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easiest/least confusing of the all the sets they encountered in the study (no matter the order of set
presentation, suggesting it was not just an order effect). Perhaps, for whatever reason, the
sentences created for Set 1 were not challenging enough to elicit the WMC difference. Just and
Carpenter (1992) themselves revised sentences from Ferreira and Clifton (1986) in order to find
the effect, and these same sentences were used as a starting point for the sentences created for
Set 1 in the current experiment (because that list was available, whereas the Just and Carpenter
sentences were not). It is possible that there was some unknown element missing from the
current set that inadvertently lessened the difficulty of the sentences. The fact that there was an
effect of animacy in reading times for the last area of the sentence (i.e., the words following the
critical area) that carried over into judgment response times (as described above) supports this
argument because the effect was present for both low- and high-span participants (though
showed a trend to disappear for low-spans in the reduced sentences). Just and Carpenter’s (1992)
explanation of their data was that high- but not low-span participants were taking the inanimacy
of the head noun into account during online processing in order to read the critical area faster.
According to single resource theory, this difference between span groups should occur because
the complex object-relative sentences should be too demanding by virtue of their syntactic
structures to allow low-span participants to use the pragmatic cue online. Thus, the data of the
current experiment suggest that the syntactic structures of the Set 1 sentences were not
demanding enough to preclude the online use of pragmatic cues by low-span participants. This
conclusion would be strengthened by results demonstrating the WCAREQ interaction with sets
rated subjectively as more difficult. According to participant reports, the most difficult set was
Set 2, while Set 3 fell somewhere in the middle.
Waters and Caplan (1996b) Stimuli – Set 2 (Appendix C)
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures on ANOVA on true/false judgment accuracy showed a main effect of complexity, F (3,
90) = 99.29, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .80, and of answer, F (1, 30) = 121.51, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .80. The main
effect of complexity was qualified by an interaction with animacy, F (3, 90) = 7.76, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2
= .34, which was in turn qualified by a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC,
F (3, 90) = 3.21, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10. This interaction is reflected by the fact that low-spans were
significantly less accurate than high-spans on sentences with inanimate subject-relative clauses, t
(30) = -3.51, p < .01. All other contrasts were non-significant.
The main effect of complexity was also qualified by an interaction with answer, F (3, 90)
= 50.16, p < .001, such that accuracy was significantly higher for true items than for false for all
sentence types, except reduced object-relatives, where accuracy was significantly higher for false
items than for true, all ts > 4.62, ps < .001. Answer also interacted with animacy, F (3, 90) =
17.08, p < .001. For true items, accuracy was higher with an inanimate subject than with an
animate subject, but for false items accuracy was higher for animate subjects than for inanimate.
Figure 3.3.7 below shows the accuracy scores (out of 10) collapsed across answer.
The three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC on subject-relative items,
where low-spans showed lower accuracy for inanimate items than high-spans, is unexpected and
is certainly not the WCAREQ interaction that would support single resource theory. One
explanation may be that in these items both the subject and the object were inanimate, while
animate versions had inanimate objects. Perhaps when it came time to judge the veracity of the
true/false statement, low-span participants had a harder time distinguishing the subject from the
object if both were inanimate.
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Overall we can see in Figure 3.3.7 that the judgment accuracy drops significantly for the
experimental sentences compared to the filler sentences. Much of this effect is due to a drop in
accuracy on false items. Because of this drop on false items, 18 of the 32 participants did not
have any correctly judged false items for at least one sentence type. This is important because
accuracy was used as a criterion for including a trial in the critical area reading time analysis
below. Critical area reading times are collapsed across answer, due to the fact that judgments
come after the sentence has been read, but it is still worth noting that 18 of 32 participants
contributed reading times from correctly judged true items only. More details will be provided
about these dropped data points below.

Figure 3.3.7. Experiment 1 Set 2 True/False judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on true/false judgment response time showed main effects of complexity, F (3, 90) =
34.11, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .52, and animacy, F (1, 30) = 19.00, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 34. These main effects
were qualified by a two-way interaction of complexity and animacy, F 3, 90) = 4.32, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2
= .14. Figure 3.3.8 shows the means for each sentence type.
The interaction of complexity and animacy was due to the fact that response times were
longer for inanimate main clause and subject-relative sentences than for animate main clause and
subject-relative sentences, ts > 3.85, ps < .01, but there was no significant difference between
inanimate and animate object-relative items of either type.
Critical Area Reading Time.
Unlike the Just and Carpenter’s (1992) stimuli, the Waters and Caplan (1996b)
experimental sentences do not contain a by phrase. For this reason, the critical area in Set 2
sentences is defined as the second verb (which was also the last word of the sentence) because
this is where any ambiguity is resolved, and thus should place the greatest demand on processing
resource(s).
As with Set 1 stimuli, critical area reading times analyses for Set 2 were confined to those
sentences for which a correct true/false judgment was made (again, regardless of whether the
correct answer was true or false) and reading times were trimmed using the participants’ own
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means and standard deviations, as described above. However, because of the difficulty in
correctly responding to false comprehension items, 18 of 32 participants never did so for at least
one type of sentence. All told, 37 data points were lost, with five participants losing one type
each, eight losing two types, four losing three types, and one losing four types. Put another way:
11 people did not contribute critical area reading times for false inanimate OR-U sentences, 7 did
not contribute for false animate OR-U items, 7 did not contribute for false inanimate OR-R
items, 11 did not contribute for false animate OR-R items, and 1 did not contribute for false
inanimate MC items. Because of this amount of missing data, all analyses reported below were
also conducted including items with incorrect true/false judgments. The results did not change,
and so are reported here with the incorrect items excluded to be consistent with the previous
literature. Figure 3.3.9 below shows the mean reading time for each sentence type by span group.

Figure 3.3.8. Experiment 1 Set 2 True/False judgment response times, with standard error bars.

Figure 3.3.9. Experiment 1 Set 2 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.
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A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA revealed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 7.35, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .20, a main effect
of WMC, F (1, 30) = 4.92, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14, an interaction between complexity and animacy, F
(3, 90) = 4.99, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14, and an interaction between complexity and WMC, F (3, 90) =
3.68, p < .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11. The interaction of complexity and animacy was reflected in the fact that
critical area reading times were significantly longer for inanimate subject-relatives than for
animate subject-relatives, t (31) = 3.35, p < .01, but no other contrasts were significant. The
interaction of complexity and WMC reflected the fact that low-spans were significantly faster
than high-spans for main clause items, subject-relative items, and reduced object-relative items,
ts > 2.41, p < .04. Figure 3.3.10 below shows the critical area reading times for just the
experimental object-relative sentences in Set 2, displayed for comparison with Just and
Carpenter’s (1992) findings.

Figure 3.3.10. Recreated results of Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left panel, next to actual data
for Set 2 in Experiment 1 on the right.
In the left panel of Figure 3.3.10 we can see that Just and Carpenter (1992) found an
interaction of animacy and WMC on their by phrase sentences. The right panel of Figure 3.3.10
clearly shows that we did not replicate this interaction with Waters and Caplan’s (1996b) garden
path sentences. Data from the current study do, however, show an interaction of complexity and
WMC that was not found by Waters and Caplan (1996b). The question is why the nature of the
interaction in our results differs from the results of both of the previous studies.
It is perhaps easiest to explain why our results differ from those of Waters and Caplan
(1996b). In that study, reading time for individual words or phrases was not recorded directly.
Rather, the authors estimated per word reading time by dividing the time it took to read and
respond to sentences by the number of words in the sentence. This methodology assumes a priori
that reading times are uniform across all areas of the sentence and does not allow any differences
based upon sentence area to be seen. In the current experiment, we are able to examine
differences in reading speed in different areas. Indeed, if we look at mean reading times for all
words leading up to the critical area we see a marginal effect of complexity (p = .051), no effect
of WMC, and no interaction of the two; This is exactly what Waters and Caplan (1996b) found
with their per word reading time estimate. It is only when we are able to separate the last
word/critical area from the rest of the sentence that the effect of WMC, including its interaction
with complexity, emerges.
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Next, we must consider why it could be that we find a different two-way interaction than
that found by Just and Carpenter (1992). In the first place, our reading times differ from those in
the previous study both because they are longer overall and because it is the high- and not lowspans who show the longest reading times. The fact that our reading times are all equal to or
greater than the longest reading times found in Just and Carpenter (1992) is likely attributable to
the well-known sentence wrap up effect discussed by Balogh et al. (1998), where reading times
just generally increase at the ends of sentences, because the critical area in this set of sentences is
also the last word. The flip between low- and high-spans too is explainable by the construction of
the sentence as it is in line with the finding of MacDonald et al. (1992) that high-spans show
longer reading times at the ends of garden path sentences than low-spans. Those authors
attributed the difference to a cost that high-spans pay for maintaining dual interpretations of a
sentence during processing.
The second issue to examine is why the two-way interaction in the current data is
between WMC and complexity rather than WMC and animacy, as it was in Just and Carpenter
(1992). Comparing this set to the first, accuracy was significantly lower while judgment response
times were significantly slower (see section 3.4 below for statistics across all three sets),
suggesting that these items were quite difficult. Two factors could account for this difficulty. The
first factor is the structure of the sentences themselves. Although short, reduced object-relatives
in Set 2 are quite confusing due to the abrupt onset of a verb at the end. For most people, their
first reading of the sentence “The horse raced past the barn fell” is extremely confusing and we
would expect lower performance on such sentences. However, we would also expect
performance to be better when these sentences are unreduced, and yet it is not. This suggests a
second explanation for the difficulty: the nature of the true/false comprehension items.
Unlike in the previous set, true/false comprehension items in the current set could not be
created simply by reversing the roles of the subject and object of the relative clause in the
stimulus sentence because the subject is not explicitly present in the sentence (i.e., the entity that
raced the horse past the barn is never named). Instead, true/false comprehension items were
formed by making the object of the relative clause the actor or object of the verb. In other words,
for Set 1 participants had both nouns in the true/false item and simply had to judge if the
relationship between them was accurate (i.e., did the person race the horse or did the horse race
the person), while in Set 2 they had to determine if the object did the action or had the action
done to it by some unnamed entity (i.e., did the horse race itself past the barn or did someone
else race it past the barn). This second judgment is arguably a far more subtle distinction,
especially in the case of inanimate objects.
This difference also raises the question of whether or not the animacy of the noun was as
relevant to the task in Set 2 as it was in Set 1. In Set 1 items, most of the subjects of the by phrase
were animate as a matter of course (see Appendix B). We did not purposely set out to manipulate
this factor as previous studies did not discuss doing so, but note that this would mean that
true/false judgments for animate items would most often involve choosing which of two animate
nouns performed an action while inanimate items would involve choosing between nouns that
contrasted in animacy. This contrast may account for the facilitation effect of inanimate nouns on
critical area reading times in reduced object-relatives in Set 1 because storing nouns with similar
properties (e.g., both common, both proper, etc.) while processing a complex sentence can
impair comprehension performance (Gordon, Hendrick, & Levine, 2002). In Set 2, on the other
hand, there was no contrast of animacy for any items because true/false items only ever
contained the head noun. Furthermore, because the head noun was animate and inanimate
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equally often, animacy itself was not a strong clue as to the head noun’s role in the sentence, and
thus participants would gain little by incorporating the animacy cue online during sentence
processing. If it is the case that participants can alter their reading strategies to best meet task
demands, then it would be unsurprising to find little effect of animacy on the critical area reading
times of Set 2 sentences.
Finally, it must be noted that although we found a two-way interaction of WMC and
complexity that Waters and Caplan (1996b) did not, we did not find the WCAREQ interaction that
they would argue is necessary to support single resource theory. We have already argued that
animacy may not have been the strongest cue in Set 2 sentences, due both to the nature of the
sentences themselves and by extension to the nature of the true/false comprehension items, and
that this may have altered reading strategies. However, in Figure 3.3.9, we can see a nonsignificant trend for animacy to affect the critical area reading times of reduced object-relative
sentences for high-spans only. The difference in these reading times, 83-ms, roughly equal to the
significant 75-ms difference found by Just and Carpenter (1992) on the same type of sentence.
One reason this this difference does not reach significance in the current data may be due the
large degree of variability in the high-spans’ reading times (see standard error bars in Figure
3.3.9). Low-spans, on the other hand, do not show the slightest trend for an animacy affect and
also have much less variability in their reading times. One explanation for this pattern of results
may be that high-spans differed more in the extent to which they altered their reading strategies
in response to task demands, whereas low-spans were more uniform in their reading strategy
shifts.
Waters and Caplan (2004) Stimuli – Set 3
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on true/false judgment accuracy showed significant main effects of
complexity, F (3, 90) = 9.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .23, and animacy, F (1, 30) = 16.57, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.36, which were qualified by a significant interaction between the two, F (3, 90) = 5.68, p < .01,
𝜂𝑝2 = .16. Examination of this interaction showed that accuracy was higher for animate objectrelative items (both unreduced and reduced) than for inanimate object-relative items, ts > 2.62,
ps ≤ .01, did not differ for subject-relative items, and was lower for animate main clause items
than for inanimate ones, t (31) = -2.78, p < .01.
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of WMC, F (1, 30) = 11.12, p < .01,
2
𝜂𝑝 = .27, such that accuracy was generally greater for high-spans than for low-spans. Finally,
there was a significant main effect of answer, F (1, 30) = 6.41, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .18, such that
accuracy was greater for true items than for false, suggesting a bias to response ‘true’ to items.
Figure 3.3.11 shows the accuracy scores (out of 10) for each sentence type, collapsed across
answer.
The fact that accuracy was higher for animate than inanimate reduced object-relatives is
interesting in that it is a reversal of the animacy effect found by Just and Carpenter (1992), and
suggests that inanimate items are the more ambiguous item type in Set 3 sentences. This reversal
makes sense in light of the structure of Set 3 sentences (see Appendix D), where the subject and
object of the relative clause are found at the beginning of the sentence and must be stored while
the rest of the sentence is processed. As previously mentioned, Gordon et al. (2002) found that
storing nouns that shared characteristics (in that case, the characteristic was common or proper
noun status) while processing complex structures impaired performance on the comprehension
task. Based on this result, it would make sense that having two animate nouns at the head of Set
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3 sentences would impair performance on the task, whereas having a contrasting pair (i.e., one
animate and one inanimate) would facilitate it.

Figure 3.3.11. Experiment 1 Set 3 True/False judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on true/false judgment response time showed significant main effects of complexity, F
(3, 90) = 29.68, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .50, and animacy, F (1, 30) = 22.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .43. These
main effects were qualified by two-way interactions between: complexity and WMC (𝜂𝑝2 = .10),
complexity and animacy (𝜂𝑝2 = .16), animacy and WMC (𝜂𝑝2 = .16), all Fs > 3.48, ps < .02, which
in turn were qualified by a significant three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC,
F (3, 90) = 3.39, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10. Examination of this interaction revealed that true/false
judgment response times were longer for inanimate unreduced object-relative items than animate
unreduced object-relative items for high-spans t (15) = 4.39, p < .01, and for inanimate reduced
object-relative items than for animate reduced object-relative items for high-spans, t (15) = 6.89,
p < .001. Figure 3.3.12 below shows the true/false judgment response times for each sentence
type, collapsed across answer.
Note that the significant three-way interaction is the WCAREQ called for by Waters and
Caplan (1996a) and as such is support for the single resource theory of syntactic processing, as it
would not be predicted in the dual resource view. However, there are two difficulties with this
Set 3 interaction being interpreted as a replication of the Just and Carpenter (1992) data. The first
problem is that the interaction is not in the critical area, as predicted by the single resource
theory, but rather is found at the time of the true/false judgment. One could argue that this
represents a carry-over effect in these sentences, where the differential processing is delayed
until the time of judgment. However, this is problematic in that it does not go far in rebutting the
Waters and Caplan (1996b) argument that an interaction with WMC in the syntactic processing
task is a result of post-interpretive processing triggered by the use of true/false judgments rather
than a reflection of online syntactic processing (even though that argument would not explain an
effect of animacy, since pragmatic cues should not affect complexity in the dual resources
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theory). One way to address this comment is to look at whether or not true/false reaction times in
Set 3 are significantly longer than those in the previous sets, which would suggest more postinterpretive processing occurring. This comparison will be presented below in section 3.4, but to
preview: Set 3 judgment response times were longer than those in Set 1 only for inanimate
object-relative items, and for no items in Set 2.

Figure 3.3.12. Experiment 1 Set 3 True/False judgment response times, with standard error bars.
Figure 3.3.13 below more clearly illustrates the WCAREQ interaction by displaying
true/false judgment response times for the object-relative sentences only. We can see that
animacy has no effect on the low-spans, but for high-spans true/false judgment responses are
faster when the subject is animate than when it is inanimate. This pattern of results suggests that
animate items are only less ambiguous for high-spans (because they can take into account the
pragmatic cue), and that any extra time spent in post-interpretive processing is only necessary
when the subject is inanimate and therefore more ambiguous. For low-spans, animacy is not
taken into account online, and so they spend an equal amount of time on the true/false judgment
for inanimate and animate items.

Figure 3.3.13. Recreated critical area reading times from Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left
panel, next to judgment response time data for Set 3 in Experiment 1 on the right.
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Critical Area Reading Time.
Like Waters and Caplan (1996b), the Waters and Caplan (2004) stimuli lack the by
phrase of the Just and Carpenter (1992) stimuli, and thus the critical area in these sentences was
defined as the second verb, where any ambiguity is resolved. However, unlike Waters and
Caplan (1996b), the second verb in Set 3 is followed by a short noun phrase (e.g., ‘the workers’)
rather than being the last word of the sentence itself. As with the previous sets, critical area
reading times were trimmed using individual means and standard deviations and items for which
participants made correct judgments were used for the following analyses.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 4.69, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14,
such that critical area reading times in main clause and subject-relative sentences were
significantly faster than those in unreduced and reduced object-relative sentences, ts > -2.08, ps <
.05. There were no other significant main effects or interactions. Figure 3.3.14 below shows the
means for each sentence type, while Figure 3.3.15 shows means in experimental sentences only
for comparison with Just and Carpenter (1992) data.

Figure 3.3.14. Experiment 1 Set 3 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.

Figure 3.3.15. Recreated results of Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left panel, next to actual data
for Set 3 in Experiment 1 on the right.
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The data in Figure 3.3.15 clearly show no replication of the Just and Carpenter (1992)
three-way interaction in the critical area. The same analyses were also conducted on the noun
phrase immediately following the second verb to see if any effect might be carried over into this
region, but this did not change the results. If one accepts the argument above that the animacy
cue was still at play in Set 3, albeit in the opposite direction from the first two sets, one would
still expect to find differences in the critical area reading times. These differences would just be
the opposite of those found in the Just and Carpenter (1992) data (i.e., high-spans showing longer
reading times for inanimate items than for animate ones). However, recall that we previously
argued that three factors might serve to wash out interactions in the critical area. The first factor
was the fast button pressing strategy employed by both low- and high-span participants,
particularly in longer sentences. Just as in the previous sets, participants knew how long Set 3
sentences were from the beginning of the trial. Set 3 sentence lengths (8 to 12 words) happen to
be intermediate between Set 1 and Set 2 (6 to 9 and 10 to 14 words respectively), suggesting that
rushing might still play a role in critical area reading times of these sentences.
The second, related factor mentioned above is the location of the critical area. In Set 1,
the critical area is right in the middle of the sentence, while in Set 2 it is the last word. For Set 3
the critical area is near the end of the sentence, but not the last word. The shifting of the threeway interaction from the critical area to the judgment response time could indicate that
ambiguous inanimate items were not resolved on the second verb as predicted, but rather could
only be properly interpreted after the noun phrase accompanying the verb had been read. Taking
a look at the deep structure of reduced inanimate object-relative sentences from each set supports
this argument because it can be seen that the final noun phrase is actually part of the same verb
phrase as V2, just as how in Set 1 and Set 2 the by phrase and V2 respectively are components of
verb phrases.

Figure 3.3.16. (Simplified) Deep structure sentence trees for inanimate reduced object-relative
sentences in Set 3 (left), Set 1 (middle) and Set 2 (right).
Finally, recall that we argued earlier that sentences must be of sufficient complexity to
elicit the three-way interaction. Set 1 did not appear to be complex enough, while Set 2 sentences
appeared to be quite difficult. Set 3 sentences were subjectively rated as having a difficulty level
somewhere between these two sets (see section 3.4 for statistical comparisons). Thus, it stands to
reason they might be of sufficient complexity to elicit the differences predicted by single
resource theory, albeit not in the critical area due to the other factors described above.
3.4 Cross-Set Comparisons
Our explanation of the pattern of results in Experiment 1 depends upon several
arguments. First, we argue that Set 1 sentences may have been too easy, while Set 2 and Set 3
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sentences were more difficult. Difficulty level matters because span group differences are not
likely to emerge when sentences are too easy. Secondly, we argue that the WCAREQ interaction
seen with Set 3 sentences in judgment response times is not entirely an artifact of postinterpretive processing, despite occurring after entire sentence has been read. Instead, we argue
that the interaction has shifted to judgment times due to the nature of Set 3 sentences. Finally, we
argue that the length of sentences impacted the speed with which participants pressed to continue
reading. Specifically, we argue that longer sentences (i.e., Set 1) led to more rushing than shorter
ones (i.e., Set 2). In order to examine these arguments, we compared all three dependent
variables (accuracy, judgment response time, and critical area reading time) across sets.
Accuracy.
Comparing Set 1 to Set 2, paired-samples t-tests revealed that accuracy was significantly
higher on Set 1 than Set 2 for all types of sentences, ts > 6.63, ps < .001. Comparing Set 1 to Set
3, paired-samples t-tests showed that accuracy was significantly lower on Set 1 animate items
(both unreduced and reduced), ts > -2.96, ps < .01. Finally, comparing Set 2 to Set 3, pairedsamples t-tests revealed that accuracy was significantly lower in Set 2 than in Set 3 for all
sentence types, ts > -6.07, ps < .001. Means are shown in Figure 3.4.1.

Figure 3.4.1. Judgment accuracy across sets, with standard error bars.
These accuracy results support the subjective reports of participants by showing that Set
2 sentences were indeed more difficult than either Set 1 or Set 3. The fact that animate items in
Set 3 were easier than those in Set 1 does not support the subjective reports that Set 3 was of
medium difficulty. It does, however, support the idea that animate items in Set 3 were not the
most difficult items because of the flip in the effects of the animacy cue in these types of
sentences.
Judgment Response Times.
Comparing Set 1 to Set 2, paired-samples t-tests revealed that judgment response time
was significantly longer in Set 2 than in Set 1 for all sentence types except animate reduced, ts >
-2.37, ps < .05. Comparing Set 1 to Set 3, paired-samples t-tests showed that judgment response
time was significantly longer in Set 3 than in Set 1 for inanimate items (both types), ts > -3.30,
ps < .01, but the reverse was true for animate reduced items, t (31) = 2.56, p < .05. Finally,
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comparing Set 2 to Set 3, paired-samples t-tests revealed that judgment response time was
significantly slower in Set 2 than in Set 3 for animate items of both types, ts > 2.33, ps < .05.
Mean number judgment response time for each set by sentence type can be seen in Figure 3.4.2.

Figure 3.4.2. True/False judgment response times across the three stimulus sets of Experiment 1,
with standard error bars.
The fact that Set 3 judgment response times are longer for inanimate than for animate
items does suggest that such items require more post-interpretive processing at the time of
judgment. However, the fact that animacy matters at all suggests that participants are able to take
animacy into account during sentence processing. It is only in the more ambiguous case, the
inanimate items, that extra post-interpretive processing is required to make a true/false
comprehension judgment. This supports the idea that the animacy cue operates differently in Set
3 than in Set 1 and Set 2. It also supports the single resource theory by showing that the
pragmatic cue can facilitate online processing, as does the fact that the cue only does this for
those participants with sufficient capacity (i.e., high-spans).
Critical Area Reading Times.
Comparing Set 1 to Set 2, paired-samples t-tests revealed that critical area reading times
were faster in Set 1 for all sentence types, ts > -4.81, ps < .001. Comparing Set 1 to Set 3, pairedsamples t-tests revealed that critical area reading times were faster in Set 1 for all sentence types,
ts > -4.46, ps < .001. Finally, comparing Set 2 to Set 3, paired-samples t-tests revealed that
critical area reading times were longer in Set 2 for all sentence types, ts > 2.79, ps < .01.
One explanation for the longer critical area reading times in Set 2 is that the critical area
is also the last word of the sentence, and thus subject to sentence wrap-up effects (Balogh et al.,
1998). However, sentence wrap-up effects do not explain why there is also an interaction of
complexity and WMC in the Set 2 critical area. Finding that interaction in Set 2 but not in Set 1
supports the argument that rushing in longer sentences (i.e., Set 1) may have contributed to a
lack of significant interactions with WMC in Set 1. When participants slowed down in the
critical area of the more difficult Set 2 sentences, this interaction emerged. Rushing may still
have been present in Set 3, but to a lesser extent than in Set 1 because of the intermediate length
of sentences in Set 3.
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Figure 3.4.3. Critical area reading times across sets, with standard error bars.
3.5 Discussion
The goal of Experiment 1 was to produce conditions under which syntactic processing
task performance on three types of experimental sentences formed in the manner of three
previous studies (Just and Carpenter, 1992; Waters and Caplan, 1996b; Waters and Caplan,
2004) could be directly compared with each other using the same presentation method and
syntactic processing task judgment type.
Presentation method (self-paced word-by-word reading paradigm) and task judgment
type (true/false comprehension items) were chosen specifically to replicate, if possible, the
results of Just and Carpenter (1992). Using by phrase object-relative sentences, Just and
Carpenter (1992) found a two-way interaction of WMC and animacy that supported single
resource theory by suggesting that high- but not low-span participants could use the animacy
pragmatic cue online to facilitate processing in the critical area of complex sentences. Waters
and Caplan (1996b) and Waters and Caplan (2004) used garden path and subject-object objectrelative sentences (among others) in a syntactic processing task with an acceptability/plausibility
judgment to refute the results of Just and Carpenter (1992). Both studies failed to find a
significant relationship between WMC and performance on the syntactic processing task.
However, comparison of these results to those of Just and Carpenter (1992) is somewhat
questionable, given that the studies also differed in presentation method and syntactic processing
task judgment type.
Using three sets of sentences, one for each of the previous experiments, we attempted to
determine the effects of these methodological differences on the three main dependent variables
of the syntactic processing task (accuracy, judgment response time, and critical area reading
time) by adding animacy to Sets 2 and 3, creating reduced versions of Set 3 experimental
sentences, and presenting all sentences in the same method and with the same type of judgment.
Given the data and arguments in the previous literature, we hypothesized that if single resource
theory were true we would find significant interactions with WMC for the critical area reading
times in all three sets. In particular, we were interested in whether or not these methods would
produce a three-way interaction of WMC, complexity, and animacy (i.e., the WCAREQ
interaction) that would satisfy Waters and Caplan’s (1996a) criticisms of single resource theory.
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Our results for Set 1 failed to replicate those of Just and Carpenter (1992), despite the fact
that this set contained the same type of by phrase sentences and we used the same judgment type
they did. Critical area reading times did show an interaction of complexity and animacy, but
there was no effect of WMC. Closer examination of the data and subjective participant reports
suggested that the failure to replicate may have been due to insufficient item difficulty and a
rushing reading strategy. Although we attempted to recreate the stimuli from Just and Carpenter
(1992), accuracy levels, subjective reports, and evidence of online use of the pragmatic cue by
low-span participants all suggest that our experimental sentences were less difficult than those in
the previous study for unknown reasons. Furthermore, subjective reports, comparisons of ‘fast’
and ‘slow’ readers, and comparisons of reading times across sets support the idea that the
majority of participants adopted a rushing reading strategy that may have obscured any effects of
WMC on critical area reading times. This is in contrast to previous literature that used the same
presentation methods and found per word reading times measured in this manner to be equivalent
to first-pass reading times measured with an eye-tracker (e.g., Just et al., 1982).
With Set 2 sentences we found a two-way interaction of WMC and complexity that was
not found by Waters and Caplan (1996b) using the same type of sentences, most likely because
the previous study used mean per word reading times rather than directly measuring critical area
reading times as in the current study. This two-way interaction is not, however, a direct
replication of Just and Carpenter’s (1992) interaction of WMC and animacy nor is it the
WCAREQ. Examination of standard error bars on these means suggests that this difference did not
reach significance in the current study due to high variability. Based upon accuracy data and
consideration of the nature of the Set 2 experimental sentences and their corresponding true/false
comprehension statements, we argue that this high variability in the high-span group may be a
result of differing reading strategies prompted by task demands. Specifically, we argue that the
animacy cue was not as relevant to making true/false judgments in Set 2 as in Set 1 because of
the lack of an explicitly named subject of the object-relative clause, and that because of this
decreased relevance, at least some high-span participants adopted a reading strategy that ignored
animacy during processing of the complex sentences.
With Set 3 sentences we found the WCAREQ interaction, but it was located in the
judgment response times rather than in the critical area of the sentence. It is not entirely clear
why this was the case, but one possibility suggested by cross-set comparisons is that the Set 3
sentences were long enough to produce a rushing reading strategy similar to that seen in Set 1. It
could also be argued, however, that the effects of WMC are seen in judgment response times and
not the critical area because judgments in this set required more post-interpretive processing. We
cannot entirely rule out this possibility, though it seems unlikely based upon cross-set
comparisons showing that Set 3 judgment times were only longer than those in Set 1 for the most
difficult items (inanimate reduced object-relatives in this set). In other words, the results suggest
that high-spans do incorporate the animacy of nouns online, but require extra time to make
judgments when the noun’s animacy status is not helpful for answering the true/false item.
Together, the results of Experiment 1 do not fully support either single or dual resource
theory, but they do suggest that several factors that have been previously overlooked can
significantly impact results and should thus be considered carefully in future research.

55

CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2
4.1 Introduction
Experiment 2 was an attempt to replicate Waters and Caplan (1996b, 2004) using their
judgment type (sense judgments) on a subset of their stimuli (garden path and subject-object
sentences respectively) as well as the by phrase sentences of Just and Carpenter (1992) in order
to determine what effects, if any, judgment type has on syntactic processing task performance.
In addition to modifying the judgment type, data analyses are somewhat different in
Experiment 2, to match the studies we are attempting to replicate. Waters and Caplan (1996b)
did not consider critical area reading times to be the primary dependent variable because they did
not measure it. Rather, they first analyzed A' scores and response times for the sentence
judgments. Beyond that, they did calculate mean per word reading times by dividing the total
time to read the sentence and respond to the judgment by the number of words in the sentence.
These same measures will be examined in the current experiment. In addition to these analyses,
we will also look at our data in the manner of Waters and Caplan (2004). In this study judgment
accuracy was looked at as a mean proportion correct, judgment response times were not
considered of interest, and critical area listening times were reported and compared to listening
times in other areas of the sentences. Finally, these data will also be looked at in the manner of
Just and Carpenter (1992) for ease of comparison with the first experiment.
4.2 Methods
Participants
Participants were 32 (27 female) undergraduate psychology students at Louisiana State
University who received course credit for their participation. All participants reported normal or
corrected to normal vision and hearing, and no history of language or speech impairments. Mean
age was 19.50 (SD = 1.32). Sixteen participants were categorized as low-span and 16 as highspan (descriptives for WMC tasks can be found in Table 4.2.1 below). An additional 19
participants were run in Experiment 2, but 15 were dropped because they were medium-span and
the remaining four did not achieve the 85% performance criterion on at least one automated task.
Table 4.2.1. Experiment 2 WMC measure descriptives.

R-span
Automated S-span
Tasks O-span
Composite
D&C
(1980)

Original
Recode

Low-span
Mean
SD
-1.01
0.66
-0.94
0.84
-1.03
1.14
-1.23
0.54

High-span
Mean
SD
0.89
0.30
0.90
0.52
0.90
0.28
1.11
0.18

2.06
0.72

2.63
0.79

0.25
0.08

0.50
0.06

Syntactic Processing Task
The three stimulus sets of Experiment 2 are identical to those used in Experiment 1,
including the main clause (MC) and subject-relative (SR) filler sentences, with the exception that
items which were previously followed by a false statement for the true/false judgment were
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modified to contain a word that did not make sense in the context of the rest of the sentence.
Items that were previously followed by a true comprehension statement were not modified. After
each sentence, participants were asked to judge whether or not it made sense by pressing keys
marked “Yes” or “No” on the keyboard.
Because of the very different constructions of object-relative sentences in the three sets, it
was the case that the semantically anomalous words were found in different locations within
each type of sentence. For the Waters and Caplan (1996b) garden path sentences (both OR-U and
OR-R), the semantically anomalous words of necessity preceded the final verb sentence (e.g.,
The hair that was rinsed in hot bacon dried.), while in the Waters and Caplan (2004) subjectobject sentences, semantically anomalous words were always last, located in the noun phrase
following the critical verb (e.g., The document that the machine copied shocked the cassette.),
and in the Just and Carpenter (1992) sentences the anomalous word was the last in the by phrase
(e.g., The pedestrian that was followed by the potato amused the gathered spectators.)
All other presentation methods were the same as in Experiment 1, including
counterbalancing of set presentation and randomization of blocks within sets, thus we have once
again have judgment accuracy, judgment response time, and critical area reading time data for
analyses.
Working Memory Capacity Measures
The same four working memory capacity (WMC) measures from Experiment 1 were
used in Experiment 2, in precisely the same way. Once again, composite z-scores for the
automated tasks were used to select participants for the low- and high-span groups, and results
were also calculated using the recoded Daneman and Carpenter (1980) Reading-span task to split
participants. Results were the same for both splits, so the first analyses with the composite zscores are the ones reported here.
4.3 Results
Waters and Caplan (1996b) Stimuli – Set 2 (Appendix C)
The Set 2 stimuli in Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items which were followed by a false comprehension item in Experiment 1 were
modified in Experiment 2 to contain a semantically anomalous word. This word always came
before the critical area (i.e., the second verb) in the OR-U and OR-R sentences because the
critical area coincides with the last word in these garden path sentences.
The primary variable of interest to Waters and Caplan (1996b) was sense judgment
accuracy, and specifically A' scores. In their whole sentence condition, Waters and Caplan
(1996b) also calculated mean per word reading times by dividing the time between initial
sentence presentation and participant response by the number of words in the sentence. In order
for more direct comparisons, these measures will be added to the reported results for Set 2.
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) within-between repeated measures ANOVA showed a main
effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 47.18, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .47, but no effect of WMC and no
interaction between the two. Note that animacy was not included in this analysis because Waters
and Caplan (1996b) did not utilize this factor and we are attempting to determine if our data
resembles theirs. A' were significantly lower on reduced object-relative items than all other
items for both low- and high-span participants, ts > 5.74, ps < .001. The left panel of Figure 4.3.1
below shows the A' scores reconstructed from the results of the relevant sentences in Waters and
Caplan (1996b), while the right panel shows the A' scores for Set 2 (calculated according to
Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). Comparing the panels, it can be seen that reduced object-relative
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performance was much lower in Set 2 than in the Waters and Caplan (1996b) data, though the
unreduced object-relative scores are comparable. Despite this difference, the Set 2 data
represents a replication of Waters and Caplan (1996b) in that there is no effect of WMC and no
interaction with complexity.

Figure 4.3.1. Recreated A' scores from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel compared to
Set 2 A' scores in Experiment 2 on the right, with standard error bars.
For the sake of comparison, and because Waters and Caplan (1996b) did not manipulate
animacy, sense judgment accuracy in terms of number of correctly judged items was also
examined in the manner of Experiment 1, with a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2
(WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis showed main effects
of complexity, F (3, 90) = 37.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .56, animacy, F (1, 30) = 16.97, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.36, and answer, F (1, 30) = 30.25, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .50. These main effects were qualified by twoway interactions of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 5.14, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .15, of complexity
and answer, F (3, 90) = 47.04, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .61, and of animacy and answer, F (1, 30) = 4.41, p
< .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13. These two-way interactions were in turn qualified by three-way interactions of
complexity, animacy, and answer, F (3, 90) = 13.19, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .31, of complexity, answer,
and WMC, F (3, 90) = 4.45, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13, and of complexity, animacy, and WMC, F (3, 90)
= 3.31, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10. Figure 4.3.2 displays the means by sentence type.
Examination of the three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and answer revealed
that acceptable item accuracy was higher for inanimate main clauses than for animate main
clauses, t (31) = -3.52, p < .01, for inanimate reduced object relative clauses than for animate
reduced object-relative clauses, t (31) = -3.35, p < .01, and for animate unreduced object-relative
clauses than for inanimate unreduced object-relative clauses, t (31) = 2.20, p < .05. For
unacceptable items, accuracy was higher for animate main clauses than for inanimate main
clauses, t (31) = 3.04, p < .01, and for inanimate subject-relative clauses than for animate
subject-relative clauses, t (31) = -4.06, p < .001. Examination of the three-way interaction of
complexity, answer, and WMC revealed that the low-spans were significantly more accurate than
high-spans on acceptable reduced object-relative items, t (30) = 2.21, p = .04, but no other
contrasts were significant.
Finally, examination of the three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC
revealed low-spans were significantly more accurate than high-spans on the animate reduced
object-relative items, t (30) = 3.17, p < .01, but no other contrasts were significant. Note that this
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three-way interaction includes the variables of the WCAREQ , but is not of the form predicted by
single resource theory in that the theory would not predict that low-spans would have higher
accuracy than high-spans. However, this odd result does not necessarily represent a serious
challenge to the single resource theory because accuracy is an offline measure and Just and
Carpenter’s (1992) key finding rested upon support from the online measure of critical area
reading time.

Figure 4.3.2. Experiment 2 Set 2 Sense judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
As in Experiment 1, performance on unacceptable items in Set 2 was apparently
significantly more difficult than in other sets. Ten of 32 participants did not have any accurate
unacceptable items for animate reduced object-relative sentences. Unlike Experiment 1,
however, this does not affect the analysis of critical area reading times because only correctly
judged acceptable items will be used, but there was one person out of 32 that did not have any
correctly judged acceptable animate reduced object-relative items.
Judgment Response Time.
Waters and Caplan (1996b) did not analyze sense judgment response times independently
in their whole sentence condition, which is the condition of their study most analogous to the
current experiment. Rather, they took the entire time from the initial presentation of a sentence
until the sense judgment response (i.e., reading time and response time) and divided by the
number of words in the sentence to estimate a mean per word reading time. This measure is more
analogous to the critical area reading time measure than to the sense judgment response time, so
here we will look at sense judgment response times exactly as we did in Experiment 1. Figure
4.3.3 displays the mean sense judgment response times for Set 2.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on sense judgment response times showed an interaction between complexity and
animacy, F (3, 90) = 3.34, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10, and another between animacy and WMC, F (1, 30)
= 5.57, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .16. The interaction between complexity and animacy is due to significantly
longer sense judgment response times for animate subject-relatives than for inanimate subjectrelatives, t (31) = 2.54, p = .02. The interaction between animacy and WMC is due to low-spans
having significantly faster sense judgment response times than high-spans for inanimate subject59

relatives, inanimate unreduced object-relatives, and inanimate reduced object-relatives, all ts > 2.21, ps < .05. These two interactions do not represent a replication of key finding of Just and
Carpenter (1992).

Figure 4.3.3. Experiment 2 Set 2 Sense judgment response times, with standard error bars.
Critical Area Reading Time.
As already mentioned, Waters and Caplan (1996b) did not examine critical area reading
times but rather divided reading-plus-judgment reaction times by the number of words in each
sentence to arrive at mean per word reading times. In the current experiment, sense judgment
reaction times were already separated out and examined above, but we did calculate mean word
reading times by summing all individual word reading times and dividing by the number of
words in the sentence. The left panel of Figure 4.3.4 below shows the mean per word reading
times as recreated from the Waters and Caplan (1996b) data, while the right panel shows the
mean per word reading times calculated on the Set 2 data. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) withinbetween repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant main effects of complexity or WMC,
and no interactions. The lack of an effect of WMC and an interaction is consistent with Waters
and Caplan (1996b), though the lack of an effect of complexity is not.
The problem with the Waters and Caplan (1996b) method of calculating per word reading
times is that it assumes reading times remain steady throughout sentences. This assumption is
contrary to the prediction of the single resource theory that reading times will increase when
processing demands are high (i.e., in the critical area of sentences). Calculating mean per word
reading times from reading times for the whole sentence cannot possibly address any variability
attributable to region. Thus, we also looked at critical area reading times in Set 2 sentences in the
manner of Experiment 1. However, unlike in Experiment 1, it is not sound to include all items in
this analysis because the presence of an anomalous word is likely to disrupt processing
independently of any effects of syntactic complexity, and in Set 2 garden path sentences the
anomalous word always came before the critical area, due to the critical area coinciding with the
last word of the sentence. Thus, the current analysis was conducted only on correctly judged
acceptable items rather than on all correctly judged items. It should also be noted that one person
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did not have any correct acceptable animate reduced items, so that person was dropped from the
analysis.

Figure 4.3.4. Recreated per word reading times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel
compared to per word data from Set 2 in Experiment 2 on the right, with standard error bars.
Figure 4.3.5 below shows mean critical area reading times for each sentence type for
acceptable items only. These times were trimmed as described in Experiment 1, using individual
means and standard deviations to replace less than 2% of outlying data points overall and less
than 2% for any individual. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) within-between repeated
measures ANOVA showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 87) = 5.09, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .15, such
that critical area reading times were faster in both main clause and subject-relative clause
sentences than in reduced object-relatives, ts > -2.77, ps < .01. There was also a main effect of
animacy, F (1, 29) = 6.05, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .21, such that critical area reading times were faster for
inanimate than for animate items. The lack of a two-way interaction of WMC and animacy does
not replicate the findings of Just and Carpenter (1992), while the lack of a two-way interaction of
WMC and complexity fails to replicate Experiment 1 results.
Figure 4.3.6 below shows the comparison of Just and Carpenter (1992) and Set 2 critical
area reading times for object-relative sentences only. Note that the trend in the Set 2 data for
high-spans is similar to that in the Just and Carpenter (1992) data; the high-spans show faster
reading times for the critical area in the object-relative sentences when the head noun is
inanimate than when it is animate. However, unlike Just and Carpenter (1992), this trend is also
present to some extent in the low-span data, resulting in a lack of a significant three-way
interaction. Finally, note the difference in scale between the two panels. As in Experiment 1, Set
2 critical area reading times are significantly longer overall than those found in the Just and
Carpenter (1992) data, likely due to the same sentence wrap-up effects discussed earlier (Balogh,
et al., 1998).
The bigger question in the context of the current study is why the Set 2 results of
Experiment 1 were not replicated in Experiment 2, when the only thing that changed was the
type of judgment being made about the items. One reason may be that the Experiment 2
judgment type required the insertion of an anomalous word into the Set 2 sentences. These
anomalous words had to be located before the critical area of the experimental sentences because
the critical area was the very last word. Although we only included acceptable items in the
current analysis, the presence of the anomalous word before the critical area in half the
experimental trials may have encouraged the use of a different task strategy for all sentences
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because participants could easily have learned that the key to answering the sense judgment was
the second-to-last word of the majority of the sentences in the task. A change in reading strategy
could very well have washed out the interaction found in Experiment 2. One way to determine if
this explanation holds weight is to look at reading times on the anomalous words in Experiment
2 sentences (left panel of Figure 4.3.7 below) compared to reading times on the non-anomalous
words in the same location in Experiment 1 sentences (right panel of Figure 4.3.7 below).

Figure 4.3.5. Experiment 2 Set 2 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.

Figure 4.3.6. Recreated Just and Carpenter (1992) data in the left panel compared to Experiment
2 Set 2 critical area reading times on the right.
As we can see in Figure 4.3.7, reading times at the anomalous word in Experiment 2
show an upward trajectory for both low- and high-span individuals that continues into the last
word of the sentence, which is also the critical area seen in Figure 4.3.6. In Experiment 1, on the
other hand, reading times are fairly flat just before the critical area. The interaction of complexity
and WMC does not emerge until the final word. These differing patterns at the same location in
Set 2 sentences do seem to suggest that there is a different strategy at play in the two judgment
conditions. Thus, although Waters and Caplan (1996a) argued that the sense judgment was a
better syntactic processing measure because it was a less offline measure than the comprehension
item, it seems likely that this judgment type is problematic, at least for use with object-relative
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sentences constructed in the manner of Waters and Caplan (1996b) that require the anomaly to
appear before the critical area of the sentence because it changes the way participants read the
sentences and the nature of this change is the same in both low- and high-spans.

Figuer 4.3.7. Experiment 2 anomalous word reading times in the left panel compared to
Experiment 1 same-location word reading times in the right panel.
Waters and Caplan (2004) Stimuli – Set 3 (Appendix D)
The Set 3 stimuli in Experiment 2 were identical to those in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items which were followed by a false comprehension item in Experiment 1 were
modified in Experiment 2 to contain a semantically anomalous word. Anomalous words were
deliberately placed after the critical area (i.e., the second verb). Because the critical area was
towards the end of the sentence, this meant that the anomalous word always ended up being the
last word of the sentence. Note that this differs from Waters and Caplan (2004) in that (as far as
can be determined from their example sentences) their anomalous words appeared before the
critical area (e.g., The secretary that the camera met drove the car.).
The results of Waters and Caplan (2004) were presented somewhat differently than those
of Waters and Caplan (1996b). First, their sense judgment accuracy measure was proportion
correct rather than A'. Secondly, because they presented their stimuli auditorily in phrases, with
participants controlling the rate of presentation, Waters and Caplan (2004) were able to analyze
listening times across sentence regions. The results of Set 3 are presented in accordance with
these methods and those of the previous experiments for the sake of comparison.
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA on
mean proportion correct was conducted in a manner analogous to Waters and Caplan (2004).
This analysis showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 3.33, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10, such that
proportion scores were higher for main clause than for subject-relative clause sentences, t (31) =
-2.90, p < .01, and lower for subject-relative clause than for reduced object-relative clause
sentences, t (31) = -2.07, p < .05. There was no main effect of WMC nor an interaction. This is
compatible with the findings of Waters and Caplan (2004). The left panel of Figure 4.3.8 below
shows mean proportion correct recreated from the Waters and Caplan (2004) data, while the
right panel shows the Set 3 data.
Waters and Caplan (2004) did not manipulate animacy, but this factor was present in the
Set 3 data, so we also ran a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed withinbetween repeated measures ANOVA on the mean proportion correct. This analysis showed a
main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 3.33, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10, as well as an interaction of
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complexity and answer, F (3, 90) = 8.60, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .22, that was then qualified by a threeway interaction of complexity, answer, and WMC, F (3, 90) = 3.91, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12.
Examination of this interaction showed that low-spans had higher accuracy on acceptable
animate main clause sentences than on unacceptable animate main clause sentences, t (15) =
2.15, p < .05, while high-spans had higher accuracy on acceptable inanimate subject-relative
sentences than on unacceptable inanimate subject-relatives, t (15) = 4.57, p < .001, and lower
accuracy on acceptable animate and inanimate unreduced object-relative items than unacceptable
animate and inanimate unreduced object-relatives, ts < -2.61, ps = .02, as well as lower accuracy
on acceptable animate reduced items than on unacceptable animate reduced items, t (15) = - 2.61,
p = .02. These results suggest a bias to call object-relative items unacceptable.

Figure 4.3.8. Recreated proportion correct data from Waters and Caplan (2004) in the left panel
compared to data from Experiment 2 Set 3 on the right, with standard error bars.
There was also a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and answer, F (3, 90) =
2.87, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝2 = .09. Examination of this interaction revealed that accuracy was significantly
better for acceptable animate main clause items than for acceptable inanimate main clause items,
t (31) = 2.78, p < .01, and for acceptable inanimate subject-relative items over acceptable
animate subject-relative items, t (31) = -2.15, p = .04, but no other contrasts were significant.
Finally, there was a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC, F (3, 90) =
4.54, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13. Examination of this interaction showed that high-spans were significantly
more accurate on inanimate unreduced object-relative clauses than on animate unreduced objectrelative clauses, t (15) = 2.72, p = .02. No other contrasts were significant. Figure 4.3.9 below
shows the mean proportion correct by sentence type. This three-way interaction is not quite the
WCAREQ single resource theory would predict because high-spans do not also show a significant
effect of animacy on the more complex reduced object-relatives, but as we have mentioned
previously, this is not a fatal flaw because accuracy is not the primary variable upon which Just
and Carpenter (1992) base their arguments.
Recall from Experiment 1 that we argued that the animacy cue operated differently in Set
3 sentences, with animacy actually being the cue that would make the sentence less ambiguous
due to the subject-object word order, which might lead one to expect accuracy to be higher on
animate object-relatives than on inanimate ones. However, this is a different type of judgment, in
which the participant need only know if the last noun of the sentence (which is not the subject)
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makes sense in the context of the rest of the sentence, so the meaning of this difference is
unclear.

Figure 4.3.9. Experiment 2 Set 3 Sense judgment proportion correct, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
Unlike Waters and Caplan (1996b), Waters and Caplan (2004) did examine sense
judgment response times in their paper. Figure 4.3.10 below shows a reconstruction of the
Waters and Caplan (2004) data in the left panel and the analogous mean sense judgment reaction
times in the Set 3 data, collapsed across answer. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed withinbetween repeated measures ANOVA on the Set 3 data revealed a marginal main effect of WMC,
F (1, 30) = 4.18, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12, such that high-spans showed longer response times than lowspans.
Because the Set 3 data also included animacy as a factor, we also conducted a 4
(complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA on
judgment response times. This analysis showed a main effect of WMC, F (3, 90) = 4.29, p < .05,
𝜂𝑝2 = .13, such that high-spans had longer judgment response times than low-spans. No other
main effects were significant, nor were there any significant interactions. Figure 4.3.11 below
shows the mean sense judgment reaction times collapsed across answer.
These results do not replicate the WCAREQ interaction found in Set 3 judgment response
times in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 we argued that the WCAREQ interaction may have been
located in response times rather than the critical area because of the deep structure of the
sentences (i.e., that the last noun phrase was part of the verb phrase, so perhaps verb two was not
the sole word in the critical area). If this argument is accepted, it could also explain why the
WCAREQ interaction is not found in Experiment 2, where the anomalous word necessary for the
sense judgment is found in the noun phrase after the second verb and is thus part of the syntactic
component (i.e., the verb phrase) that constitutes the critical area. As we argued with Set 2
above, it is possible that the location of the anomaly may change the strategy employed while
reading sentences, even when an anomalous word is not actually present in the item (i.e.,
acceptable items), either because it disrupts processing of the syntactic component altogether
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(e.g., in unacceptable items) or because it’s predictable location changes how participants read
the sentences in general (i.e., in both unacceptable and acceptable items).

Figure 4.3.10. Recreated Sense judgment response times from Waters and Caplan (2004) in the
left panel compared to data from Experiment 2 Set 3 on the right, with standard error bars.

Figure 4.3.11. Experiment 2 Set 3 Send judgment response times, with standard error bars.
As with Set 2 above, one way to determine whether or not the location of the anomalous
word changed how participants read sentences is to look at reading times in the anomaly location
of Experiment 2 sentences (left panel of Figure 4.3.12 below) compared to reading times on the
same word location in Experiment 1 (right panel of Figure 4.3.12 below). Figure 4.3.12 shows
these reading times for acceptable experimental sentences only.
As can be seen in Figure 4.3.12, reading times in the anomalous word location
are noticeably longer in Experiment 2 than in the same area in Experiment 1, and this is despite
the fact that the figure shows only acceptable sentences that did not actually contain an
anomalous word. This suggests that the presence of the anomalous words, and perhaps especially
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its predictable location, altered participants’ reading strategies during the task. This alteration of
strategy may explain the lack of the WCAREQ interaction in this data.

Figure 4.3.12. Reading times for anomalous words in Experiment 2 in the left panel, compared to
reading times for the same word location in Experiment 1 in the right panel.
Critical Area Reading Time.
Waters and Caplan (2004) examined their critical area listening times in a different
manner than Just and Carpenter (1992). Rather than looking for a three-way interaction of
complexity, animacy, and WMC, Waters and Caplan (2004) looked for a three-way interaction
of complexity, phrase, and WMC. One reason for this difference was that the authors did not
manipulate animacy. A second reason for this difference was that the authors argued that if
single resource theory is correct, then the area of the sentence where processing load is highest
(i.e., the critical area) should place a disproportionate burden on the resources of low-span
individuals, and thus you should see a significant increase in their reading times that is not seen
for high-spans (or is seen, but to a lesser extent). Figure 4.3.13 below is a reconstruction of the
data from Waters and Caplan (2004). Note that the contrast is between only two types of
sentences: simple subject-relatives (which they formed in a different manner than those in the
current study) and the more complex unreduced object-relatives. Also note that the listening
times were calculated by subtracting the duration of the auditory phrase from the length of time
between when it began to play and when the participant pressed the button to hear the next
phrase. Because listening times were calculated in this manner, the values dip below zero on
some phrases.
Figure 4.3.14 below shows the Set 3 reading time data presented in the same manner,
with phrase on the X-axis. (These times were trimmed as described in Experiment 1, using
individual means and standard deviations to replace less than 2% of outlying data points overall
and less than 2% for any individual.) The left panel shows the comparison between SR and ORU sentences, which is directly comparable to the Waters and Caplan (2004) data, while the panel
on the right shows the comparison between the SR and OR-R sentences. Recall that Waters and
Caplan (2004) did not present OR-R sentences in their study.
A 2 (complexity) x 5 (phrase) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures on
ANOVA on the Set 3 data in the left panel of the figure below showed a main effect of
complexity, F (1, 30) = 16.60, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .36, and a main effect of phrase, F (4, 120) = 19.98,
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .40. These main effects were qualified by an interaction between the two, F (4,
120) = 3.69, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11. Examination of this interaction revealed that reading times in
subject-relative sentences were faster than those in unreduced object-relative sentences for areas
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V1, V2, and NP3, ts > -2.34, ps < .05. We also conducted independent samples t-tests for just the
V2 area. These results confirmed that low- and high-span reading times did not differ for any
sentence type.

Figure 4.3.13. Recreation of Waters and Caplan (2004) phrase listening times.
A 2 (complexity) x 5 (phrase) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures on
ANOVA on the data in the right panel of the figure below showed a main effect of complexity, F
(1, 30) = 14.86, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .33, and a main effect of phrase, F (4, 120) = 20.60, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.41. These main effects were qualified by an interaction, F (4, 120) = 4.26, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12.
Examination of this interaction showed that reading times in subject-relatives were faster than
those in reduced object-relatives for areas V2 and NP3, ts = -3.13, ps < .01. We also conducted
independent samples t-tests for just the V2 area. These results confirmed that low- and high-span
reading times did not differ for any sentence type.

Figure 4.3.14. Experiment 2 Set 3 phrase reading time data.
For the sake of comparison, we also looked at critical area reading times in the Set 3 data
in the same manner as Just and Carpenter (1992). In the Set 2 data above, this analysis could
only be conducted on correctly judged acceptable items because of the disruption in processing
caused by the presence of the anomalous word before the critical area. Set 3 does not (in theory)
have this same problem because the anomalous word was always the last word of the sentence,
and therefore did come after the critical area (i.e., defined in the literature as the second verb
only). Despite this, the analyses reported below were run two times: once with only correct
acceptable items and once with all correct items. The pattern of results did not differ. The data
reported here are for correct acceptable items only. Figure 4.3.15 shows mean reading times in
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the critical area (V2) for Set 3 experimental sentences in the right panel and data for the same
sentence types recreated from Just and Carpenter (1992) on the left.
A 2 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on just the object-relative sentences showed no significant main effects or interactions,
despite the fact that there appears to be a trend for low-span participants to spend less time
reading the critical areas of animate sentences than inanimate ones.

Figure 4.3.15. Recreation of the Just and Carpenter (1992) data in the left panel compared to
Experiment 2 Set 3 data on the right.
Note that overall the critical area reading times seen in Figure 4.3.15 are much longer
than those found in Just and Carpenter (1992), and even those for the same set in Experiment 1.
Cleary all participants are spending longer in the critical phrase. One possible explanation is that
participants may spend longer checking their interpretation of the sentence thus far before they
encounter the potential anomaly. Recall that participants had a rough idea of the length of the
sentence and knew when they were approaching it. It was also the case that the anomaly was
always on the last word, right after the critical area, giving participants and expectation of when
it could be encountered (and this was also reinforced by the location of the anomalies in the
unacceptable filler items). If one knows the anomaly might be coming up, it makes sense to
pause and be sure one has a handle on the sentence before proceeding. It would also make sense
for the low-spans to spend more time doing this on inanimate items than on animate ones, if the
argument that animacy works differently in Set 3 (from the previous experiment) holds. This is
because the inanimate sentences would actually be the ambiguous ones in this case, and thus it
would take longer to check their interpretations for low-spans who have not already used the
pragmatic cue in their processing of the sentence. However, this would mean that the low- and
not high-spans were the ones gaining an advantage from the animacy cue, which is the opposite
of what was found in Experiment 1 and what would be predicted by single resource theory. This
may not be problematic, however, if the pause here actually reflects a pause for offline reasoning
about the sentence so far before encountering the possible anomaly. If this were the case, it
would not be surprising to see no animacy-based differences for high-spans, yet still see them for
low-spans.
Just and Carpenter (1992) Stimuli – Set 1 (Appendix B)
The Set 1 stimuli in Experiment 2 were identical to those found in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items previously followed by a false comprehension item were modified to
contain a semantically anomalous word. In this case, the anomalous word was found in the by
phrase (The pedestrian followed by the potato amused the gathered spectators.; see Appendix B).
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By now it should be clear from the discussion of the results of the other sets why this may have
been problematic, but in actuality this feature potentially makes the stimulus sentences more
comparable to those used in Waters and Caplan (1996b, 2004) because stimulus sentence in
those experiments also contained anomalous words before the critical area, at least as far as can
be determined from the example sentences provided. Because the overall purpose of Experiment
2 was to replicate Waters and Caplan (1996b, 2004) if possible, results are reported after their
conventions where possible as well as in a manner comparable to Experiment 1.
Accuracy.
The right panel of Figure 4.3.16 below shows the mean A' scores in the Set 1 data by
sentence type, while the left panel shows the reconstructed Waters and Caplan (1996b) data for
their object-relative sentences. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on the Set 2 A' scores showed no significant main effects and no interactions,
in line with the findings of Waters and Caplan (1996b).

Figure 4.3.16. Recreated A' scores from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel compared to
Set 1 A' scores in Experiment 2, with standard error bars.
Sense judgment accuracy was also analyzed in the manner of Just and Carpenter (1992).
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on the accuracy scores revealed three two-way interactions. The interaction
of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 7.49, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .20, was such that accuracy was
greater for inanimate main clause items than for animate ones, t (31) = 2.05, p < .05, but no other
contrasts were significant. There was also an interaction of complexity and answer, F (3, 90) =
6.66, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .18, in which accuracy was higher for acceptable main clause items than for
unacceptable, t (31) = 4.10, p < .001, but no other contrasts were significant. Finally, there was
an interaction of animacy and answer, F (1, 30) = 14.70, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .33, such that accuracy
was higher on acceptable inanimate items, t (31) = 3.32, p < .001, but there was no difference for
animate items. Figure 4.3.17 below shows accuracy scores (out of 10) collapsed across answer.
These results not only show no evidence of the WCAREQ interaction, they do not even
show an effect of WMC. The overall high level of performance, whether measured in A' or in
sums of scores, suggests once again that these items were quite easy to judge. That being the
case, there is no reason to expect there to be any effect of WMC, much less an interaction. It is
still unclear why the Set 1 sentences were not difficult enough to elicit an interaction, when the
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same type of sentences did do so in Just and Carpenter (1992), but the data so far suggests that
this is the case.

Figure 4.3.17. Experiment 2 Set 1 Sense judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on sense judgment response times showed a significant main effect of WMC, F (1, 30)
= 8.84, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .23, such that high-spans has significantly longer response times than lowspans. There was also a two-way interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 3.01, p =
.03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .09, due to longer reaction times on inanimate main clause items than on animate ones t
(31) = 2.07, p < .05. Figure 4.3.18 below shows the means for all sentence types.
Clearly these results do not show the WCAREQ interaction that one might use to support
the single resource theory. However, it is also the case that single resource theory would not
really predict this interaction in the judgment response times anyway. The critical areas of Set 1
items are embedded near the beginning of the sentences and there is no compelling reason to
think any effect in that area would carry over into the judgment response times. What is apparent
is an effect of WMC, such that high-spans have longer response times than low-spans. This may
be a simple effect of the high-spans putting in more of an effort to reconsider sentences before
making a final judgment, despite the overall ease of the sentences.
Critical Area Reading Time.
Because the anomalous word in the Set 1 sentences occurred in the by phrase, critical
reading time analyses include only correctly judged acceptable items, and because the purpose of
Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Waters and Caplan (1996b), we calculated mean
per word reading times for Set 1 as described above in the Set 2 results. Critical area reading
times were trimmed as in all other sets and experiments, with less than 2% of data replaced.
Figure 4.3.19 below shows the Set 2 data next to the recreated data from Waters and Caplan
(1996b).
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Figure 4.3.18. Experiment 2 Set 1 Sense judgment response times, with standard error bars.

Figure 4.3.19. Recreated per word reading times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left
panel compared to Experiment 2 Set 1 data on the right, with standard error bars.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) within-between repeated measures ANOVA on per word
reading times revealed a significant main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 16.59, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.14, but no effect of WMC and no interaction. Examination of this effect showed that mean per
word times were longer for main clauses than for both subject-relatives and unreduced objectrelatives, and both subject-relative and reduced object-relatives showed longer times than
unreduced object-relatives, all ts > 2.31, ps < .05.
By phrase reading times were also analyzed according to the methods of Just and
Carpenter (1992). Figure 4.3.20 below shows the critical area reading times for correctly judged
acceptable items of all sentence types. These times were trimmed as described in Experiment 1,
using individual means and standard deviations to replace less than 2% of outlying data points
overall and less than 2% for any individual. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed
within-between repeated measures ANOVA on these reading times revealed a main effect of
complexity, F (3, 90) = 3.56, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11. There were no other significant main effects and
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no significant interactions. Examination of the effect of complexity showed that critical area
reading times were longer in main clause sentences than in subject-relatives and in unreduced
object-relatives, ts > 2.49, ps < .05. No other contrasts were significant.
Once again for comparison purposes, the critical area reading times for experimental
sentences only are pulled out of the data and displayed in Figure 4.3.21 below. The left panel of
4.3.21 shows the comparable recreated data from Just and Carpenter (1992). As can be clearly
seen, the interaction found in the Just and Carpenter (1992) data is not in evidence in the Set 1
data. Both low- and high-spans showed no difference between inanimate and animate objectrelative items of either type.

Figure 4.3.20. Experiment 2 Set 1 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.

Figure 4.3.21. Recreated critical area reading times from Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left
panel compared to Experiment 2 data for Set 1 on the right.
The critical area reading time results for Set 1 are in line with the predictions of the dual
resource theory in that they certainly provide no evidence of the WCAREQ interaction called for
by Waters and Caplan (1996a), nor even the two-way interaction of WMC and animacy that was
observed by Just and Carpenter (1992). However, this may not be that surprising, given the
variety of factors that have already been argued to disrupt the interaction. First is the fact that the
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sentences in this set are the easiest complex sentences in the current experiment, as confirmed by
both subjective participant reports and objective assessment of accuracy rates. Second is the fact
that participants quite likely rushed through reading these rather long sentences as they did in
Experiment 1. Next is the fact that the anomalous word was found in the critical area, and
participant knew this. This may have changed the task significantly for the participants.
Comparing critical area times from Experiment 1 (that are at the lowest level seen in Just and
Carpenter, 1992) to those from Experiment 2 (that are at the highest level seen in Just and
Carpenter, 1992), it appears as though overall all participants were encouraged by the setup of
the task to pause longer at the by phrase to check for the semantic anomaly, but this strategy was
independent of both animacy and WMC.
4.4 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine the effect of altering the type of judgment
used in the syntactic processing task on the various performance variables. To accomplish this,
we administered the same stimulus sets as in Experiment 1, but with slight alterations. These
alterations involved inserting anomalous words into half of the sentences and were required to
turn the previously false items into the unacceptable items needed for a sense judgment modeled
after that used in Waters and Caplan (1996b; 2004).
The overall results of Experiment 2 are in line with the findings of Waters and Caplan
(1996b; 2004). We did not find significant effects of WMC anywhere they would be predicted by
single resource theory, and certainly no WCAREQ interaction. This is in direct contrast to
Experiment 1, where we found some support for single resource theory, particularly in the
critical area reading times of Set 2 (the WMC by complexity interaction) and the judgment
response times of Set 3 (the three-way interaction of WMC, complexity, and animacy). We
argued that one reason the use of sense judgments eradicated the effects of WMC seen in
Experiment 1 might be that anomalous words were in predictable locations before the critical
area and thus induced the use of a different reading strategy than that used in Experiment 1.
Examination of reading times for anomalous words in Experiment 2 compared to reading times
for words in the same locations in Experiment 1 supported this idea, by showing that reading
times were longer overall even in sentences were an anomalous word was not actually present
(i.e., acceptable items).
Waters and Caplan (1996a) argued that the acceptability/plausibility judgment (which is
the same as what we have called the sense judgment here) should be preferred over the true/false
comprehension judgment because it represents a more online measure of syntactic processing
than the latter type of judgment. The data from Experiments 1 and 2 support the idea that these
two judgments are getting at different types of processing. However, the data do not necessarily
comment on which judgment type is to be preferred. What is clear is that task demands induced
by judgment type impact online reading strategies and that this is not a factor that can be
dismissed when attempting to test the single and dual resource theories of syntactic processing.
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 3
5.1 Introduction
As the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 have demonstrated, the type of
judgment being made about sentences can have important consequences for the dependent
measures of interest. Comprehension questions are the most obvious choice of judgment to use
in a syntactic processing task, but have been criticized on the grounds that they may involve
post-interpretive processing and thus are not capable of capturing variation in online syntactic
processing (Waters & Caplan, 1996a). The most obvious remedy for this criticism is to not use
accuracy as the primary dependent variable at all, but rather to use the more online measure of
critical area reading times. Another remedy proposed by Waters and Caplan (1996a) was to use
sense judgments because the detection of semantic anomalies is arguably more reflective of
online processing. However, as the previous experiments have demonstrated, sense judgments
can be problematic in their own right. One reason this may be so is that there is some evidence to
suggest that detection of semantic and syntactic errors occurs independently (Koch et al., 2003).
Furthermore, semantic anomalies that appear before the critical area of complex sentences may
terminate processing of the complex syntactic structure altogether. Finally, the mere presence of
anomalies appears to change the manner in which participants read sentences, as we saw when
comparing anomalous word reading time to reading time in the same area of sentences without
anomalies. If it is the case that sense judgments change the very nature of the syntactic
processing task, as these arguments suggest, then sense judgments would arguably be essentially
useless for testing between single and dual resource hypotheses.
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine an alternate judgment type, the
grammaticality judgment, in the syntactic processing task in order to compare it to the previous
types of judgment. The grammaticality judgment addresses the complaint lodged against
comprehension questions by Waters and Caplan (1996b) because, like sense judgment, it should
not involve post-interpretive processing. Furthermore, detecting grammatical errors is arguably
an even more direct measure of syntactic processing than detection of semantic anomalies. Thus,
it stands to reason that the grammaticality judgment may represent an acceptable compromise in
the disagreement over the most appropriate judgment type. One problem that will remain,
however, is that the grammatical error for Set 2 will always come before the critical area. This is
unfortunate, but also unavoidable when the critical area is the last word of the sentence as it is in
Set 2 sentences.
Because Experiment 3 is not a direct replication of any study, results will be presented in
numerical set order (i.e., Set 1, Set 2, Set 3) and in the manner used in the previous experiments
wherever possible for direct comparisons.
5.2 Methods
Participants
Participants were 32 (22 female) undergraduate psychology students at Louisiana State
University who received course credit for their participation. All participants reported normal or
corrected to normal vision and hearing, and no history of language or speech impairments. Mean
age was 19.34 (SD = 1.49). Sixteen participants were classified as low-span and 16 as high-span
on the basis of composite z-scores on the automated span tasks (descriptives for the WMC tasks
are in Table 5.2.1 below). An additional 18 participants were run in Experiment 3: 10 were
dropped because they were medium-span, five were dropped for not meeting the 85%
performance criterion for at least one automated task, one was dropped for missing too many
75

items on the syntactic processing task, one was dropped for reporting a history of hearing
impairment, and one was dropped for exhibiting odd behavior during the experiment such as
insisting on reading all sentences aloud and providing commentary on almost all of them.
Syntactic Processing Task
The three stimulus sets for Experiment 3 were identical to those in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items that were followed by a false comprehension item in Experiment 1 were
modified in Experiment 3 to contain a small grammatical error (e.g., subject-verb agreement
errors; See Appendices B through D). For the Just and Carpenter (1992) sentences, the
grammatical error was found after the by phrase (e.g., The pedestrian that was followed by the
mime were amusing the gathered spectators.), while for both the Waters and Caplan (1996b) and
Waters and Caplan (2004) sets it was found in the critical area (e.g., “The hair that was rinsed in
hot water dry.” and “The document that the machine copied shock the public.” respectively)
because of the limited location options provided by the construction of the stimuli.
Working Memory Capacity Measures
The same four WMC measures from the previous two experiments were administered in
Experiment 3, with the composite z-score from the automated tasks used to classify participants
into low- and high-span groups. All results reported here use the composite as the grouping
variable because results were no different when split by the recoded Daneman and Carpenter
(1980) task. Table 5.2.1 below shows the means and standard deviations for each of the WMC
measures in the current experiment.
Table 5.2.1. Experiment 3 WMC measure descriptives.

R-span
Automated S-span
Tasks O-span
Composite
D&C
(1980)

Original
Recode

Low-span
Mean
SD
-0.82
0.85
-0.89
0.93
-1.23
0.72
-1.22
0.61

High-span
Mean
SD
0.97
0.34
0.71
0.55
1.05
0.25
1.13
0.27

2.50
0.75

2.81
0.78

0.63
0.07

0.40
0.08

5.3 Results
Just and Carpenter (1992) Stimuli – Set 1 (Appendix B)
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on grammaticality judgment accuracy showed main effects of complexity, F
(3, 90) = 14.45, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .33, and answer, F (1, 30) = 8.43, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .22 (the effect of
WMC was marginal, F (1, 30) = 3.80, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11). These main effects were qualified by
two two-way interactions of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 4.63, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13, and of
complexity and answer, F (3, 90) = 11.60, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .28. These two-way interactions were in
turn qualified by a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and answer, F (3, 90) = 12.32,
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .29. Examination of this interaction revealed that grammatical inanimate main
clause items showed lower accuracy than grammatical animate main clause items, t (31) = -4.28,
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p < .001, while grammatical inanimate subject-relatives and reduced object-relatives had higher
accuracy than grammatical animate subject-relatives and object-relatives respectively, ts > 3.70,
ps < .01. For agrammatical items, there were no significant differences in animacy for any
sentence type. Figure 5.3.1 below shows mean grammaticality accuracy (out of 10) for each
sentence type, collapsed across answer.

Figure 5.3.1. Experiment 3 Set 1 Grammaticality judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
Although the effect of WMC is not significant, we can see in Figure 5.3.1 high-spans
tend to show higher accuracy than low-spans, and that this differences appears somewhat larger
in the more complex sentences than it is in the simple ones. One odd finding is that accuracy is
lowest for main clause sentences for both low- and high-span participants. As has been argued
previously, this oddity may be an artifact of the method of construction and lower frequency of
main clause sentences in the current experiment that result in some confusion for these items.
Regardless, what is clear from Figure 5.3.1 is that there is no WCAREQ interaction in accuracy
scores.
For comparison with Waters and Caplan (1996b), we also calculated A' scores for
grammaticality judgments. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between ANOVA
showed only a main effect for complexity, F (3, 90) = 7.94, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .21, such that A'
scores were lower for main clause sentences than for subject-relatives and object-relatives (both
reduced and unreduced), ts > -2.03, ps ≤ .05, and higher for subject-relatives than for reduced
object-relatives, t (31) = 2.19, p = .04. Figure 5.3.2 below shows mean A' scores by sentence
type in Set 1 next to A' values recreated from Waters and Caplan (1996b).
In order to explore the effects of animacy, we also conducted a 4 (complexity) x 2
(animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA on A'. This analysis
revealed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 7.94, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .21, and an interaction of
complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 4.14, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12. Examination of this interaction
revealed that A' scores were higher for inanimate subject-relatives than for animate subjectrelatives and for inanimate reduced object relatives than for animate reduced object-relatives, ts
> 2.49, ps <.02.
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Figure 5.3.2. Recreated A' scores from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel compared to
Set 1 A' scores in Experiment 3 on the right, with standard error bars.

Figure 5.3.3. Experiment 3 Set 1 A' scores, with standard error bars.
Altogether, these analyses on judgment response accuracy suggest that main clause
sentences may have confused participants due to their initial similarity to reduced animate
clauses (discussed in Experiment 1 above). Aside from this, performance is generally better for
simpler sentences, and high-spans tend to have better performance than low-spans. These
findings are compatible with both the single and dual resource views of syntactic processing. As
in both previous experiments, the current data show no WCAREQ interaction, but this is not
particularly supportive of either theory, since the WCAREQ wouldn’t necessarily be expected in
accuracy performance even by single resource theory.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on grammaticality judgment response times showed no main effects and no
interactions. Mean response times are displayed in Figure 5.3.4 below.
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Figure 5.3.4. Experiment 3 Set 1 Grammaticality judgment response times, with standard error
bars.
As in the previous experiments, judgment response times do not show any significant
effects of WMC and certainly no interaction with complexity and animacy. Again, this is not
necessarily surprising given that the critical area of Set 1 sentences is embedded in the items and
there is no reason to expect any difference that might manifest itself there to carry over into the
response times. Furthermore, single resource theory would not predict the interaction at the time
of response. There is a slight trend in the experimental sentences for low-spans to show longer
judgment times for more complex sentences, but there is also a large amount of variance in the
data. Even if this difference were significant, it would not distinguish between theories.
Critical Area Reading Time.
In Experiment 1, we combined Set 1 true and false items for critical area reading time
analysis because the question came after the critical area. In Experiment 2 the semantic anomaly
was found in the critical area of Set 1 sentences, so critical area reading time analysis was done
on acceptable items only. In Experiment 3, the grammatical anomaly was found immediately
after the critical area in Set 1, so in theory we could include agrammatical items in our analysis.
However, this is not possible for Set 2 and Set 3 data due to the location of their grammatical
errors, so analyses are reported for grammatical Set 1 items only for the sake of consistency
within the experiment. Finally, these times were trimmed as described in Experiment 1, using
individual means and standard deviations to replace less than 2% of outlying data points overall
and less than 2% for any individual.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on critical area reading times showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 8.15, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .21, as well as a two-way interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90) = 4.62, p =
.03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13. Examination of this interaction revealed that inanimate main clause items had
longer reading times in the critical area than animate main clause items, t (31) = 2.23, p = .03,
but no other contrast was significant.
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Figure 5.3.5. Experiment 3 Set 1 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.
Figure 5.3.4 below shows mean critical area reading times for just the experimental
sentences of Set 1 in the right panel, compared to the recreated critical area reading time data
from Just and Carpenter (1992) on the left.

Figure 5.3.6. Recreated critical area reading times from Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left
panel compared to Experiment 3 data for Set 1 on the right.
As in Experiment 2, the critical area reading times in Experiment 3 are flat near the
uppermost values found in Just and Carpenter (1992) for all participants, whereas the times from
Experiment 1 were near the lowest values. As with the sense judgment, the grammatical error in
the current experiment was predictably located, though in this case it was right after rather than
in the critical area. The overall longer times in the critical area suggest a strategy of slowing
down in preparation of detecting the potential error. Low-spans appear to have paused somewhat
longer than high-spans, but it appears to be a strategy applied equally in inanimate and animate
sentences and at least partially explains the lack of an interaction. Another explanation is the
same that has been argued previously: That Set 1 sentences were too easy to elicit the interaction
and their length encouraged a rushing button-pressing strategy.
In addition to these analyses, we also calculated mean per word reading time as in
Experiment 2 for the sake of comparison. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between
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repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 6.54, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.15. Per word reading times were higher in main clause sentences than in both subject-relatives
and unreduced object-relatives, ts > 2.50, ps ≤ .02, higher in subject-relatives than in unreduced
object-relatives, t (31) = 2.52, p = .02, and higher in reduced object-relatives than unreduced
object-relatives, t (31) = -2.31, p = .03. Figure 5.3.7 below shows mean per word reading times
for Set 1 sentence types in the right panel and the recreated mean per word reading times from
Waters and Caplan (1996b) for comparison in the left panel.

Figure 5.3.7. Recreated per word times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel
compared to Experiment 3 Set 1 data on the right, with standard error bars.
Because animacy was manipulated in the current experiment, we also analyzed per word
reading times in a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA. This analysis showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 11.63, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .28, that was qualified by a two-way interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90)
= 5.09, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .15, which in turn was qualified by a three-way interaction of complexity,
animacy, and WMC, F (3, 90) = 3.17, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10. Examination of the three-way
interaction revealed that mean per word reading time was significantly lower in inanimate
reduced object-relatives than in animate reduced object-relatives for low-spans, t (31) = -3.29, p
< .01, while for high-spans mean per word reading time was lower in inanimate unreduced
object-relatives than in animate unreduced object-relatives, t (31) = -2.56, p = .02. Note that this
three-way interaction is not quite the WCAREQ because animacy had an effect for low-spans on
one type of sentence and for high-spans on another, whereas we would expect only the highspans to show the animacy effect in the ideal version of the WCAREQ. Figure 5.3.8 below
displays the mean per word reading times for each sentence type.
The per word reading times do not change the picture presented by the critical area
reading times because neither measure resulted in the exact WCAREQ interaction. However, their
inclusion is useful for the sake of comparing the methodology of computing mean times as
opposed to actually recording critical area times. In the current experiment, we can see that the
method of measuring and assessing reading times can change the statistical picture, from a
simple two-way interaction with one measure to a more complex three-way with the other.
Generally speaking, we would argue that the estimated per word times should be the least
preferred, as they do not allow for measurement of differences related to sentence area.
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Another issue highlighted by our analysis of per word reading times is that something is
missed when animacy is not taken into account in the syntactic processing task. Although we did
not have full stimulus lists from Just and Carpenter (1992) or Waters and Caplan (1996b; 2004),
the fact that the latter two studies do not mention it either as a controlled or manipulated variable
suggests that it was not accounted for. This is problematic when combining inanimate and
animate items may obscure the effects of WMC, though it makes sense if one ascribes to the idea
that pragmatic cues cannot be used in online processing (e.g., Fodor, 1988) and thus should not
matter in the syntactic processing task.

Figure 5.3.8. Experiment 3 Set 1 per word reading times, with standard error bars.
Waters and Caplan (1996b) Stimuli – Set 2 (Appendix C)
The Set 2 stimuli in Experiment 3 are identical to those in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items that were followed by a false comprehension item in Experiment 1 were
modified in Experiment 3 to contain a small grammatical error.
Unlike Set 1, it was not possible to place the grammatical error after the critical area in
Set 2 sentences because the critical area coincides with the end in this set. Furthermore, because
we wanted participants to at least process the ambiguity, it did not make sense to have the error
near the beginning of the sentence. Thus, the grammatical error in Set 2 was placed on the last
word/critical area/verb (e.g., The hair that was rinsed in hot water dry.).
Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on accuracy revealed main effects of complexity, F (3, 90) = 35.20, p < .001,
𝜂𝑝2 = .54, animacy, F (1, 30) = 36.73, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .55, and answer, F (1, 30) = 10.58, p < .01,
𝜂𝑝2 = .26. These main effects were qualified by two-interactions of complexity and animacy, F (3,
90) = 16.35, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .35, complexity and answer, F (1, 30) = 63.55, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .68¸and
animacy and answer, F (1, 30) = 7.13, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .19. These two-way interactions were in turn
qualified by a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and answer, F (3, 90) = 28.40, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .49. Examination of this three-way interaction revealed that accuracy was higher for
grammatical inanimate reduced object-relative items than for grammatical animate reduced
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object-relative items, t (31) = 11.36, p < .001, and for agrammatical inanimate main clause items
than for agrammatical animate main clause items, t (31) = 3.05, p < .01. Figure 5.3.9 below
shows mean number correct by sentence type.

Figure 5.3.9. Experiment 3 Set 2 grammaticality accuracy, with standard error bars.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, there were participants in Experiment 3 who did not have any
correctly judged agrammatical items (nine of the 32), and there were two who did not have any
correctly judged grammatical animate reduced object-relatives. Only these latter two missing
data points affect the critical area reading time analyses below, as only correctly judged
grammatical items were included.
As before, we also calculated A' scores for comparison with Waters and Caplan (1996b).
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA showed a main
effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 17.72, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .30, such that A' scores were lower for
main clause items than for subject-relative items, t (31) = -4.26, p < .001, and lower for reduced
object-relatives than for main clause sentences, subject-relatives, and unreduced object-relatives,
ts > 3.27, ps < .01. The left panel of Figure 5.3.10 below shows the recreated Waters and Caplan
(1996b) A' data, while the right panel shows mean A' scores in the Set 2 data.
Because we manipulated animacy in the current experiment, we also analyzed A' scores
in a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA. This analysis revealed main effects of complexity, F (3, 84) = 15.95, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
.37, and animacy, F (1, 28) = 12.78, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .32, and an interaction between the two, F (3,
84) = 10.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .24. Examination of this interaction revealed that A' scores were
higher for inanimate reduced object-relatives than for animate reduced object-relatives, t (30) =
5.67, p < .001, but no other contrasts were significant. Figure 5.3.11 below shows these means.
As already discussed, the lack of the critical three-way interaction in accuracy scores
does not differentiate between the predictions of single and dual resource theory. Effects of
complexity were in evidence in the Set 2 data, but these would be expected by both theories.
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Figure 5.3.10. Recreated A' scores for Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel for
comparison with Experiment 3 Set 2 data on the right, with standard error bars.

Figure 5.3.11. Experiment 3 Set 2 A' scores, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on grammaticality response time showed only a main effects of complexity, F (3, 90) =
5.05, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14. Judgment response times were longer for main clause and reduced objectrelative items than for unreduced object-relatives, ts > 2.41, ps < .05.
As already discussed, the single resource theory does not predict a three-way interaction
in judgment times and one was not found here. There was a trend for low-spans to have longer
reaction times for reduced object-relative items (both inanimate and animate) than high-spans,
which would be in line with both single and dual resources because these are the most difficult
sentences, but otherwise WMC does not seem to have much effect on the judgment response
times in the current set. There is a bit of a trend of judgment times being faster for inanimate than
for animate items in reduced object-relatives. The fact that this trend is seen for both low- and
high-spans and is found here rather than in the critical area suggests it is the result of some postinterpretive processing of the pragmatic cue.
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Figure 5.3.12. Experiment 3 Set 2 Grammaticality judgment response times, with standard error
bars.
Critical Area Reading Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on correctly judged grammatical items revealed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90)
= 9.93, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .26, such that critical area reading times were faster in main clause,
subject-relative, and unreduced object-relative sentences than in reduced object-relative
sentences, ts > -3.66, ps < .01. Figure 5.3.13 below shows mean critical area reading time for
each sentence type. These times were trimmed as described above, with less than 2% of data
replaced.
These results do not show any interaction of complexity and animacy, nor is there an
interaction with WMC. However, it can be seen that there is a non-significant tendency that
critical area reading times are longer for high-spans than for low-spans on the most difficult
sentences (i.e., the reduced object-relatives), a trend in line with that of Experiment 1 and
MacDonald et al.’s (1992) results with garden path sentences. However, the fact that the trend is
for reading times to be higher on inanimate than animate items does not fit with these results and
suggests that something different is at play in the current experiment. This may be related to the
fact that grammatical anomaly is found before the critical area in Set 2 sentences.
For the sake of comparison with Just and Carpenter (1992), the left panel of Figure 5.3.14
below shows the recreated Just and Carpenter (1992) data for critical area reading times in the
experimental sentences while the right shows the Set 2 data. The data on the right suggests that
both low- and high-spans paused longer at the critical area of inanimate reduced object-relatives
than at the critical area of animate reduced object-relative clauses. Although this trend is not
significant, it is the opposite of the findings in the previous experiments and of the Just and
Carpenter (1992) data. Overall (and in hindsight) the fact that there is no significant interaction
of complexity, animacy, and WMC is not surprising mainly because the grammatical error
occurs before the critical area. If error detection can occur before the complex structure is
processed, it makes sense that the participant would proceed directly to the response screen
rather than continue to struggle with what were subjectively and objectively the hardest
sentences in the experiment.
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Figure 5.3.13. Experiment 3 Set 2 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.

Figure 5.3.14. Recreated critical area reading times from Just and Carpenter (1992) in the left
panel compared to Experiment 3 data for Set 2 on the rigth.
For comparison with Waters and Caplan (1996b), we also calculated mean per word
reading time on Set 2 data. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 25.81, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .46.
Per word reading times were longer for main clause items than for subject-relatives and
unreduced object-relatives, ts > 3.88, ps < .01, and longer for subject-relatives than for
unreduced object-relatives, t (28) = 3.31, ps < .01, but shorter for subject-relatives and unreduced
object-relatives than for reduced object-relatives, ts > -4.27, ps < .001. Figure 5.3.15 below
shows the recreated mean per word reading times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) and mean per
word times for Set 2.
As before, we also looked at mean per word reading times in light of our animacy
manipulation, as displayed in Figure 5.3.16 below. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC)
mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis showed main effects of
complexity, F (3, 90) = 25.81 < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .46, and animacy, F (1, 30) = 5.11, p < .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .15,
that were qualified by an interaction between the two, F (3, 90) = 2.91, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝2 = .08.
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Examination of this interaction showed that per word reading times were longer for inanimate
subject-relative items than for animate subject-relatives, t (31) = 3.00, p <.01, and for longer for
inanimate reduced items than for animate reduced items, t (31) = 2.40, p = .02.

Figure 5.3.15. Recreated per word reading times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the panel of
the left compared to Experiment 3 Set 2 data on the right, with standard error bars.

Figure 5.3.16. Experiment 3 Set 2 per word reading times, with standard error bars.
Waters and Caplan (2004) Stimuli – Set 3 (Appendix D)
The Set 3 stimuli in Experiment 3 are identical to those in Experiment 1, with the
exception that items that were followed by a false comprehension item in Experiment 1 were
modified in Experiment 3 to contain a small grammatical.
Unlike Set 1, it was not possible to place the grammatical error after the critical area in
Set 3 because sentences ended with a noun phrase immediately following the critical area (i.e.,
the second verb). Therefore, the grammatical error was found on the critical area itself as in Set 1
sentences in Experiment 2 (e.g., The lock that the thief opened secure the safe.)
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Accuracy.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (answer) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated
measures ANOVA on grammaticality judgment accuracy showed main effects of complexity, F
(3, 90) = 13.67, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .31, animacy, F (1, 30) = 12.44, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .29, answer, F (1,
30) = 19.62, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .40, and WMC, F (1, 30) = 4.96, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14. These main
effects were qualified by a two-way interaction of complexity and answer, F (3, 90) = 24.03, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .45, which in turn was qualified by a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy,
and answer, F (3, 90) = 2.73, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .08. Examination of this interaction showed that
accuracy was significantly higher for grammatical inanimate main clause items than for
grammatical animate main clause items, t (31) = -2.78, p < .01, and that for agrammatical items,
inanimate subject-relatives had higher accuracy than animate subject-relatives, t (31) = -4.19, p <
.001. There was also an interaction of complexity and WMC, F (3, 90) = 3.08, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝2 = .09,
such that low-spans showed significantly higher accuracy on main clause items than on reduced
object-relatives, t (15) = 2.62, p = .02, but high-spans did not differ in accuracy for any sentence
type. Figure 5.3.17 below shows accuracy scores for each type of sentence.
In addition to simple accuracy, A' scores were calculated for the Set 3 data for
comparison with Waters and Caplan (1996b). A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC) mixed withinbetween repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 9.12, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .23, such that main clause A' scores were lower than those for subject-relatives,
unreduced object-relatives, and reduced object-relatives, ts > -2.41, ps < .01, and A' scores for
subject-relatives were lower than those for reduced object-relatives, t = 2.07, p < .05. The main
effect of WMC was not significant (p = .07, 𝜂𝑝2 = .11), nor was the interaction. Figure 5.3.18
below shows the mean A' scores by sentence type for Set 3 on the right and the A' scores
recreated from Waters and Caplan (1996b) on the left.

Figure 5.3.17. Experiment 3 Set 3 Grammaticality judgment accuracy, with standard error bars.
We also examined A' scores in a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed withinbetween repeated measures ANOVA to examine the effects of animacy. This analysis showed
main effects of complexity, F (3, 90) = 9.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .23, and animacy, F (1, 30) = 6.61, p
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= .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .18, and an interaction between the two, F (3, 90) = 3.62, p = .02, 𝜂𝑝2 = .10, such that
A' were lower for inanimate main clause and subject-relative clause sentences than for animate
main clause and subject-relative sentences, respectively, ts > -2.87, ps < .01. Figure 5.3.19 below
displays the A' means by sentence type.

Figure 5.3.18. Recreated A' scores from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the left panel compared to
Set 3 A' scores in Experiment 3 on the right, with standard error bars.
The results of the accuracy analysis are in line with what one would expect from both the
single and dual resource perspectives in that low-spans showed a significant decrease in
performance between the simplest (i.e., MC) and most complex (i.e., reduced object-relative)
sentences, but the high-spans showed no such decline. Both theories would agree that low-spans
should decline in accuracy as complexity increases. The lack of three-way interaction is also
congruent with both theories, as already discussed.

Figure 5.3.19. Experiment 3 Set 3 A' scores, with standard error bars.
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Judgment Response Time.
A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on grammaticality judgment response time showed a main effect of animacy, F (1, 30)
= 4.11, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12, that was due largely to longer response times for inanimate main clause
items than for animate ones. Figure 5.3.20 below displays the mean grammaticality judgment
response time for each sentence type.
In Experiment 1 we saw a three-way interaction of complexity, animacy, and WMC. In
the current experiment, neither animacy nor WMC interact with complexity individually or
together. This may be an effect of the grammatical error being placed in the critical area in the
current experiment (an unfortunate limitation of the sentence structure). It is possible that not
only the presence (in agrammatical items) but the possibility of a grammatical error (in
grammatical items) in the critical area changed processing in such a way as to cancel out the
interaction found previously. Indeed, judgment response times in the current experiment are
significantly faster than those found in Experiment 1 (which were between 2500 and 3500ms),
and more in line with those from Experiment 2 (which were between 700 and 1100ms),
suggesting something about the task changed response strategies. It could be argued (likely by
Waters and Caplan, 1996a) that what changed was that the judgments in Experiments 2 and 3
were more online than the true/false judgment in Experiment 1 and thus more reflective of
syntactic processing. The evidence in the current experiment cannot refute this argument, though
the effect of animacy for high-spans in Experiment 1 is suggestive that the interaction was due to
online processing rather than offline (i.e., that the high-spans were taking animacy into account
when it was encountered early in the sentence and this advantage was transferred over to
judgment times). Thus it seems at least possible that the change was related to an error detection
mechanism that when activated in the critical area erases the carry-over effect seen in
Experiment 1.

Figure 5.3.20. Experiment 3 Set 3 Grammaticality judgment response times, with standard error
bars.
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Critical Area Reading Time.
Critical reading times for Set 3 sentences could only be analyzed for correctly judged
grammatical items, due to the presence of the grammatical anomaly in the critical area of the
sentence. A 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures
ANOVA on these critical area reading times revealed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) =
4.07, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .12, that was qualified by an interaction of complexity and animacy, F (3, 90)
= 4.50, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13, such that reading times were faster in inanimate subject-relative items
than in animate subject-relatives, t (31) = -3.85, p < .01, but no other contrasts were significant.
Figure 5.3.21 below shows the mean critical area reading times for each sentence type. These
times were trimmed as described above, and less than 2% replaced.

Figure 5.3.21. Experiment 3 Set 3 critical area reading times, with standard error bars.
Figure 5.3.22 below displays the critical area reading times from the Set 3 object-relative
sentences in the right panel for comparison with the Just and Carpenter (1992) data on the left.
While nothing is significant, three things are noticeable in this comparison. First, there is a trend
for reading times to be longer for inanimate items than for animate ones for both low- and highspans. Next, notice that reading times are shorter for high-spans on unreduced items but longer
on reduced items. Finally, the reading times for Set 3 are all above the maximum values seen in
the Just and Carpenter (1992) data. These differences are likely effects of locating the
grammatical error on the critical area.
Mean per word reading times were also calculated for Set 3 (Figure 5.3.23 below), for
ease of comparison with the results of Waters and Caplan (1996b). A 4 (complexity) x 2 (WMC)
mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA on per word reading times revealed a main
effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 12.49, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .29, such that per word times were longer
for main clause than for subject-relative items, t (31) = 3.26, p < .01, longer for reduced object
relatives for main clauses, subject-relatives, and unreduced object-relatives, ts = -3.35, ps < .01.
We also examined per word reading times in a 4 (complexity) x 2 (animacy) x 2 (WMC)
mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVA in order to explore any effect of the animacy
manipulation. The analysis showed a main effect of complexity, F (3, 90) = 12.49, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
91

.29, and one of animacy, animacy F (1, 30) = 4.55, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝2 = .13, but no interaction of the
two. The main effect of complexity was such that per word times were longer for main clause
items than for subject-relatives, t (31) = 3.26, p < .01, and longer for reduced object-relative
items than for main clauses, subject-relatives, and unreduced object-relatives, ts > 3.35, ps < .01.
Figure 5.3.24 below displays the mean per word reading times for each sentence type.

Figure 5.3.22. Experiment 3 Set 3 critical area reading times.

Figure 5.3.23. Recreated per word reading times from Waters and Caplan (1996b) in the panel of
the left compared to Experiment 3 Set 3 data on the right, with standard error bars.
Finally, in line with Waters and Caplan (2004), we analyzed reading times in two 2
(complexity) x 5 (phrase) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between repeated measures ANOVAs.
Figure 5.3.25 below is a recreation of the Waters and Caplan (2004) data, shown for comparison
with the Set 3 data to follow.
In the first 2 (complexity) x 5 (phrase) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between ANOVA, we
looked at subject-relatives compared to unreduced object-relatives (i.e., the same structures used
in Waters and Caplan, 2004). This analysis showed main effects of complexity, F (1, 30) = 6.89,
p = .01, 𝜂𝑝2 = .19, and phrase, F (4, 120) = 12.31, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .29, that were qualified by an
interaction between the two, F (4, 120) = 5.81, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .16. For subject-relative items
reading times were faster: for NP1 than for NP3, t (31) = -2.51, p = .02, for NP2 than for V1 and
V2, ts > -2.66, ps < .01, and for V1 than for V2 and NP3, ts > -2.43, ps ≤ .02. For unreduced
object-relative items reading times were shorter for: NP1 than for V1, V2, and NP3, ts > -3.71,
ps < .01, and for NP2 than for V1, V2, and NP3, ts > -4.33, ps < .001, and for V1 than NP3, t
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(31) = -2.58, p = .02. We also conducted independent samples t-tests for just the V2 area. These
results confirmed that low- and high-span reading times did not differ for any sentence type. The
left panel of Figure 5.3.26 below displays the phrase reading times in this analysis.

Figure 5.3.24. Experiment 3 Set 3 per word reading times, with standard error bars.

Figure 5.3.25. Recreation of Waters and Caplan (2004) phrase listening times.
In the second 2 (complexity) x 5 (phrase) x 2 (WMC) mixed within-between ANOVA,
we looked at subject-relatives compared to reduced object-relatives (a type not presented by
Waters and Caplan, 2004). This analysis showed main effects of complexity, F (1, 30) = 22.29, p
< .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .43, and phrase, F (4, 120) = 11.14, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .27, that were qualified by an
interaction between the two, F (4, 120) = 8.98, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .23. The results in this analysis for
subject-relatives are the same as those in the previous analysis. For reduced object-relatives
reading times were faster: for NP1 than for V1, V2, and NP3, ts > -3.31, ps < .01, and for NP2
than for V1, V2, and NP3, ts > -2.80, ps < .01. The right panel of Figure 5.3.26 below displays
the phrase reading times in this analysis. We also conducted independent samples t-tests for just
the V2 area. These results confirmed that low- and high-span reading times did not differ for any
sentence type.
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Figure 5.3.26. Experiment 3 Set 3 phrase reading time data.
Neither per word times nor phrase analyses showed critical three-way interactions (of
complexity, animacy, and WMC in the first case, and of complexity, phrase, and WMC in the
second). These findings are in line with those of dual resource studies such as Waters and Caplan
(1996b, 2004), though this support for dual resource theories is qualified by the arguments
already discussed for why the judgment type might have obscured any critical interactions in the
current data.
5.4 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to test an alternate type of judgment, grammaticality,
using the same stimuli from the previous two experiments in a self-paced word-by-word reading
paradigm in order to determine if this judgment might be more appropriate for use in the
syntactic processing task than either true/false or sense judgments. The results suggest that the
grammaticality judgment affects sentence reading strategies in a similar manner as the sense
judgment used in Experiment 2. That is, the use of the grammaticality judgment causes all
participants to spend longer reading sentences than they do when they are asked to make
true/false comprehension judgments. This effect is one potential explanation for the fact that the
significant effects of WMC seen in Experiment 1 did not re-appear in Experiment 3.
The lack of any significant interactions with WMC could be argued as providing support
for the dual resource view. However, such a conclusion may be premature given the variety of
stimulus characteristics noted above. For example, the fact that the grammatical error was
predictable and came before the critical area in at least some experimental sentences (e.g., Set 2)
could have altered reading strategies just as semantic anomalies seemed to in Experiment 2. Thus
the main take-way from Experiment 3 is not support for either the single or dual resource theory,
but rather a reinforcement of the argument that the type of judgment used in the syntactic
processing task has significant effects on the major dependent variables. These effects should be
fully considered when attempting to test between the theories.
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CHAPTER 6. CROSS-EXPERIMENT COMPARISONS
In addition to the analyses within experiments, we were also interested in looking for
cross-experiment differences within each of our three stimulus sets on the main dependent
variables of accuracy, judgment response time, and critical area reading time, focusing
exclusively on the experimental object-relative sentences. By looking at the same set across all
three judgment types, we can more clearly determine how differing the type of judgment in the
syntactic processing task affects the results.
6.1 Set 1 – Just and Carpenter (1992)
Accuracy.
We ran a series of one-way ANOVAs on accuracy rates for each of the four experimental
object-relative sentences. There were no significant differences in accuracy for inanimate objectrelative sentences of either type (i.e., unreduced or reduced). For animate unreduced objectrelative sentences, there was a significant effect of experiment, F (2, 93) = 4.00, p < .05.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons revealed the accuracy was significantly higher in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 1, p < .05. There was also a significant effect of experiment in the animate
reduced object-relative sentences, F (2, 93) = 5.53, p < .01. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons
showed that accuracy was significantly higher in Experiment 2 than in both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 3, p < .05. Mean accuracy rates in each experiment are displayed in Figure 6.1.1
below.

Figure 6.1.1. Judgment accuracy across Experiments for experimental object-relative sentences,
with standard error bars.
Overall accuracy rates for experimental sentences are quite high, yet we still find a
significant increase in performance on the most difficult sentences of the set (i.e., the animate
reduced) using the sense judgment in Experiment 2. We have already argued, with some support,
that placing an anomalous word in sentences changes the reading strategy and thus affects
reading times. The significant change in accuracy also suggests the sense judgment task may be
different from the true/false comprehension judgment in an important way. Importantly, this
difference seems to make the sense judgment task easier than either the true/false comprehension
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task or the grammaticality task when complexity is greatest. This suggests that the sense
judgment may not be the most appropriate one to use when assessing syntactic processing.
Judgment Response Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on judgment response times for each of the four
experimental object-relative sentences showed significant group differences for all sentence
types, Fs > 111.41, ps < .001. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that Experiment 1
judgment response times were significantly longer than those in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3,
ps < .001. Figure 6.1.2 below displays the means by experiment.

Figure 6.1.2. Judgment response times across Experiments for experimental object-relative
sentences, with standard error bars.
Longer judgment response times for the true/false judgment are not surprising, given that
the true/false comprehension judgment requires the participant to read a short statement and then
make the judgment, while the sense and grammaticality judgments require only a response.
Because of this, the comparison of judgment response times across experiments does not tell us
much of interest about the influence of judgment type on performance.
Critical Area Reading Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on critical area reading times in true/acceptable/
grammatical items for each of the four experimental object-relative sentences showed significant
group differences for all sentence types, Fs > 4.68, ps < .01. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons
showed that critical area reading times were significantly faster in Experiment 1 than in
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 for all sentence types, all ps < .05. Figure 6.1.3 below displays
the means for each sentence type by experiment.
The finding that critical area reading times increased with sense and grammaticality
judgments suggests that these types of judgment fundamentally change the nature of the
syntactic processing task. If this effect were only found in Experiment 2, one might argue that it
was strictly an artifact of placing the anomalous word in the critical area. However, the effect
persists in Experiment 3 when the grammatical error is found just after the critical area. Still, one
might argue that the effect in Experiment 3 is due to the anticipation of the error arriving just
after the critical area. However, the same effect is present both before the critical area (Fs > 5.86,
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ps < .01; Bonferroni ps < .05; see Figure 6.1.4) and after it (Fs > 6.59, ps < .01; Bonferroni ps <
.05; see Figure 6.1.5).

Figure 6.1.3. Critical area reading times by Experiment for experimental object-relative
sentences, with standard error bars.

Figure 6.1.4. Area 1 reading times by Experiment for experimental object-relative sentences,
with standard error bars.
Thus, analysis of each of the three areas of the sentence show an effect of judgment type,
such that sense and grammaticality judgments slow down reading times, even when semantic or
grammatical anomalies are not actually present in the acceptable and grammatical items. This
supports the argument that participants are engaging in a different strategy while performing the
task with instructions to look for semantic anomalies or grammatical errors than when they know
they will be asked a true/false question about the sentence.
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Figure 6.1.5. Area 3 reading times by Experiment for experimental object-relative sentences,
with standard error bars.
6.2 Set 2 – Waters and Caplan (1996b; Appendix C)
Accuracy.
Figure 6.2.1 below shows mean accuracy on each of the four experimental sentence types
by experiment for Set 2 stimuli. A series of one-way ANOVAs showed significant group
differences for each of the four experimental sentence types, Fs > 21.10, ps < .001. Bonferroni
post hoc comparisons for inanimate and animate unreduced object-relatives and inanimate
reduced object-relatives showed that accuracy was lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2
and Experiment 3, ps < .001. For animate reduced object-relatives, the reverse was true –
accuracy was higher in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, p < .001.

Figure 6.2.1. Judgment accuracy across experiments, with standard error bars.

98

These results suggest that both the sense and grammaticality manipulations reduce the
difficulty of judging Set 2 sentences, except in the most ambiguous case (i.e., animate reduced
object-relatives). This is likely due to the fact that the animate reduced object-relatives in this set
are extremely difficult and unusual and thus appear nearly nonsensical as they are, regardless of
deliberate anomalies or errors (e.g., The horse raced past the barn fell.)
Judgment Response Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on judgment response times for the four types of
experimental sentences showed significant group differences for all types, Fs > 90.49, ps < .001.
As in the previous set, Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that Experiment 1 judgment
times were significantly longer than those in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, ps < .001. Figure
6.2.2 below displays the mean judgment response times for each sentence type.

Figure 6.2.2. Judgment response times across experiments, with standard error bars.
As already discussed, the fact that judgment response times are longer in Experiment 1 is
most likely due almost entirely to the fact that participants must read a true/false item and then
make a judgment, as opposed to judging immediately when the response screen appears.
Critical Area Reading Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on critical area reading times for the four experimental
sentences types revealed significant group differences for all types, Fs > 6.82, ps < .01.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons revealed that this was due to faster critical area reading times
in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, ps < .05. Figure 6.2.3 below shows the
mean critical area reading times for each sentence type.
As with Set 1, we also looked at reading times in the pre-critical area of the sentence (the
only other area in Set 2 sentences). As can be seen in Figure 6.2.4 below, reading times in this
area also appear longer in the second and third experiments than in the first, though the
difference is only significant for inanimate and animate unreduced object-relatives, Fs > 3.51, ps
< .05, and only between Experiment 1 and 3, Bonferroni post hoc ps < .05.
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Figure 6.2.3. Critical area reading times across experiments, with standard error bars.

Figure 6.2.4. Pre-critical area reading times across experiments, with standard error bars.
Set 2 critical area reading time analyses line up with those seen in Set 1, that is that
reading times increase in sense and grammaticality judgment conditions, compared to the
true/false judgment condition. There was a smaller effect in the pre-critical area of Set 2,
however, together these reading time results still support the argument of a fundamental change
in the nature of the syntactic processing task caused by judgment type.
6.3 Set 3 – Waters and Caplan (2004)
Accuracy.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on judgment accuracy for the four experimental sentence
types in Set 3 revealed significant group differences for inanimate unreduced object-relatives, F
(2, 93) = 8.24, p < .01, and inanimate reduced object-relatives, F (2, 93) = 3.49, p < .05.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons revealed that accuracy on inanimate unreduced object-relatives
was lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, p < .01. For inanimate
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reduced object-relatives, accuracy was lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2, p < .05.
Figure 6.3.1 shows the mean accuracy for each sentence type.

Figure 6.3.1. Judgment accuracy across experiments, with standard error bars.
Judgment Response Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on judgment response times for the four experimental
sentences types revealed significant group differences for all types, Fs > 77.11, ps < .001.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that these differences were due to longer judgment
response times in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, ps < .001. Figure 6.3.2
displays the mean judgment response time for each sentence type. As with the previous sets, the
significantly longer times in Experiment 1 are not surprising, given the need for participants to
read the true/false statement before making a judgment about it.

Figure 6.3.2. Judgment response time across experiments, with standard error bars.
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Critical Area Reading Time.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on the critical area reading times for all four experimental
sentence types revealed significant group differences for all but animate unreduced objectrelatives, Fs > 3.16, ps < .05. For inanimate unreduced and animate reduced object-relatives,
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that critical area reading times were shorter in
Experiment 1 than in Experiment 3. For inanimate reduced object-relatives, Bonferroni post hoc
comparisons showed that critical area reading times were shorter in Experiment 1 than in
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Figure 6.3.3. shows the mean reading times for all types.

Figure 6.3.3. Critical area reading times across experiments, with standard error bars.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on the pre-critical area reading times showed significant
group differences for both inanimate and animate reduced object-relatives, Fs > 3.54, ps < .05.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that reading times were faster in Experiment 1 than in
Experiment 3 for both types of item, ps < .05. Means can be found in Figure 6.3.4.
A series of one-way ANOVAs on post-critical area reading times showed significant
group differences for both types of inanimate item, Fs > 4.48, ps <.01. Bonferroni post hoc
comparisons for the inanimate unreduced items showed that post-critical area reading times were
significantly faster in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 3, p < .05. For inanimate reduced items,
post-critical area reading times were faster in Experiment 1 than in both Experiment 2 and
Experiment 3, Bonferroni post hoc ps < .05. There was also a marginally significant group
difference for animate reduced items, F (2, 93) = 3.06, p = .052. Means can be found in Figure
6.3.5 below.
Set 3 reading times thus show a pattern similar to that seen in Sets 1 and 2. Reading times
throughout the sentence increase when the task is to detect a semantic anomaly or a grammatical
error as compared to when the task is to make a true/false comprehension judgment.

102

Figure 6.3.4. Pre-critical area reading times across experiments, with standard error bars.

Figure 6.3.5. Post-critical area reading times across experiments, with standard error bars.
6.4 Discussion
The pattern of accuracy results across experiments for each of the three sets suggests that
the sense and grammaticality judgments make it easier to judge complex sentences during the
syntactic processing task (except in the case of Set 2 animate reduced sentences, which are just
very confusing no matter what judgment type is used). In Set 1, accuracy increased on the
animate items, which are more ambiguous than inanimate items. In Set 2, the most difficult set,
accuracy increased on three of four sentence types. Finally, in Set 3, accuracy increased on the
inanimate items, which we argued above are the more ambiguous items in this set. This change
in task difficulty is problematic in terms of finding differences between span groups, because
only a difficult task is likely to show such effects. It also supports the argument that the task is
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fundamentally different when sense and grammaticality manipulations are used than when
true/false judgments are used.
In terms of judgment response time, our cross-experimental analyses tell us little about
the effects of judgment type, given that the there is a very logical reason for the true/false
comprehension judgment to take longer than either the sense or grammaticality judgment: the
fact that it includes the time it takes participants to read the true/false statement, not just the time
to make the judgment about it.
Finally, cross-experimental comparisons of sentence reading times, both in the critical
area and out, support the argument that the sense and grammaticality judgment task demands
produce a fundamental change in how participants read sentences because both judgment types
produce slower reading times across the entire sentence. In Experiment 1 we argued that a
rushing strategy in Set 1 sentences could be at least partially responsible for the lack of
replication of Just and Carpenter’s (1992) findings. Based upon this argument, we might expect
that the slowing caused by sense and grammaticality judgments would result in replication with
Set 1 in Experiments 2 and 3. We did not find this. We cannot entirely discount the possibility
that the low difficulty level of Set 1 sentences, confirmed by cross-set accuracy comparisons,
was sufficient in itself to continue to suppress any potential effects of WMC in these
experiments. However, it is at least possible that the sense and grammaticality judgment types
did not just slow reading, but in fact changed the very manner in which participants were
processing the sentences in the task. The question remains as to whether this effect of judgment
type would remain when the location of the anomaly or error was less predictable than it was in
the current stimuli.
In summary, the current results provide clear evidence that the relationship between the
syntactic processing task and WMC measures is different depending upon which judgment is
used. Because of this, it is important that researchers determine the nature of the effect of
judgment type on sentence reading times. If the effect is produced by a shift in processing
strategy, this strategy must be assessed to determine if it is indeed reflective of interpretive
processes, as Waters and Caplan (1996a) might argue, or if it is something else entirely. This
determination will in turn elucidate which of the judgment types ought to be used in the syntactic
processing task.
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CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the most enduring questions in linguistic research is the extent to which the
production and comprehension of a language relies upon both domain-specific and domaingeneral resources. On the generativist side of the argument are those who extrapolate backward
from linguistic data (e.g., judgments about polar interrogatives, as in Chomsky, 1968) to an
abstract, innate, and domain-specific grammar that is believed to guide not only the production
and comprehension of a native speaker, but also acquisition of a language in the first place
because the language input to which children are exposed is considered too impoverished to be
capable of allowing the child to learn the grammar from it. This account of language views the
speaker as fully competent in the abstract grammar, and thus any errors in production or
comprehension are attributed to external influences rather than to the domain-specific grammar.
On the other side of the debate are those who argue that linguistic input is constrained at
all levels of representation by probabilities and distributional dependencies that are learnable
through the use of domain-general statistical learning mechanisms. From a probabilistic
constraints perspective, syntax and other higher order linguistic rules are in fact emergent
properties of neural networks that are learning to map form to meaning in order to produce and
comprehend language rather than evidence of an innate and abstract grammar. By placing
linguistic acquisition and performance (i.e., production and comprehension) in the context of use,
the probabilistic constraints framework is able to address domain-general influences where the
generativists are not.
From these theories of what language is and how it is acquired, psycholinguists have
developed models of how syntactic processing is accomplished. Just and Carpenter (1992)
proposed the single resource theory of syntactic processing, arguing that processing of all types
of linguistic information (e.g., morphology, syntax, pragmatics, etc.) recruits the same general
verbal working memory resource, and therefore that measures of syntactic processing should be
meaningfully related to measures of verbal working memory capacity. On the basis of this
argument, they predicted that high- but not low-span participants would be able to take
advantage of an animacy cue in complex object-relative sentences. Although their predictions
were supported by their data, Waters and Caplan (1996a) disagreed with their arguments and
conclusions, proposing instead that there are two separate resources used to process linguistic
information. One resource is syntax-specific, and processes syntax obligatorily and
automatically, while the other resource is used for everything else (e.g., pragmatics). To support
these arguments, Waters and Caplan (1996b, 2004) also performed experiments in which they
measured syntactic processing and verbal working memory. The results of these studies directly
contradicted the findings of Just and Carpenter (1992), according to Waters and Caplan (1996a;
1996b; 2004).
Thus, both single and dual resource theories have empirical support, despite the fact that
they make opposing predictions that should be able to determine which of them is more accurate.
In Chapter 2 we discussed the empirical support in some detail in order to illuminate potentially
important methodological differences between studies from the two perspectives. Among these
differences are judgment type (comprehension vs. acceptability, due to Waters and Caplan’s
argument that comprehension items are offline measures), stimulus type (by phrase, garden path,
or subject-object object-relative sentences), presentation method (eye-tracking, whole sentence
presentation, listening times), and measurement of WMC (original and modified Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980, tasks, etc.). The conclusion of this review was the idea that one reason there has
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not yet been a consensus in the literature is that the two studies have been comparing apples to
oranges all along. This is because, cumulatively, all of the methodological differences between
the studies from each perspective have resulted in seemingly contradictory data that actually fit
together logically when external factors (i.e., more than just the object-relative structure type) are
taken into account.
The purpose of the current experiments was therefore to provide a first step in comparing
apples to apples by bringing together the stimuli from three representative studies (Just and
Carpenter, 1992; Waters and Caplan, 1996b, 2004) in one presentation paradigm (self-paced
word-by-word reading) in order to examine the effects of judgment type, stimulus type, and data
analysis procedures on the relationship (if any) between syntactic processing tasks and measure
of working memory capacity.
In the first experiment, we attempted to replicate the results of Just and Carpenter (1992)
using their true/false judgments on three stimulus sets created based upon their own by phrase
object-relatives, the garden path object-relatives of Waters and Caplan (1996b), and the subjectobject relatives of Waters and Caplan (2004) in a self-paced word-by-word reading paradigm.
Recall that Just and Carpenter’s (1992) critical finding was that high- but not low-span
participants could use the inanimacy of the subject of a sentence containing an object-relative
clause to process the critical by phrase more quickly. Based upon the idea of Waters and Caplan
(1996b, 2004) that all object-relatives are created equal, the overall prediction before the
experiment was run was that whatever effects were found would be found in all three sets. That
is, if single resource theory were to be supported by the presence of a three-way interaction of
complexity, animacy, and WMC, it would be supported regardless of stimulus set, while if dual
resource theory would to be supported by a lack of the same interaction, it would be lacking in
all three sets. In order to ensure the direct comparability of the stimulus sets, the animacy of Just
and Carpenter (1992) was added to the garden path (Waters and Caplan, 1996b) and subjectobject (Waters and Caplan, 2004) stimulus sentences and half of the subject-objects sentences
modeled after those of Waters and Caplan (2004) were reduced to increase their complexity.
The actual data from Experiment 1 showed several interesting results. For one thing, the
results of Just and Carpenter (1992) were not replicated with their by phrase sentences. Several
factors might explain this lack of replication. For one thing, participants subjectively reported
that the Set 1 sentences were the easiest of the three sets. Objective accuracy data backed up
these reports. Sentences for the set were created from an available list (Ferreira & Clifton, 1986)
that served as a basis for the Just and Carpenter (1992) study because that was the list available.
However, it is possible given the performance data in the current study that the Set 1 sentences in
the current study were easier than those in Just and Carpenter (1992) due to some unknown
factor, as we did not have the original materials (though this is hard to check, as Just and
Carpenter, 1992, do not report accuracy data). Another explanation for the lack of replication
with Set 1 was the participant-reported rushed button-pushing strategy, wherein participants
chose to progress as quickly as possible through sentences, especially long ones such as those in
Set 1, in order to get the entire sentence in mind before making the judgment. This strategy was
reported by both low- and high-span participants, suggesting that even if the Set 1 sentences
were difficult enough, it would still wash out any potential three-way interaction in the critical
area.
For Set 2 sentences, which were subjectively and objectively the most difficult, we did
find a two-way interaction of WMC and complexity in the critical area that Waters and Caplan
(1996b) did not. This interaction did not represent an exact replication of Just and Carpenter
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(1991), though we would argue that it is a theoretical replication. One problem was that the
critical area in these sentences also happened to be the last word, meaning that these reading
times also contain sentence wrap-up effects. Some might also argue that they could contain time
spent on post-interpretive processing. However, the latter explanation was discounted on the
basis that participants still took longer than they had in the first set to make judgments (though
not all contrasts were significant). A second potential problem was that the WMC effect found in
Just and Carpenter (1992) was reversed, such that it was the high-spans who took longer overall
in the critical areas of object-relative sentences. However, this result makes more sense in the
context of the results of MacDonald et. al. (1992). In this study, it was shown that high-spans
take longer than low-spans on garden path sentences (such as those used in Set 2). MacDonald et
al. (1992) argued that this difference reflected a processing cost for high-spans who maintained
dual interpretations of the sentence in mind until disambiguating information was provided to
indicate which interpretation was correct. Finally, the interaction in Set 2 data was between
WMC and complexity rather than WMC and animacy as it was in Just and Carpenter (1992). We
argued that this last difference was due to the nature of the garden path sentences which in turn
limited the construction of their true/false comprehension items such that questions required a
more subtle distinction of the relationship between the object and the verb of the relative clause
rather than between two nouns as in Set 1 and Set 3. This slight change in the nature of judgment
was argued to induce at least some high-span participants to alter their reading strategies so as to
discount the animacy cue, resulting in high variability in critical area reading times for animate
reduced object-relatives that may have obscured any effect of animacy. Thus, although the twoway interaction in Set 2 is not identical to that of Just and Carpenter (1992), we would argue that
it is a theoretical replication nonetheless. Importantly, this finding demonstrates that the form of
the object-relative sentences matters in terms of what results are found, something that seems to
be discounted in the Waters and Caplan’s (1996b) complexity manipulations.
Finally, in Set 3 we found the WCAREQ interaction, but it was located in the judgment
response times and in the opposite direction expected (i.e., animate subjects decreased response
times). These results suggest that it was the inanimate nouns that were more ambiguous in our
subject-object sentences, likely due the lack of animacy contrast with other nouns in the
sentence. However, because the interaction was in the judgment times rather than in the critical
areas, we cannot entirely rule out the argument that these results are due to post-interpretive
processing. On the other hand, MacDonald et al. (1992) found a significant interaction in the last
area of their sentences rather than in the critical area as they had predicted, suggesting that in at
least some structures demanding processing may be somewhat delayed. The critical area of Set 3
sentences was followed by only a short noun phrase, making it at least possible that the
interaction in the judgment response times reflects a similar sort of delay. Furthermore, the fact
that the animacy effect was found only for high-spans suggests that they were able to take the
animacy cue into account online when low-spans were not, and thus required less (potentially)
post-interpretive processing time when items were less ambiguous (i.e., animate).
Overall, the evidence from Experiment 1 is more consistent with the single resource view
than the dual resource view. However, there is evidence that post-interpretive processing does
come into play when true/false comprehension judgments are used, as Waters and Caplan
(1996a) argued. Moreover, it is clear from comparisons across sets that not all object-relative
sentences are created equal and that factors such as word order, critical area placement, and
animacy are important to consider when stimuli are developed for syntactic processing tasks.
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In Experiment 2, we attempted to replicate the findings of Waters and Caplan (1996b)
and Waters and Caplan (2004) using their sense judgment with the same three stimulus sets that
were used in Experiment 1. Once again we used the self-paced word-by-word paradigm. We also
introduced data examination methods (e.g., A', per word reading time estimations, etc.) of the
previous studies in order to more directly compare our data to theirs. Results were compatible
with those of Waters and Caplan (1996b; 2004) in that the significant interactions found in
Experiment 1 were no longer present in Experiment 2, suggesting that use of the sense judgment
was a methodological change sufficient to eradicate any relationship between the syntactic
processing task and WMC measures. However, there are reservations in arguing that these data
represent a ringing endorsement of dual resource theory. In particular, there is evidence that the
sense judgment itself is problematic in ways that were not accounted for (or at least discussed) in
the previous studies, and this is particularly true when semantic anomalies are found before
critical areas due to limitations of the sentence structures (e.g., as in sentences like “The horse
raced past the barn fell.”). Because of this, Waters and Caplan’s (1996a) argument that the sense
judgment is superior to the comprehension judgment because it is a more online measure should
be couched with the caveat that careful consideration must be applied when determining how to
go about introducing semantic anomalies into sentences in the syntactic processing task and
whether or not doing so changes participants’ sentence processing strategy in a desirable way
(i.e., to a more interpretive one).
Finally, we also conducted a third experiment to test the grammaticality judgment using
the stimuli and presentation methods from the previous two experiments. The purpose of this
was to see if the grammaticality judgment might serve as an acceptable alternative to both of the
previous judgment types, offering both a more online measure of syntactic processing (as
opposed to the comprehension judgment) and a more direct measure of syntactic knowledge (as
opposed to the semantic sense judgment). As in Experiment 2, we found no evidence of critical
three-way interactions in Experiment 3. If one accepts that the grammaticality judgment is a
good methodological choice for the syntactic processing task, then these results would seem to
support the dual resource view of syntactic processing. However, it is not clear from the data that
the grammaticality judgment was any less problematic than the sense judgment turned out to be.
This is because limitations of sentence structure led to the grammatical errors being placed
before or in the critical areas for Sets 2 and 3, making it unsurprising we did not find three-way
interactions. In Set 1, this issue was not present, but we were still left with the issue that the
items appeared to be too easy for our participants, allowing the rushed button-pressing strategy
to once again rear its head and potentially disrupt any interaction in the by phrase.
On the whole, the results of the three experiments here seem to have accomplished their
main goal. We have provided evidence that factors such as judgment type, animacy
manipulations (or lack thereof), syntactic structure type, and presentation method matter when
one is trying to measure the relationship, if any, between syntactic processing and measures of
working memory capacity. The results of Experiment 1 are more supportive of the single
resource model than the dual resource model, but this support is tentative, given the not
altogether expected forms it took (e.g., being in the judgment response times rather than the
critical area in Set 3) and the fact that it is unclear if the reading strategy employed by
participants when the task requires true/false judgments is reflective of purely interpretive
processes or if the slowed down reading strategy used when sense and grammaticality judgments
are required is.
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Future work exploring the predictions of the single and dual resource views should
certainly explore the potential effects judgment type has on strategy, as it is not clear in these
data if changes in dependent measures were due to the predictable location of the
anomaly/grammatical error, or if the sense and grammaticality tasks themselves changed the way
the participants processed items. If the changes are due to processing differences, then the
question would be which type of processing, that done for true/false judgments or that done for
sense and grammaticality judgments, is the more desirable for testing the single and dual
resource theories. Furthermore, although we have not explored this issue deeply in the current
work, we have touched on some evidence that the structure of filler sentences needs to be
considered carefully as it may contribute to any expectancies developed in the syntactic
processing task either by reinforcing things like the predictability of the location of the
anomaly/grammatical error in the experimental sentences or by providing enough variability of
structure that such predictability is impossible. It is also clear that future work should focus on
online measures, preferably first-pass reading times measured with an eye-tracker, and should
take into account things like the word order and the animacy of the subjects of complex objectrelative clauses. There is an answer to which theory of syntactic processing is more accurate, but
it cannot be found until appropriate methodologies are applied to control and/or measure the
effects of factors that have traditionally been considered extraneous to the issue of syntactic
structure.
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APPENDIX B: SET 1 STIMULUS SENTENCES
Sentence Type
Each base sentence below can be unpacked into 4 versions by choosing either the animate or
inanimate subject (in purple) and by choosing the unreduced (that was in brackets) or reduced
(omitting that was) forms. The critical reading area is also highlighted using bold underlined
yellow text. Ignoring for the moment the red (Experiment 2) and green (Experiment 3) text, base
sentences can thus be unpacked as follows:
The doctor/medication [that was] asked for by the patient/toad effectively treat(ed) the illness.
V1: The doctor that was asked for by the patient effectively treated the illness.
V2: The doctor asked for by the patient effectively treated the illness.
V3: The medication that was asked for by the patient effectively treated the illness.
V4: The medication asked for by the patient effectively treated the illness.
Judgment Type
In Experiment 1, each sentence was followed by a short statement that could either be true or
false of the experimental sentence.
Exp 1 True Item example: The patient asked for the doctor/medication. True or False?
Exp 1 False Item example: The doctor/medication asked for the patient. True or False?
In Experiment 2 Unacceptable base sentences were modified to contain a word that did not make
sense in the context of the rest of the sentence and were followed by the question “Makes Sense?
Yes or No.”
Exp 2 example: The medication asked for by the toad effectively treated the illness.
In Experiment 3 Agrammatical base sentences were modified to have an error of verb tense or
agreement and were followed by the question “Grammatical? Yes or No.”
Exp 3 example: The medication asked for by the patient effectively treat(ed) the illness.
True/Acceptable/Grammatical Base Sentences
The defendant/evidence [that was] examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.
The visitor/ship [that was] sighted by the lookout probably brought bad news.
The child/letter [that was] left at the store told a disturbing tale.
The owner/bill [that was] paid by the tenant had been owed for weeks.
The singer/song [that was] listened to by the audience was very beautiful.
The man/car [that was] reported by mall security had run over a traffic cone.
The woman/sign [that was] painted by the artist was very attractive to look at.
The child/trash [that was] sniffed by the dog was sitting on the curb.
The player/name [that was] dropped by the team had long offended many people.
The worker/laundry [that was] sprayed by the hose took a long time to dry out.
The woman/trees [that was/were] expected by the gardeners did not arrive on time.
The model/dress [that was] promoted by the designer was included in the fashion show.
The man/ATM [that was] robbed by the thieves actually had very little cash.
The hiker/compass [that was] found by the gamekeeper had been lost for weeks.
The guest/gift [that was] delivered by the chauffer delighted the host and hostess.
The author/book [that was] read by the student was very hard to understand.
The player/ball [that was] hit by the bat fell swiftly to the ground.
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The witness/report [that was] dismissed by the judge contradicted the established facts.
The artist/painting [that was] admired by the curator caused an uproar at the auction.
The diver/boat [that was] rescued by the Coast Guard arrived in port.
False/Unacceptable/Agrammatical Items
The doctor/medication [that was] asked for by the patient/toad effectively treat(ed) the illness.
The volunteer/donation [that was] accepted by the charity/waterfall help(ed) at-risk youths.
The tourist/rock [that was] observed by the geologist/skate did/do not belong in the canyon.
The chef/apple [that was] cut by the knife/balloon was/were covered in sticky caramel.
The man/meal [that was] brought by the nurse/loofah was/were not very appealing.
The spokesperson/policy [that was] voted for by the managers/desks were greatly
increase(ed/ing) sales.
The executive/deal [that was] exposed by the whistleblower/moat brought/bring down the
company.
The traveler/fruit [that was] inspected by Customs/banana was/were not allowed into the
country.
The villager/shipment [that was] seized by the military/tissue was/were not involved in the
rebellion.
The suspect/statement [that was] released by the police/porcupine frighten(ed) many of the
citizens.
The children/packages [that were] collected by the social worker/brick had/has been handled
harshly.
The parasailer/umbrella [that was] carried by the strong wind/lid finally land(ed) on the
beach.
The wife/house [that was] cared for by the mother-in-law/dogwood steadily improve(d) in
appearance.
The gunman/command [that was] executed by the soldier/toothpick cause(d) several civilian
fatalities.
The reporter/message [that was] recorded by the tape recorder/coconut could not be/being
understood.
The official/program [that was] rewarded by the state/skunk had/have high status in the
community.
The farmers/towns [that was/were] connected by the new road/sponge quickly
became/becomes quite friendly.
The philanthropist/project [that was] funded by the foundation/chandelier made/make
vaccines widely available.
The pedestrian/concert [that was] followed by the mime/potato were amus(ed/ing) the
gathered spectators.
The customer/merchandise [that was]monitored by the security guards/t-shirts disappear(ed)
without a trace.
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APPENDIX C: SET 2 STIMULUS SENTENCES
Sentence Type
Each base sentence below can be unpacked into 4 versions by choosing either the animate or
inanimate subject (in purple) and by choosing the unreduced (that was in brackets) or reduced
(omitting that was) forms. The critical reading area is also highlighted using bold underlined
yellow text. Ignoring for the moment the red (Experiment 2) and green (Experiment 3) text, base
sentences can thus be unpacked as follows:
The mechanic/branch [that was] bent over the engine/knee/stadium collapse(d)/crack(ed).
V1: The mechanic that was bent over the engine collapsed.
V2: The mechanic bent over the engine collapsed.
V3: The branch that was bent over the knee cracked.
V4: The branch bent over the knee cracked.
Judgment Type
In Experiment 1, each sentence was followed by a short statement that could either be true or
false of the experimental sentence.
Exp 1 True Item example: The branch was bent over the knee. True or False?
Exp 1 False Item example: The branch did bend over the knee. True or False?
In Experiment 2 Unacceptable base sentences were modified to contain a word that did not make
sense in the context of the rest of the sentence and were followed by the question “Makes Sense?
Yes or No.”
Exp 2 example: The branch bent over the stadium cracked.
In Experiment 3 Agrammatical base sentences were modified to have an error of verb tense and
were followed by the question “Grammatical? Yes or No.”
Exp 3 example: The branch bent over the knee crack(ed).
True/Grammatical/Acceptable Items
The staff/pudding [that was] served in the cafeteria ate/spoiled.
The reporter/crime [that was]exposed in the newspaper retired/shocked.
The man/ticket [that was] expected to win the raffle lost.
The coach/drink [that was] tested for illegal drugs fled/spilled.
The baby/toy [that was] grabbed with both hands squealed/squeaked.
The contestant/garden [that was] registered for the competition won.
The man/suitcase [that was] searched for the hidden valuables vanished.
The boy/field [that was] measured with a yard stick laughed/flourished.
The athlete/weight [that was] lifted during the competition waved/cracked.
The model/mannequin [that was] posed under the lights sweated/melted.
The resident/café [that was] evacuated during the storm returned/reopened.
The friend/question [that was] answered in the letter visited/rankled.
The spectators/clock [that were/was] watched during the game cheered/stopped.
The fireman/fire [that was] hosed down with water yelled/smoldered.
The patient/plane [that was] recovered on the island lived/rusted.
The camper/tree [that was] chopped with the ax bled/split.
The officer/detail [that was] discovered during the investigation cooperated/helped.
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The candidate/bill [that was] debated on television campaigned/passed.
The nurse/bed [that was] disinfected with the alcohol stank.
The bystander/problem [that was] noticed during the contest left/resolved.
EXTRA ANIMATE REDUCED OBJECT-RELATIVES
The horse raced past the barn fell.
The knight trained in the tent collapsed.
The doctor prescribed the medication healed.
The seamstress measured for the dress twirled.
The terrorist attacked in the market exploded.
False/Agrammatical/Unacceptable Items
The mechanic/branch [that was] bent over the engine/knee/stadium collapse(d)/crack(ed).
The retailer/ring [that was] advertised in the magazine/pineapple default(ed)/tarnish(ed).
The prisoner/banner [that was] paraded down the street/outlet stumble(d)/rip(ped).
The surfer/hair [that was] rinsed in hot water/bacon dried/dry.
The trucker/produce [that was] headed to the warehouse/omelet crash(ed)/spoil(ed).
The acrobat/saucer [that was] balanced on the ledge/feather wobble(d).
The golfer/secret [that was] admitted to the club/salmon play(ed)/were spreading.
The assistant/news [that was] shared with the partner/teapot were quitting/surprise(d).
The brother/orchard [that was] visited on the holiday/nickel smile(d)/bloom(ed).
The passengers/laundry [that were/was] piled in the car/basket/ear laugh(ed)/mildew(ed).
The teacher/assignment [that was] corrected in class/chocolate blush(ed)/count(ed).
The dancer/file [that was] copied in the studio/office/glove taught/teach/vanish(ed).
The vendor/shipment [that was] guaranteed punctual delivery/curling move(d)/arrive(d).
The pilot/crops [that was/were] dusted with the fertilizer/artichoke shower(ed)/grew(grows).
The surgeon/bread [that was] sliced with the knife/pillow faint(ed)/steam(ed).
The shoplifter/computer [that was] returned to the store/cake confess(ed)/overheat(ed).
The passenger/package [that was] hurried to the airport/spinach complain(ed)./ship(ped).
The spy/compound [that was] surveilled from the van/bulb grimace(d)/bustle(d).
The protestors/clothes [that were/was] agitated in the streets/washer/burrow
fought/fights/twist(ed).
The trainer/resources [that was/were] recruited for the project/paperclip
accept(d)/materialize(d).
EXTRA ANIMATE REDUCED OBJECT-RELATIVES
The boyfriend wooed with flowers smell(ed).
The psychiatrist counseled at the new practice recover(ed).
The victim reported to the police lie(d).
The bartender served the drinks spill(ed).
The sniper killed with the rifle decay(ed).
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APPENDIX D: SET 3 STIMULUS SENTENCES
Sentence Type
Each base sentence below can be unpacked into 4 versions by choosing either the animate or
inanimate subject (in purple) and by choosing the unreduced (that was in brackets) or reduced
(omitting that was) forms. The critical reading area is also highlighted using bold underlined
yellow text. Ignoring for the moment the red (Experiment 2) and green (Experiment 3) text, base
sentences can thus be unpacked as follows:
The towel [that] the housekeeper/bleach ruined dried/dry the spill/lake.
V1: The towel that the housekeeper ruined dried the spill.
V2: The towel the housekeeper ruined dried the spill.
V3: The towel that the bleach ruined dried the spill.
V4: The towel the bleach ruined dried the spill.
Judgment Type
In Experiment 1, each sentence was followed by a short statement that could either be true or
false of the experimental sentence.
Exp 1 True Item example: The bleach ruined the towel. True or False?
Exp 1 False Item example: The towel ruined the bleach. True or False?
In Experiment 2 Unacceptable base sentences were modified to contain a word that did not make
sense in the context of the rest of the sentence and were followed by the question “Makes Sense?
Yes or No.”
Exp 2 example: The towel the bleach ruined dried the lake.
In Experiment 3 Agrammatical base sentences were modified to have an error of verb tense and
were followed by the question “Grammatical? Yes or No.”
Exp 3 example: The towel the bleach ruined dry the spill.
True/Grammatical/Acceptable Items
The car [that] the mechanic/trailer transported passed the inspection.
The law [that] the millionaire/courts favored frustrated the workers.
The picture [that] the illustrator/advertisement included depicted the product.
The tree [that] the activist/ordinance protected sheltered the squirrel.
The fort [that] the soldiers/cannons assaulted stored the ammunition.
The boat [that] the captain/barge towed won the race.
The computer [that] the scientists/experiment used recorded the data.
The article [that] the editor/magazine published satisfied the author.
The door [that] the worker/wind closed connected the bedrooms.
The song [that] the musician/radio played delighted the patrons.
The luggage [that] the tourist/airline lost contained the souvenir.
The curtain [that] the decorator/rod held filtered the light.
The table [that] the woman/cloth covered held the vase.
The waste [that] the man/truck hauled polluted the landfill.
The painting [that] the delinquent/graffiti ruined depicted the president.
The statue [that] the auctioneer/store sold pleased the collector.
The rug [that] the child/ink stained covered the floor.
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The yard [that] the police/fence surrounded contained toxic materials.
The museum [that] the foreman/earthquake demolished held the artefacts.
The screw [that] the contractor/drill removed connected the pieces.
False/Agrammatical/Unacceptable Items
The towel [that] the housekeeper/bleach ruined dried/dry the spill/lake.
The lock [that] the thief/key opened secure(d) the safe/tangerine.
The ball [that] the player/racquet hit flew/fly over the fence/Pacific.
The boulder [that] the man/ice cracked block(ed) the road/pencil.
The pan [that] the chef/burner heated contain(ed) the pasta/farm.
The fire [that] the arsonist/match ignited burn(ed) the forest/rain.
The dirt [that] the maid/filter missed clog(ged) the drain/corn.
The ribbon [that] the crafter/scissors cut decorate(d) the box/pothole.
The report [that] the manager/county filed influence(d) the decision/camel.
The novel [that] the librarian/café provided inspire(d) the student/ratio.
The lens [that] the photographer/telescope required magnif(ied) the view/dignity.
The purchase [that] the mayor/budget allowed benefit(ed) the community/trampoline.
The treatment [that] the therapist/manual recommend cure(d) the patient/pebble.
The button [that] the soldier/lever touched launch(ed) the missile/Band-Aid.
The glass [that] the bully/rock shattered endanger(ed) the child/skateboard.
The document [that] the employee/machine copied shock(ed) the public/cassette.
The correspondence [that] the spy/server saved implicate(d) the CEO/cookie.
The water [that] the prankster/hose sprayed soak(ed) the furniture/river.
The butter [that] the girl/microwave melted flavor(ed). the popcorn/mirror.
The product [that] the actress/commercial promoted dominate(d) the market/turtle.

121

VITA
Rebecca A. Horn grew up in southern Wisconsin. She spent her junior year of high
school studying abroad before graduating in 1999. After graduation she attended classes at the
University of Wisconsin Rock County for two years. In the spring of 2004 she began work on
her B.A. in Psychology with a minor in Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin Whitewater
and graduated summa cum laude in December of 2005. She earned her M.S. in Experimental
Psychology from the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh in 2009 and her Ph.D. in
Cognitive/Developmental Psychology from Louisiana State University in 2015. For professional
purposes (i.e., conference presentations and paper submissions), she has also been known as
Rebecca Hammarlund since 2009.

122

